Where was God in Auschwitz? Can there be any God, at least any good and omnipotent God, if such hellish evils exist? After posing this question in all honesty and depth, the first chapter refutes several theories, some of them quite venerable, that deny existence to evils, reduce evils to some unreality or mere lack of good, or declare them to be an indispensable part of the best possible world. The book seeks to establish the errors of these attempts to tame the ferocious reality of evil and refutes some of their assumptions. At the same time, it recognizes and defends the important truths contained in three of these four classical attempts at "taming evil." Thus resisting any playing down the ferocious reality of evil, it offers a critical analysis of the Augustinian, Thomist and Leibnizean defenses of God in front of evil but defends the parasitic character of evil, thus rejecting any Manichean dualism.The second chapter explains the atheist argumentation against God based on the horrific reality of evil. Recognizing the reality of awful evils seems to lead to a logical contradiction between 3 propositions each theist holds true: 1. An infinitely good God exists. 2. An omnipotent God exists. 3. Evils exist. The only option that seems to be left to a serious philosopher after Auschwitz is atheism, or denying either that God is good or that he is omnipotent, which many atheists consider a dishonest "polite atheism."The third chapter shows that there are many evident and some possible hidden good reasons for God's allowing the evil of pain to occur for the sake of immense values that are dependent on the free will of persons. The only key to understand causes and reasons for suffering lies in the even greater evil: moral evil, and in moral goodness that overarches the evils in the world. The atheist cannot refute the many reasons for suffering that philosophy detects in the complex interrelations between pain and moral evil. While this audacious book demands that philosophy stretches itself to its very limits in order to apprehend meaning even in Auschwitz, it does not claim a self-sufficiency of human reason in confrontation with the mystery of evil, nor does it preclude that only far higher values accessible solely to religious faith can provide an ultimate answer to where God was in Auschwitz and to why he permits evil. While they are hidden from mere human reason, the atheist cannot refute these higher reasons and can understand their possibility, and also for this reason the construction of an atheist conclusion from Auschwitz and other atrocities fails.The final chapter copes with the challenge, based on the evil of manifold human errors, against a God who is Truth itself. It liberates God from the claim that He made human errors about the most important things inevitable or that some errors that no human person can avoid are such great evils that no higher goods (such as trust and interhuman love) can justify permitting their occurrence.Chapter 4 assesses critically important contributions of Ren� Descartes but offers an original answer to any atheist challenge to the veracity of God.The book ascends to the very heights of a philosophical answer to its great question: Can God exist if Auschwitz exists? Without a rationalistic claim of comprehending fully the mystery of evil, Seifert carefully distinguishes between admitting unsolvable mysteries about evil in relation to God and disproving God's existence. A Socratic wisdom and silence in the face of the question "where was God in Auschwitz?" must be sharply distinguished from the proud and untenable claim of having refuted the existence of an infinitely good and omnipotent God through the reality of Auschwitz and of countless other evils.This book is a substantially corrected, revised and simplified text published 2016 as "Does the Reality of Evil Disprove the Existence of God?". It addresses itself to all readers who long for a reply to its question.
In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis. His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and idealist critics, including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves. Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito, as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being.
This book makes four bold claims: 1) life is an ultimate datum, open to philosophical analysis and irreducible to physical reality; hence all materialist-reductionist explanations - most current theories - of life are false. 2) All life presupposes soul (entelechy) without which a being would at best fake life. 3) The concept of life is analogous and the most direct access to life in its irreducibility is gained through consciousness; 4) All life possesses an objective and intrinsic value that needs to be respected, human life possesses beyond this an inviolable dignity. Life and personal life are pure perfections, it being absolutely better to possess (personal) life than not to possess it. Chapter 1: the metaphysical essence and the many meanings of 'life,' as well as its 'transcendental' character. Chapter 2: the irreducibility of biological life, its amazing empirical and philosophically intelligible essential features, and the ways of knowing them. Chapter 3: the immediate evidence and indubitable givenness of mental, conscious life as well as questions of (brain-) death and immortality. Chapter 4: the inviolable objective dignity of personal life and its self-transcendence; a new theory of the fourfold source of human dignity and rights. Chapter 5 (in dialogue-form): methods and results of philosophy versus those of empirical life-sciences.
Following an explanation of the nature of an action, the topic is limited to the motives of actions which are simultaneously morally good and obligatory. Motives cause actions only upon being freely accepted. The book proposes a novel vision of a sixfold motivation of moral actions:1. The value of states of affairs the agent intends to realize - not just as a source of our pleasure or happiness, but because of their own value.2. The moral obligation itself requires an obedience its object cannot explain. 3. The moral value of one's own action (the will to be and do the good).4. A universal call to perform good actions (not to perform evil ones) not only here and now. 5. God has to be responded to, at least implicitly.6. The agent's own happiness, while not being the prime motive.It is pointed out that, while some of these motives must be explicitly present before the agent's mind and be adequately responded to for an obligatory action to be morally good, others, especially the fifth and the sixth one, need only be implicitly present in the sense of not being consciously rejected by the agent. The concluding remarks emphasize that, ultimately the moral action aims at a surrender to something eternal, and that in many cases improper motives are mixed with the ones investigated, but that this realistic recognition of the human situation is not an argument against the analyses presented.
The term “method” of realist phenomenology and philosophy can refer to three kinds of things which are being explored extensively in this work: Kinds of philosophical knowledge used to return to things themselves: intellectual “vision” of necessary intelligible essences, insights into necessary states of affairs, knowledge of less than necessary essences, knowledge of existence as such, of the ego cogitans and of a concretely existing world, other persons, and the absolute being, deductive forms of reasoning, and others. Ways to achieve such knowledge: such as various types of distinctions, asking proper questions, correct use of analogies, and replies to objections. Finally, these methods include several “tricks” and devices such as methodic doubt and epoché; these are subordinated to the other methods, and neither necessary nor universal tools of all philosophical knowledge.
At all times physicians were bound to pursue not only medical tasks, but to reflect also on the many anthropological and metaphysical aspects of their discipline, such as on the nature of life and death, of health and sickness, and above all on the vital ethical dimensions of their practice. For centuries, almost for two millennia, how ever, those who practiced medicine lived in a relatively clearly defined ethical and implicitly philosophical or religious 'world-order' within which they could safely turn to medical practice, knowing right from wrong, or at least being told what to do and what not to do. Today, however, the situation has radically changed, mainly due to three quite different reasons: First and most obviously, physicians today are faced with a tremendous development of new possibilities and techniques which allow previously unheard of medical interventions (such as cloning, cryo-conservation, ge netic interference, etc. ) which call out for ethical reflection and wise judgment but regarding which there is no legal and medical ethical tradition. Traditional medical education did not prepare physicians for coping with this new brave world of mod em medicine. Secondly, there are the deep philosophical crises and the philosophical diseases of medicine mentioned in the preface that lead to a break-down of firm and formative legal and ethical norms for medical actions.
Following an ardent debate in the 1930s on the question over whether something like a "Christian philosophy" exists, as Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and others held, the term was used by many thinkers and rejected by many others, not only by Heidegger who called it a contradiction in terms, an "iron wood," but also by Thomists who wanted to see philosophy and Christian faith strictly separated. Seifert analyses five understandings of the term "Christian philosophy" which have never been expounded with such clarity and which he rejects for different, partly for opposite, reasons. He presents these senses of Christian philosophy, and his reasons for rejecting them, in clear, straight-forward language. He presents for the first time a series of eleven wholly different and thoroughly positive and fruitful ways of understanding the (rather misleading) term "Christian philosophy." Identifying and distinguishing these legitimate ways to speak of "Christian philosophy" shed light on the manifold fruitful relations between reason and faith. In a second part of the book, Seifert gives an example of Christian philosophy in the sense of a philosophy of religion that shows the absolute presupposedness and necessity of the existence of human, divine, and angelic free will to make any sense of divine revelation and of Christian (but also of Muslim and Jewish) religion. In a third part, he presents a penetrating analysis of seven indubitable evidences that demonstrate the nature and real existence of human free will (in a so-called "libertarian" sense that rejects the thesis of the compatibility between free will and determinism). The book is introduced by the eminent Thomist philosopher, John Finnis.
No other cycle of Josef Sudek's photos depicts the artist's beloved city as a record of many Prague localities as nostalgic witnesses to the passage of time. The elongated format of his photographs enabled him not only to command a truly panoramic view of Prague: he himself was probably surprised by the resultant optic deformations whose distinctly expressive tinge offered by his old Kodak camera provided him with a golden opportunity of evoking--in his unique style--the rendition of various forms by his older friends--Czech cubists.--From book jacket.
This book makes four bold claims: 1) life is an ultimate datum, open to philosophical analysis and irreducible to physical reality; hence all materialist-reductionist explanations - most current theories - of life are false. 2) All life presupposes soul (entelechy) without which a being would at best fake life. 3) The concept of life is analogous and the most direct access to life in its irreducibility is gained through consciousness; 4) All life possesses an objective and intrinsic value that needs to be respected, human life possesses beyond this an inviolable dignity. Life and personal life are pure perfections, it being absolutely better to possess (personal) life than not to possess it. Chapter 1: the metaphysical essence and the many meanings of 'life,' as well as its 'transcendental' character. Chapter 2: the irreducibility of biological life, its amazing empirical and philosophically intelligible essential features, and the ways of knowing them. Chapter 3: the immediate evidence and indubitable givenness of mental, conscious life as well as questions of (brain-) death and immortality. Chapter 4: the inviolable objective dignity of personal life and its self-transcendence; a new theory of the fourfold source of human dignity and rights. Chapter 5 (in dialogue-form): methods and results of philosophy versus those of empirical life-sciences.
In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis. His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and idealist critics, including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves. Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito, as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being.
At all times physicians were bound to pursue not only medical tasks, but to reflect also on the many anthropological and metaphysical aspects of their discipline, such as on the nature of life and death, of health and sickness, and above all on the vital ethical dimensions of their practice. For centuries, almost for two millennia, how ever, those who practiced medicine lived in a relatively clearly defined ethical and implicitly philosophical or religious 'world-order' within which they could safely turn to medical practice, knowing right from wrong, or at least being told what to do and what not to do. Today, however, the situation has radically changed, mainly due to three quite different reasons: First and most obviously, physicians today are faced with a tremendous development of new possibilities and techniques which allow previously unheard of medical interventions (such as cloning, cryo-conservation, ge netic interference, etc. ) which call out for ethical reflection and wise judgment but regarding which there is no legal and medical ethical tradition. Traditional medical education did not prepare physicians for coping with this new brave world of mod em medicine. Secondly, there are the deep philosophical crises and the philosophical diseases of medicine mentioned in the preface that lead to a break-down of firm and formative legal and ethical norms for medical actions.
Visualisation, Presentation and Facilitation are working methods that play an increasingly important role in professional everyday life. This was the case in 1989, when this book was first published, and is more relevant now than ever. Since the first edition the author has revised this book numerous times. He has expanded and “modernised” this edition so that the best seller once again sets the benchmark in regard to content and design. The reader learns how he can skillfully visualise facts, properly prepare and confidently give presentations, effectively chair a meeting, facilitate teams and groups results-oriented, and successfully organise workshops. The book also provides the reader with proven methods, tips and techniques for communicating information understandably and vividly. The focus is always on the “how” – giving the reader concrete suggestions for practical use. With its clarity and structure this book is probably unsurpassed until this day.
Comparative law of religions has developed in recent years as a new discipline at the intersection of legal and religious science, of theology and anthropology. This book presents a systematic theoretical basis for this new discipline. While law is mostly associated with the state, many religions also have their own internal law. These internal legal norms are aimed at a particular form of behaviour on the part of believers. They therefore play a particular role in conflicts arising today between certain religious forms of behaviour. The comparison of the internal law of religions serves to establish and explain the commonalities and differences between various religious legal traditions. The religions examined here include: the law of Christian denominations, Jewish law, Islamic law, Hindu law, Buddhist law, and other religious legal systems. The work assesses six current approaches to the comparative law of religions, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, leading to the development of a new approach. The book discusses the role of religious law in state law and looks to likely future developments. The work will be essential for those interested in the administration of justice and politics, for those professions where intercultural competence is required, and for interreligious dialogue.
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