Animal Cell Culture nimal cell culture began in 1912 when Alexis Carrel grew bits of chick heart A in vitro by placing them into a drop of horse plasma. When the plasma clotted, it formed a solid surface into which the heart cells explanted. Left unattended, these cells died within several days. By regularly feeding the grow ing cells with aqueous extracts of whole chick embryos and periodically sub dividing them, Carrel was able to maintain the cells for extended periods. From these initial experiments, cell culture has expanded into an important component of biological research and commercial production. Animal cell culture is an important tool for the study of complex biologi cal systems. In vivo it is often impossible to target a treatment to one specific cell type or to adequately control the environment. For example, it is impos sible to selectively depolarize endothelial cells in vivo to determine the role of transmembrane potential in the transduction of fluid mechanical forces generated by blood flow to a biochemical response. Depolarizing all of the cells within the vascular system by injecting potassium chloride into the animal's bloodstream clearly is not an option, as it will lead to cardiac arrest.
This book gives a clear chronological account of the campaigns on the Western and Eastern Fronts and then moves on to investigate areas that many studies ignore - the war poets, the diplomacy of war-aims and peace moves, logistics, and 'the experience of the war'.
Based on a wide range of primary sources, this book shows the way in which diplomacy, economics, finance and strategy became intertwined during the First World War. The author examines the diplomatic, economic, financial and military relations between Britain and Russia and argues that the key to understanding the alliance is the British determination to win the war and the role Russia played in achieving this aim. British strategy is shown to be more the result of her relations with her allies, especially during the first years of the war, than a quarrel between East and West. This revision of the accepted interpretation of the strategy leads to a reassessment of the views of Lloyd George, Kitchener and Grey. The author concludes that in 1917 the British interest in Russia remained as it was earlier in the war: the maintenance of a powerful ally on the eastern front.
In his groundbreaking book The British Way in Warfare (Routledge, 1990), David French outlined the skillful combination of maritime, economic and diplomatic power employed by Britain to achieve its international goals. Almost two decades later, this collection offers a reassessment of French's thesis, using it as a lens through which to explore Britain's relationship with various kinds of power (military and civil) and how this was employed across the globe. In particular, each essay addresses the ways in which the use of power manifested itself in the maintenance of Britain's place within the international system between 1856 and 1956. Adopting twin methodologies, the collection firstly addresses the broad question of Britain's relationship with other Great Powers and how these influenced the strategies used, before then testing these with specific case studies. By taking this approach, it is possible to discern which policies were successful and which failed, and whether these remained constant across time and space. Measuring Britain's strategy against her commercial, imperial, and military competitors (including France, the USA, Italy, Germany, and Russia) allows intriguing conclusions to be drawn about just how an essentially maritime power could compete with much larger - and potentially more powerful - continental rivals. With contributions from an outstanding selection of military scholars, this collection addresses fundamental questions about the intersection of military, economic and diplomatic history, that are as relevant today as they were during the height of Britain's imperial power. It will prove essential reading, not only for those with an interest in British military history, but for anyone wishing to understand how power - in all its multifaceted guises - can be employed for national advantage on the international stage.
The idea of a Channel Tunnel has always aroused strong emotions in Britain. It has been supported by those wanting closer political, economic and cultural links with Europe but opposed by believers in Britain's island identity and overseas empire. In contrast, the French have been almost unanimously in favour. Channel Tunnel Vision 1850-1950 is an account of attempts over a century to build a link with France. Early schemes, some owing more to Heath-Robinson than to sound engineering practice, were succeeded by serious proposals based on scientific surveys of the sea-bed carried out in the 1860s. After describing the major entrepreneurs and their plans, Keith Wilson goes on to show the reactions of successive British Governments. On several occasions the decision on whether or not to go ahead was a very close-run thing. He quotes the views, which make remarkable reading, of Prime Ministers from Gladstone to Ramsay MacDonald; of Foreign Secretaries including Grey and Curzon; and of admirals and generals ranging from Fisher to Wolseley, French and Henry Wilson. Their fears of sabotage, invasion and a future political rift with France were set against hopes of economic advantage. They also saw an enhanced ability to respond quickly to future German aggression. How the existence of a Channel Tunnel would have affected the 1940 campaign is an intriguing speculation.
Sir Francis Bertie (from 1915 Lord Bertie of Thame) was a senior British diplomat of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras. He is perhaps best known for the thirteen years between 1905 and 1918 during which time he was Britain's ambassador in Paris, and it is with this period of his life that Dr Hamilton is mainly concerned. The book thus examines his contribution to the evolution and maintenance of the entente cordiale, the nature of his 'anti-Germanism', his influence upon Sir Edward Grey and other British statesmen, and the eclipse of professional diplomacy during the first world war. Above all it is a study of a man whom another British diplomat was later to describe as 'the very last of the great ambassadors'.
How and why did Britain become involved in the First World War? Taking into account the scholarship of the last twenty-five years, this second edition of Zara S. Steiner's classic study, thoroughly revised with Keith Neilson, explores a subject which is as highly contentious as ever. While retaining the basic argument that Britain went to war in 1914 not as a result of internal pressures but as a response to external events, Steiner and Neilson reject recent arguments that Britain became involved because of fears of an 'invented' German menace, or to defend her Empire. Instead, placing greater emphasis than before on the role of Russia, the authors convincingly argue that Britain entered the war in order to preserve the European balance of power and the nation's favourable position within it. Lucid and comprehensive, Britain and the Origins of the First World War brings together the bureaucratic, diplomatic, economic, strategical and ideological factors that led to Britain's entry into the Great War, and remains the most complete survey of the pre-war situation.
The Boer War of 1899-1902 was an epic of heroism and bungling, cunning and barbarism, with an extraordinary cast of characters - including Churchill, Rhodes, Conan Doyle, Smuts, Kipling, Gandhi, Kruger and Kitchener. The war revealed the ineptitude of the British military and unexpectedly exposed the corrupt underside of imperialism in the establishment of the first concentration camps, the shooting of Boer prisoners-of-war and the embezzlement of military supplies by British officers. This acclaimed book provides a complete history of the Boer War - from the first signs of unrest to the eventual peace. In the process, it debunks several of the myths which have grown up around the conflict and explores the deadly legacy it left for southern Africa.
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