Bioethics emerged at a time when infectious diseases were not a major concern. Thus bioethics never had to develop a normative framework sensitive to situations of disease transmission. The Patient as Victim and Vector explores how traditional and new issues in clinical medicine, research, public health, and health policy might look different in infectious disease were treated as central. The authors argue that both practice and policy must recognize that a patient with a communicable infectious disease is not only a victim of that disease, but also a potential vector- someone who may transmit an illness that will sicken or kill others. Bioethics has failed to see one part of this duality, they document, and public health the other: that the patient is both victim and vector at one and the same time. The Patient as Victim and Vector is jointly written by four authors at the University of Utah with expertise in bioethics, health law, and both clinical practice and public health policy concerning infectious disease. Part I shows how the patient-centered ethic that was developed by bioethics- especially the concept of autonomy- needs to change in the context of public health, and Part II develops a normative theory for doing so. Part III examines traditional and new issues involving infectious disease: the ethics of quarantine and isolation, research, disease screening, rapid testing, antibiotic use, and immunization, in contexts like multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, syphilis, hepatitis, HIV/AIDS, and HPV. Part IV, beginning with a controversial thought experiment, considers constraint in the control of infectious disease, include pandemics, and Part V 'thinks big' about the global scope of infectious disease and efforts to prevent, treat, or eradicate it. This volume should have a major impact in the fields of bioethics and public health ethics. It will also interest philosophers, lawyers, health law experts, physicians, and policy makers, as well as those concerned with global health.
This book presents a comprehensive theory of the ethics and political philosophy of public health surveillance based on reciprocal obligations among surveillers, those under surveillance, and others potentially affected by surveillance practices. Public health surveillance aims to identify emerging health trends, population health trends, treatment efficacy, and methods of health promotion--all apparently laudatory goals. Nonetheless, as with anti-terrorism surveillance, public health surveillance raises complex questions about privacy, political liberty, and justice both of and in data use. Individuals and groups can be chilled in their personal lives, stigmatized or threatened, and used for the benefit of others when health information is wrongfully collected or used. Transparency and openness about data use, public involvement in decisions, and just distribution of the benefits of surveillance are core elements in the justification of surveillance practices. Understanding health surveillance practices, the concerns it raises, and how to respond to them is critical not only to ethical and trustworthy but also to publicly acceptable and ultimately sustainable surveillance practices. The book is of interest to scholars and practitioners of the ethics and politics of public health, bioethics, privacy and data technology, and health policy. These issues are ever more pressing in pandemic times, where misinformation can travel quickly and suspicions about disease spread, treatment efficacy, and vaccine safety can have devastating public health effects.
We live more and more of our lives online; we rely on the internet as we work, correspond with friends and loved ones, and go through a multitude of mundane activities like paying bills, streaming videos, reading the news, and listening to music. Without thinking twice, we operate with the understanding that the data that traces these activities will not be abused now or in the future. There is an abstract idea of privacy that we invoke, and, concrete rules about our privacy that we can point to if we are pressed. Nonetheless, too often we are uneasily reminded that our privacy is not invulnerable-the data tracks we leave through our health information, the internet and social media, financial and credit information, personal relationships, and public lives make us continuously prey to identity theft, hacking, and even government surveillance. A great deal is at stake for individuals, groups, and societies if privacy is misunderstood, misdirected, or misused. Popular understanding of privacy doesn't match the heat the concept generates. With a host of cultural differences as to how privacy is understood globally and in different religions, and with ceaseless technological advancements, it is an increasingly complex topic. In this clear and accessible book, Leslie and John G. Francis guide us to an understanding of what privacy can mean and why it is so important. Drawing upon their extensive joint expertise in law, philosophy, political science, regulatory policy, and bioethics, they parse the consequences of the forfeiture, however great or small, of one's privacy.
States of Health identifies the practical relevance of federalism in the United States to people facing ethical decisions about health and health care, and it considers the theoretical justifications for permissible differences among states. It asks whether authority over important aspects of health is misaligned in the United States today, with some matters problematically left to the states while others are taken over by the federal government.
The two volumes of Death, Dying, and the Ending of Life present the core of recent philosophical work on end-of-life issues. Volume I examines issues in death and consent: the nature of death, brain death and the uses of the dead and decision-making at the end of life, including the use of advance directives and decision-making about the continuation, discontinuation, or futility of treatment for competent and incompetent patients and children. Volume II, on justice and hastening death, examines whether there is a difference between killing and letting die, issues about physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia and questions about distributive justice and decisions about life and death.
It's my land, I can do whatever I want with it. This is our neighborhood (or city, or park), and we should be the ones deciding how it's used. These are two strongly held - and diametrically opposed - views of appropriate land use. As John G. and Leslie Pickering Francis demonstrate, the debate about what to do with land is messy, complex, and often based on dangerously misguided principles. Raising the question of what rights owners - community, as well as individual - in fact have, the Francises argue that land stewardship transcends narrow spatial definitions. Their analysis of the discourse about property ownership offers a sophisticated, much-needed approach to land-use policy.
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