The aim of this study is to fill a significant gap in the existing literature on the role of non-state actors, ranging from rebels and criminal gangs at one extreme to the corporate security industry at the other. As part of the general privatisation of the security sector in the western world, combined with the US-led war on terror, non-state actors have increasingly been tied to the foreign policy priorities of the dominant western military powers. Iraq and Afghanistan are the examples often used, and are well-described in other chapters in this book. In sub-Saharan Africa, as in many fragile states around the world, this picture is blurred, and it is often difficult to make clear distinctions between public and private, or between illegal and legal etc., (non)-state actors.
According to much of the academic literature, the nature of war changed dramatically in the last part of the twentieth century, especially after the end of the Cold War. According to this logic there is a dichotomy between war as a social phenomenon and warfare as the domain of the state, as envisaged by the late Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in the shape of the “Trinitarian War”. The lack of capacity on the part of predominately Third World states to control conflicts has led to low-intensity conflicts (LIC), which can be witnessed, for instance, in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia and Sri Lanka. Since the end of the Cold War it has been common for weak state rulers with formal state legitimacy but not empirical legitimacy to have continued to enjoy international recognition because of international fears that they are the only barrier against a total collapse. Amongst other things this paved the way for an expansion of the market for private military and security companies (PMSC) such as the South African-based Executive Outcomes (EO) in the 1990s. However, the lack of state capacity led to a sub-contracting, willingly or unwillingly, of the state’s monopoly on the use of force to non-state actors, PMSCs and semi-state actors, like local militias, warlords, criminal gangs and vigilant groups, in an attempt to secure weak state leaders’ positions. In the competition for state control internationally recognised leaders have an advantage over their non-state rivals because they can seek military help outside their countries with the agreement of the international community and in accordance with international law.
China has raised its stakes in human rights governance. It has systematically sought to remove human rights from the centre of the international order by launching alternative human rights concepts, blocking human rights financing at the UN, and hindering civil society involvement in human rights scrutiny. China’s approach to human rights is not only guided by past experiences of humiliation and the idea of developmentalism, but first and foremost by the desire to secure the existing political system and its leadership. The alternative design for human rights is built around consensual cooperation rather than hard legal obligations and international scrutiny. It promotes dialogue and capacity-building instead of practices such as naming and shaming. States supportive of human rights should respond to Chinese efforts in the Human Rights Council as well as within the UN more broadly. This can be done by raising awareness of the systematic attack on human rights, increasing knowledge about Chinese foreign policy objectives, and by creating practices that help to achieve common stances.
In December 2019, Myanmar defended itself before the International Court of Justice against genocide charges for the atrocities committed in 2016–2017 against the Rohingya Muslims. The Rohingya crisis has driven several hundreds of thousands of the Rohingya as refugees into neighbouring Bangladesh with an unsettled future. In addition, questions of perpetrator accountability remain open. The UN Human Rights Council created a fact-finding mission and an international investigative mechanism for the purpose of bringing the individuals responsible to justice. With Western states generally condemning Myanmar’s actions, China’s influence in and over Myanmar has intensified, as the country has blocked robust action before the UN Security Council, leading to charges of political inaction. There is growing legal pressure against Myanmar at the national and international level, forcing it to respond. While accountability proceedings are important, problems may emerge when several courts deal with the same situation. Their capacity to provide immediate relief in relation to the crisis is also small.
State responsibility in international law is considered one of the cornerstones of the field. For a long time it remained the exclusive responsibility system due to the primacy of States as subjects of international law. Its unique position has nonetheless been challenged by several developments both within and outside the international legal order, such as the rise of alternative responsibility ideas and practices, as well as globalization and its consequences. This book adopts a critical and holistic approach to the law of State responsibility and analyzes the functionality of the general rules of State responsibility in a changed international landscape characterized by the fragmentation of responsibility. It is argued that State responsibility is not equally relevant across the broad spectrum of international obligations, and that alternative constructions of responsibility, namely international criminal law and international liability, have increased in standing.
The aim of this study is to fill a significant gap in the existing literature on the role of non-state actors, ranging from rebels and criminal gangs at one extreme to the corporate security industry at the other. As part of the general privatisation of the security sector in the western world, combined with the US-led war on terror, non-state actors have increasingly been tied to the foreign policy priorities of the dominant western military powers. Iraq and Afghanistan are the examples often used, and are well-described in other chapters in this book. In sub-Saharan Africa, as in many fragile states around the world, this picture is blurred, and it is often difficult to make clear distinctions between public and private, or between illegal and legal etc., (non)-state actors.
According to much of the academic literature, the nature of war changed dramatically in the last part of the twentieth century, especially after the end of the Cold War. According to this logic there is a dichotomy between war as a social phenomenon and warfare as the domain of the state, as envisaged by the late Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in the shape of the “Trinitarian War”. The lack of capacity on the part of predominately Third World states to control conflicts has led to low-intensity conflicts (LIC), which can be witnessed, for instance, in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia and Sri Lanka. Since the end of the Cold War it has been common for weak state rulers with formal state legitimacy but not empirical legitimacy to have continued to enjoy international recognition because of international fears that they are the only barrier against a total collapse. Amongst other things this paved the way for an expansion of the market for private military and security companies (PMSC) such as the South African-based Executive Outcomes (EO) in the 1990s. However, the lack of state capacity led to a sub-contracting, willingly or unwillingly, of the state’s monopoly on the use of force to non-state actors, PMSCs and semi-state actors, like local militias, warlords, criminal gangs and vigilant groups, in an attempt to secure weak state leaders’ positions. In the competition for state control internationally recognised leaders have an advantage over their non-state rivals because they can seek military help outside their countries with the agreement of the international community and in accordance with international law.
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