Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia s success. (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian emerging markets . Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst crony capitalism . Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely a few small glitches in the road . Moody s and Standard and Poor s had upgraded the Philippines long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand s situation to Mexico s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997: Thailand s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany . The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis; they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in Foreign Affairs was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation [...]
The collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001, involving the extraordinary default on $150 billion in debt, has been blamed variously on the failure of neoliberal policies or on the failure of the Argentine government to pursue those policies vigorously enough during the 1990s. But this is too myopic a view, Klaus Veigel contends, to provide a fully satisfactory explanation of how a country enjoying one of the highest standards of living at the end of the nineteenth century became a virtual economic basket case by the end of the twentieth. Veigel asks us to take the long view of Argentina&’s efforts to re-create the conditions for stability and consensus that had brought such great success during the country&’s first experience with globalization a century ago. The experience of war and depression in the late 1930s and early 1940s had discredited the earlier reliance on economic liberalism. In its place came a turn toward a corporatist system of interest representation and state-led, inward-oriented economic policies. But as major changes in the world economy heralded a new era of globalization in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the corporatist system broke down, and no social class or economic interest group was strong enough to create a new social consensus with respect to Argentina&’s economic order and role in the world economy. The result was political paralysis leading to economic stagnation as both civilian and military governments oscillated between protectionism and liberalization in their economic policies, which finally brought the country to its nadir in 2001.
Investigates the decline of the corporatist and inward-oriented postwar model of development during the 1970s and 1980s and the emergence of a new paradigm driven by the desire to participate in the process of globalization. Uses Argentina as a case study"--Provided by publisher.
Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia s success. (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian emerging markets . Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst crony capitalism . Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely a few small glitches in the road . Moody s and Standard and Poor s had upgraded the Philippines long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand s situation to Mexico s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997: Thailand s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany . The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis; they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in Foreign Affairs was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation [...]
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