Kenneth Joseph Arrow's Books

The literature on the theory of social choice has grown considerably beyond the few items in existence at the time the first edition of this book appeared in 1951. Some of the new literature has dealt with the technical, mathematical aspects, more with the interpretive. My own thinking has also evolved somewhat, although I remain far from satisfied with present formulations. The exhaustion of the first edition provides a convenient time for a selective and personal stocktaking in the form of an appended commentary entitled, 'Notes on the Theory of Social Choice, 1963, ' containing reflections on the text and its omissions and on some of the more recent literature. This form has seemed more appropriate than a revision of the original text, which has to some extent acquired a life of its own.

The first of three volumes of essays in honour of the distinguished economic theorist Professor Kenneth J. Arrow.

The tension between what we wish for and what we can get, between values and opportunities, exists even at the purely individual level. A hermit on a mountain may value warm clothing and yet be hard-pressed to make it from the leaves, bark, or skins he can find. But when many people are competing with each other for satisfaction of their wants, learning how to exploit what is available becomes more difficult. In this volume, Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow analyzes why - and how - human beings organize their common lives to overcome the basic economic problem: the allocation of scarce resources. The price system is one means of organizing society to mediate competition, and Arrow analyzes its successes and failures. Alternative modes of achieving efficient allocation of resources are explored: government, the internal organization of the firm, and the 'invisible institutions' of ethical and moral principles. Professor Arrow shows how these systems create channels to make decisions, and discusses the costs of information acquisition and retrieval. He investigates the factors determining which potential decision variables are recognized as such. Finally, he argues that organizations must achieve some balance between the power of the decision makers and their obligation to those who carry out their decisions - between authority and responsibility.

The publication of Arrow's collected papers will be welcomed by economists and other social scientists and in particular by graduate students, who can draw from them the knowledge and the discernment in selection of scientific problems that only a master can offer. The author has added headnotes to certain well-known papers, describing his process.

The third in a series of volumes published in honour of Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, each covering a different area of economic theory.

Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

Leading theorists offer insights on the role of uncertainty and information in the market.

Arrow takes up the basic question of whether collective choices can reflect individual preferences. The seminal 1950 paper that opens the volume shows that given reasonable conditions that social choices must satisfy to reflect individual preferences, it is impossible to make a choice among alternatives without violating some of the conditions.

This second volume of economic theory is divided into sections on general equilibrium and on the microfoundations of macroeconomics.

Unlike the papers of some other great economists, those of Kenneth Arrow are being read and studied today with even greater care and attention than when they first appeared in the journals. The publication of his collected papers will therefore be welcomed by economists and other social scientists and in particular by graduate students, who can draw from them the deep knowledge and the discernment in selection of scientific problems that only a master can offer. The author has added headnotes to certain well-known papers, describing how he came to write them. The study of production is central to economic theory, and capital and its accumulation are two of the most interesting aspects of the modern production process. Capital may take the form of inventories of inputs, inventories of outputs, or machines and other fixed goods. The essential and unique aspect of all types of capital is that it must be accumulated as the result of prior stages of the production process. This gives the dynamic theory of production a recursive structure that can be exploited by economic analysis. The optimization of production under recursive conditions lends itself to general mathematical methods of dynamic programming and optimal control theory. This is the main theme of the essays included in this fifth volume of Kenneth Arrow's Collected Papers.

This is a collection of theoretical papers, including contributions by Partha Dasgupta and three Nobel prize-winning economists: Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Joseph Stiglitz. Originally published in 1982.

Discusses oil imports, medical welfare, health insurance, urban economic development, job discrimination, environmental preservation, interindustry flow analysis, social responsibility, and economic efficiency.

The third volume of Arrow's Collected Papers concerns the basic concept of rationality as it applies to an economic decision maker. In particular, it addresses the problem of choice faced by consumers in a multicommodity world and presents specific models of choice useful in economic analysis. It also discusses choice models under uncertainty.

Book's by Kenneth Joseph Arrow

Social Choice and Individual Values

Social Choice and Individual Values

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 1, Social Choice and Public Decision Making

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 1, Social Choice and Public Decision Making

The Limits of Organization

The Limits of Organization

General Equilibrium

General Equilibrium

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 3, Uncertainty, Information, and Communication

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 3, Uncertainty, Information, and Communication

The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

Markets, Information and Uncertainty

Markets, Information and Uncertainty

Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow: Social choice and justice

Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow: Social choice and justice

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 2, Equilibrium Analysis

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 2, Equilibrium Analysis

Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow: Social choice and justice

Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow: Social choice and justice

Production and Capital

Production and Capital

Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy

Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy

General Equilibrium

General Equilibrium

Applied Economics

Applied Economics

Individual Choice Under Certainty and Uncertainty

Individual Choice Under Certainty and Uncertainty

Applied Economics

Applied Economics

Username

Password

Username

Password

Password again

Birthday

Email