We study the optimal foreign exchange (FX) intervention policy in response to a positive terms of trade shock and associated Dutch disease episode in a small open economy model. We find that during a Dutch disease episode tradable production drops below the socially optimal level, resulting in lower welfare under learningby- doing (LBD) externalities. FX reserves accumulation improves welfare by preventing a large appreciation of the real exchange rate and by inducing an efficient reallocation between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. For an empirically plausible parametrization of LBD externalities, the model predicts that in response to a 10 percent increase in commodity prices FX reserves should increase by 1.5 percent of GDP. We also find that the welfare gains from optimally using FX reserves are twice as high as the gains from relying only on monetary policy. These results suggest that FX intervention is a beneficial policy to counteract the loss of competitiveness during a Dutch disease episode.
This paper examines emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) central bank interventions to maintain financial stability during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through empirical analysis and case study reviews, it identifies lessons for designing future programs to address challenges faced in EMDEs, including less-developed financial markets and lower levels of institutional credibility. The focus is on the functioning of the financial markets that are key to maintaining financial stability—money, securities, and FX funding markets. Several lessons emerge, including: (i) objectives should be well-specified and communicated to facilitate eventual exit; (ii) intervention triggers should prioritize liquidity metrics over prices; (iii) actions should be sufficiently large to address market dysfunction; (iv) the risks of fiscal dominance and moral hazard should be minimized; and (v) program design should incentivize self-liquidation by appropriate pricing or through short-term operations that quickly liquidate. While interventions may increase risks to central bank balance sheets, potentially challenging policy solvency and operational independence, a well-designed framework can significantly mitigate these risks.
We study the optimal foreign exchange (FX) intervention policy in response to a positive terms of trade shock and associated Dutch disease episode in a small open economy model. We find that during a Dutch disease episode tradable production drops below the socially optimal level, resulting in lower welfare under learningby- doing (LBD) externalities. FX reserves accumulation improves welfare by preventing a large appreciation of the real exchange rate and by inducing an efficient reallocation between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. For an empirically plausible parametrization of LBD externalities, the model predicts that in response to a 10 percent increase in commodity prices FX reserves should increase by 1.5 percent of GDP. We also find that the welfare gains from optimally using FX reserves are twice as high as the gains from relying only on monetary policy. These results suggest that FX intervention is a beneficial policy to counteract the loss of competitiveness during a Dutch disease episode.
This paper examines emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) central bank interventions to maintain financial stability during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through empirical analysis and case study reviews, it identifies lessons for designing future programs to address challenges faced in EMDEs, including less-developed financial markets and lower levels of institutional credibility. The focus is on the functioning of the financial markets that are key to maintaining financial stability—money, securities, and FX funding markets. Several lessons emerge, including: (i) objectives should be well-specified and communicated to facilitate eventual exit; (ii) intervention triggers should prioritize liquidity metrics over prices; (iii) actions should be sufficiently large to address market dysfunction; (iv) the risks of fiscal dominance and moral hazard should be minimized; and (v) program design should incentivize self-liquidation by appropriate pricing or through short-term operations that quickly liquidate. While interventions may increase risks to central bank balance sheets, potentially challenging policy solvency and operational independence, a well-designed framework can significantly mitigate these risks.
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