The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was one of the truly world-wide conflicts following the expansion of European colonies, with engagements spanning from India to Canada. As with so many of the European wars, the causes were a question of land and legitimacy. The ever-present simmering tensions between England and France, and the newly emergent Prussia and Austria, led to a conflict that dragged many other nations into the strife. Notable in this war were the brilliance of Frederick, who would earn his title “the Great” during these wars, and the eclipse of Spain, Portugal and Sweden as powers of the first rank. However, the policy of England, that of Pitt, was to limit the commitment in terms of men; priority was given to the Royal Navy, and an indirect form of colonial warfare allied with blockade was established. The naval intricacies, along with their political and land-based military corollaries, are illuminated in Corbett’s two volume history of the English contribution to the Seven Years war. This First volume in the series focusses on the actions to 1759, including the warfare in the Caribbean, around the French and German coast-lines, and the actions in and around Quebec, leading to that city’s capture. Sir Julian S. Corbett was a prolific author and authority on British warfare and more particularly the naval aspects; he was also lecturer in history to the Royal Naval College. Author — Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, LLM. (1854-1922) Illustrations – 10 maps and plans.
Unlike his contemporary American theorist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Britain’s eminent maritime strategist, Sir Julian Corbett, believed that victory in war did not come simply by the exercise of sea power and that, historically, this had never been the case. Corbett’s keen analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 and his discussion of the pros and cons of limited conflict is still of great value to our understanding of today’s limited wars. Based on intelligence reports provided by the Japanese government, this work on the Russo-Japanese naval war was written as an official study in the years just before World War I and classified “confidential” by the Royal Navy. The two-volume study demonstrates the lessons the war held for the future and shows the essential differences between maritime and continental warfare, while also exploring their interaction.
The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was one of the truly world-wide conflicts following the expansion of European colonies, with engagements spanning from India to Canada. As with so many of the European wars, the causes were a question of land and legitimacy. The ever-present simmering tensions between England and France, and the newly emergent Prussia and Austria, led to a conflict that dragged many other nations into the strife. Notable in this war were the brilliance of Frederick, who would earn his title “the Great” during these wars, and the eclipse of Spain, Portugal and Sweden as powers of the first rank. However, the policy of England, that of Pitt, was to limit the commitment in terms of men; priority was given to the Royal Navy, and an indirect form of colonial warfare allied with blockade was established. The naval intricacies, along with their political and land-based military corollaries, are illuminated in Corbett’s two volume history of the English contribution to the Seven Years war. This First volume in the series focusses on the actions to 1759, including the warfare in the Caribbean, around the French and German coast-lines, and the actions in and around Quebec, leading to that city’s capture. Sir Julian S. Corbett was a prolific author and authority on British warfare and more particularly the naval aspects; he was also lecturer in history to the Royal Naval College. Author — Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, LLM. (1854-1922) Illustrations – 10 maps and plans.
Unlike his contemporary American theorist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Britain’s eminent maritime strategist, Sir Julian Corbett, believed that victory in war did not come simply by the exercise of sea power and that, historically, this had never been the case. Corbett’s keen analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 and his discussion of the pros and cons of limited conflict is still of great value to our understanding of today’s limited wars. Based on intelligence reports provided by the Japanese government, this work on the Russo-Japanese naval war was written as an official study in the years just before World War I and classified “confidential” by the Royal Navy. The two-volume study demonstrates the lessons the war held for the future and shows the essential differences between maritime and continental warfare, while also exploring their interaction.
Sir Julian Corbett was regarded as one of the greatest naval historians of the early twentieth century. Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 was never available to the public during his lifetime. As noted in the introduction to Volume I, Corbett dealt not with “minute details and themes,...but a continuous narrative that demonstrated the interrelationship of land and sea events as they impinged on each other in conception, execution and results. Thus political objectives, geographic factors, and the machinery of government all could be seen working together as part of a whole.” Corbett’s work delineated the differences between maritime and land warfare, while also exploring their interaction. Published in hardcover by the Naval Institute Press in 1994, both volumes are now available in paperback for the first time.
DIVThis brilliant exposition by a great strategist proposes that the key to maritime dominance lies in effective use of sea lines for communications and in denying that use to the enemy. /div
Sir Julian Corbett was regarded as one of the greatest naval historians of the early twentieth century. Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 was never available to the public during his lifetime. As noted in the introduction to Volume I, Corbett dealt not with “minute details and themes,...but a continuous narrative that demonstrated the interrelationship of land and sea events as they impinged on each other in conception, execution and results. Thus political objectives, geographic factors, and the machinery of government all could be seen working together as part of a whole.” Corbett’s work delineated the differences between maritime and land warfare, while also exploring their interaction. Published in hardcover by the Naval Institute Press in 1994, both volumes are now available in paperback for the first time.
Of the many campaigns in the long history of Britain, naval and otherwise, there have been few more momentous than the campaign in the Mediterranean in 1804-5 culminating in the battle of Trafalgar. They spawned a national hero in the figure of heroic lord Nelson, one-armed and blind in one eye, dying at the moment of his greatest victory over a more numerous enemy. However, the story of the battle, much less the campaign, was more complex than the story of one man, however great. It is this web of sailings, counter-sailings, orders, alliances, courage and genius that Corbett elucidates with his great naval knowledge and lucid text. Sir Julian Corbett wrote this most important of studies, drawing on not only his comprehensive archive material at the Royal Naval college, but also important sources from French and Spanish sources. He was a prolific author and authority on British warfare, and more particularly the naval aspects, as well as a lecturer in history to the Royal Naval College. Author — Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, LLM. (1854-1922) Illustrations – 5 maps and plans.
The present work is designed as a sequel to Drake and the Tudor Navy (1898), to which it practically forms a third and concluding volume, carrying the reader through the period of hostilities with Spain which extended from the death of Drake in 1596 to the conclusion of the war at James I.’s accession. It is a period which, if we except the operations of Essex at Cádiz in 1596, has been much neglected by historians and as much misunderstood. [...] Mainly the work is concerned with naval history, hut not so exclusively as the two previous volumes. Military affairs begin to intrude themselves. Indeed it is doubtful whether the naval and the military history of England should ever be written apart. The real importance of maritime power is its influence on military operations. This is the thesis which lies at the bottom of all the teaching with which Captain Mahan’s name is pre-eminently associated. [...] The direction of a great war can only be followed out in the mutual reaction of the two forces, and how closely they are inter-dependent nothing shows more emphatically than the last years of the Elizabethan war. It is impossible to deal adequately with the naval operations without understanding what the soldiers were doing. To treat, for instance, of the action of the fleet during the Spanish descent on Ireland in 1601 without following the strategy ashore might be naval chronicling. It would not be history. WITH PORTRAITS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS.
DIVThis brilliant exposition by a great strategist proposes that the key to maritime dominance lies in effective use of sea lines for communications and in denying that use to the enemy. /div
The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was the one of the truly world-wide conflicts, with engagements spanning from India to Canada. The causes, as with so many of the European wars, was a question of land and legitimacy, the ever present simmering tensions between England and France, and the newly emergent Prussia and Austria, leading to a conflict that dragged many other nations into the strife. Notable in this war were the brilliance of Frederick, who would earn his title “the Great” during these wars; and the eclipse of Spain, Portugal and Sweden as powers of the first rank. However, the policy of England - that of Pitt - was to limit the commitment in terms of men; priority was given to the Royal Navy, and an indirect form of colonial warfare allied with blockade was established. The naval intricacies, along with their political and land-based military corollaries, are illuminated in Corbett’s two volume history of the English contribution to the Seven Years war. The second volume carries the narrative on into 1760: an abortive counter-attack by French forces in Canada; further pressure in Germany thwarted by Frederick and his generals; and the catastrophic intervention of Spain into the war. Sir Julian S. Corbett was a prolific author and authority on British warfare and more particularly the naval aspects; he was also lecturer in history to the Royal Naval College.Author — Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, LLM. (1854-1922) Illustrations – 4 maps and plans.
Fighting Instructions 1530-1816. by Julian S. Corbett. Publications of the navy records society vol. XXIX. Royal Navy Fighting Instructions. The inaccessibility of the official Fighting Instructions from time to time issued to the fleet has long been a recognised stumbling-block to students of naval history. Only a few copies of them were generally known to exist; fewer still could readily be consulted by the public, and of these the best known had been wrongly dated. The discovery therefore of a number of seventeenth century Instructions amongst the Earl of Dartmouth's papers, which he had generously placed at the disposal of the Society, seemed to encourage an attempt to make something like a complete collection. The result, such as it is, is now offered to the Society. It is by no means exhaustive. Some sets of Instructions seem to be lost beyond recall; but, on the other hand, a good deal of hitherto barren ground has been filled, and it is hoped that the collection may be of some assistance for a fresh study of the principles which underlie the development of naval tactics. It is of course as documents in the history of tactics that the Fighting Instructions have the greatest practical value, and with this aspect of them in view I have done my best to illustrate their genesis, intention, and significance by extracts from contemporary authorities. Without such illustration the Instructions would be but barren food, neither nutritive nor easily digested. The embodiment of this illustrative matter has to some extent involved a departure from the ordinary form of the Society's publications. Instead of a general introduction, a series of introductory notes to each group of Instructions has been adopted, which it is feared will appear to bear an excessive proportion to the Instructions themselves. There seemed, however, no other means of dealing with the illustrative matter in a consecutive way. The extracts from admirals' despatches and contemporary treatises, and the remarks of officers and officials concerned with the preparation or the execution of the Instructions, were for the most part too fragmentary to be treated as separate documents, or too long or otherwise unsuitable for foot-notes. The only adequate way therefore was to embody them in Introductory Notes, and this it is hoped will be found to justify their bulk.
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