Author of the acclaimed work Iceberg Risk: An Adventure in Portfolio Theory, Kent Osband argues that uncertainty is central rather than marginal to finance. Markets don't trade mainly on changes in risk. They trade on changes in beliefs about risk, and in the process, markets unite, stretch, and occasionally defy beliefs. Recognizing this truth would make a world of difference in investing. Belittling uncertainty has created a rift between financial theory and practice and within finance theory itself, misguiding regulation and stoking huge financial imbalances. Sparking a revolution in the mindset of the investment professional, Osband recasts the market as a learning machine rather than a knowledge machine. The market continually errs, corrects itself, and makes new errors. Respecting that process, without idolizing it, will promote wiser investment, trading, and regulation. With uncertainty embedded at its core, Osband's rational approach points to a finance theory worthy of twenty-first-century investing.
In several recent articles, the Barro-Grossman model of general equilibrium under shortage has been modified to incorporate money demand and alternative retail sales mechanisms. This paper extends this work to allow for spillovers in deficit goods markets (modeled as feedback of black market prices on the real value of nominal money balances). Comparative statics analysis confirms the conventional view, recently challenged in the literature, that government expenditure in a shortage economy tends to reduce output. The conventional view associating shortage with higher savings is, however, substantially qualified. The model appears to be more consistent than previous models with the available empirical evidence, and offers insights into the consequences of price and monetary reform in shortage economies.
When a formerly centrally-planned economy frees prices and allows or compels producers to respond to market signals, conventional measures tend to severely overstate short–run output decline and inflation. In part the overstatement stems from neglect of private sector activity, or from belated recognition of inflation previously disguised as quality improvements. Even when individual prices and outputs are correctly measured, however, shifts in relative prices consequent to price decontrol create a serious aggregation problem. Moreover, the standard indices ignore the deflationary trends in black markets. Superior growth and inflation indices are devised using a combination of official and black market prices.
It is not unusual for reforming socialist economies to relax wage controls without hardening budget constraints on enterprises or freeing consumer goods prices. This policy can be dangerously destabilizing. While higher wages permit workers to purchase more of some goods, they also tend to exacerbate shortages and to breed waste and corruption. Beyond a certain level, economy-wide wage hikes will worsen worker welfare. This is true regardless of whether deficit goods are strictly rationed, are sold randomly at official prices to queuing workers, or are offered to workers by “insiders” only at black market prices. However, the form of allocation does influence output and worker welfare.
It is widely feared that, once prices are decontrolled in the formerly centrally–planned economies, households’ release of previously accumulated money will trigger a hyperinflation. This paper finds, instead, that whether a country’s fiscal, monetary, and labor market policies are destabilizing typically does not depend on the money stock. However, the release of a monetary overhang can precipitate a large initial real wage shock. To the extent such a shock is not feasible politically, there is a motive for monetary reform, which must be weighed against the cost of reduced public confidence in money.
Energy exports, which are already the primary source of Soviet convertible currency earnings and an important contributor to the budget, could bring in much more revenue if the Soviet Union were to reduce its extremely high levels of energy consumption. To encourage this process, energy prices need to be raised substantially. Under plausible assumptions, it is shown that an increase in prices could yield sizable foreign exchange earnings. Large increases in energy prices could, however, threaten the solvency of industrial enterprises, precipitate major economic and social dislocation, and severely strain interrepublican economic relationships.
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