While the ancient Greeks and Romans are seldom studied in the modern American polity, their societies possessed distinct civic virtues and standards of excellence that formed the basis of the United States. The authors argue that the Founders and Framers of the U.S. created a nation based on the juxtaposition of ancient principles, which helped cultivate a population of civic minded, excellent citizens. The history of the U.S. is far from perfect, but the idea of America, at its origin, was revolutionary. In modern times, however, the authors argue that the American people are forgetting what it means to be American. The decline of both civic virtue and standards of excellence in today’s America is responsible for the rise of poor political leadership. Under President Donald Trump, America’s ability to maintain peace throughout the world, known as Pax Americana, was deteriorated, which worsened the integrity, stability, and longevity of the country. While many scholars have attempted to explain the rise of Trump, the authors argue that if American citizens want to know how Trump rose to power, they need only look into a mirror.
While common-sense attitudes towards the United States Supreme Court have been focused on what decisions they are likely to make, this book aims to focus on the impacts of other politicized elements of the Court. Through statistical modeling and other quantitative analyses, Justin DePlato examines the ability of the presidency and the Senate to influence and shape policy through the Court’s nomination process, docket selection, and judicial retirements. The Court operating as a political institution threatens to affect, where it hasn’t already outright intervened, civil liberties and social issues in the modern era and represents a controversial mechanic in the workings of American statecraft.
In this book, Justin DePlato examines and analyzes the reasons and justifications for, as well as instances of, executive emergency power in political thought and action. The book begins by analyzing the theory of executive emergency power across a wide breadth of philosophical history, from Ancient Greek, Renaissance, through modern American political thought. This analysis indicates that in political philosophy two models exist for determining and using executive emergency power: an unfettered executive prerogative or a constitutional dictatorship. The modern American approach to executive emergency power is an unfettered executive prerogative, whereby the executive determines what emergency power is and how to use it. The book addresses the fundamental question of whether executive power in times of crisis may be unfettered and discretionary or rather does the law define and restrain executive emergency power. The author reviews and analyzes seven U.S. presidencies that handled a domestic crisis—Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Lincoln, G. W. Bush, and Obama—to show that presidents become extraordinarily powerful during crises and act unilaterally without oversight. The use of executive emergency power undermines the normal processes of democratic republicanism and harms the rule of law. The author analyzes the U.S. Constitution, formerly classified Department of Justice Memos, primary sourced letters, signing statements, executive orders, presidential decrees, and original founding documents to comprehensively conclude that presidential prerogative determines what emergency powers are and how they are to be executed. This book challenges the claim that presidents determine their emergency power with appropriate congressional oversight or consultation. The analysis of the empirical data indicates that presidents do not consult with Congress prior to determining what their emergency powers are and how the president wants to use them. Justin DePlato joins the highly contentious debate over the use of executive power during crisis and offers a sharp argument against an ever-growing centralized and unchecked federal power. He argues that presidents are becoming increasingly reckless when determining and using power during crisis, often times acting unconstitutional.
The world-renowned, enigmatic Inspector Hawthorne stumbles into an unfortunate death of a wealthy businessman while visiting his brother. His suspicions tell him that while the death seems ordinary, there is nothing ordinary about it. The investigation weaves together mystic Christian discoveries that turn an ordinary death into a complicated murder.
While commonsense attitudes towards the United States Supreme Court have been focused on what decisions they are likely to make, this book focuses on the impacts of other politicized elements of the Court, such as the nomination process, docket selection, and judicial retirements.
In this book, Justin DePlato examines and analyzes the reasons and justifications for, as well as instances of, executive emergency power in political thought and action. The book begins by analyzing the theory of executive emergency power across a wide breadth of philosophical history, from Ancient Greek, Renaissance, through modern American political thought. This analysis indicates that in political philosophy two models exist for determining and using executive emergency power: an unfettered executive prerogative or a constitutional dictatorship. The modern American approach to executive emergency power is an unfettered executive prerogative, whereby the executive determines what emergency power is and how to use it. The book addresses the fundamental question of whether executive power in times of crisis may be unfettered and discretionary or rather does the law define and restrain executive emergency power. The author reviews and analyzes seven U.S. presidencies that handled a domestic crisis—Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Lincoln, G. W. Bush, and Obama—to show that presidents become extraordinarily powerful during crises and act unilaterally without oversight. The use of executive emergency power undermines the normal processes of democratic republicanism and harms the rule of law. The author analyzes the U.S. Constitution, formerly classified Department of Justice Memos, primary sourced letters, signing statements, executive orders, presidential decrees, and original founding documents to comprehensively conclude that presidential prerogative determines what emergency powers are and how they are to be executed. This book challenges the claim that presidents determine their emergency power with appropriate congressional oversight or consultation. The analysis of the empirical data indicates that presidents do not consult with Congress prior to determining what their emergency powers are and how the president wants to use them. Justin DePlato joins the highly contentious debate over the use of executive power during crisis and offers a sharp argument against an ever-growing centralized and unchecked federal power. He argues that presidents are becoming increasingly reckless when determining and using power during crisis, often times acting unconstitutional.
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