When Cuba threw off the yoke of Spanish rule at the end of the nineteenth century, it did so with the help of another foreign power, the United States. Thereafter, the United States became involved in Cuban affairs, intervening twice militarily (1898-1902 and 1906-1909). What was the effect of U.S. intervention? Conventional wisdom indicates that U.S. intervention hindered the rise of militarism in Cuba in the early years of statehood. This pathfinding study, however, takes just the opposite view. Jose M. Hernández argues that while U.S. influence may have checked the worst excesses of the Independence-war veterans who assumed control of Cuba's government, it did not completely deter them from resorting to violence. Thus, a tradition of using violence as a method for transferring power developed in Cuba that often made a mockery of democratic processes. In substantiating this innovative interpretation, Hernández covers a crucial phase in Cuban history that has been neglected by most recent U.S. historians. Correcting stereotypes and myths, he takes a fresh and dispassionate look at Cuba's often romanticized struggle for political emancipation, describing and analyzing in persuasive detail civilmilitary relations throughout the period. This puts national hero Jose Martí's role in the 1895-1898 war of independence in an unusual perspective and sets in bold relief the historical forces that went underground in 1898-1902, only to resurface a few years later. This study will be of interest to all students of hemispheric relations. It presents not only a more accurate picture of the Cuba spawned by American intervention, but also the Cuban side of a story that too frequently has been told solely from the U.S. point of view.
Este libro cubre las elecciones de 1952 al 1964, desde el dominio maximo del PPD, en 1952, hasta el primer relevo de gobernadores, aunque del mismo partido, en 1964. Cubre el ascenso del movimiento Estadista y la caida del movimiento Independentista. This book covers the elections held in Puerto Rico between 1952 and 1964. That period saw the highest point in the dominance by the Popular Party; and it also saw the fall and rebirth of the pro-Statehood movement (from 12.87%% in '52 to 34.8%% in '64), coupled with the rise and fall of the pro-Independence movement (from 18.98%% in '52 to 2.81%% in '64).
Over the past 30 years there has been considerable research on the political economy of reform. Yet despite this, little is known about strategies for managing the politics of change--moving from a bad to a better equilibrium. Part of the challenge of studying this issue stems from the difficulty of obtaining detailed, so-called 'blow-by-blow' information on actual reform processes. From this type of information, one can discern and cull practical lessons on strategy, which by its very nature is about dealing with political barriers or problems as they crop up during the implementation process. This study looks at the sequence of events that ultimately led to the passage of legislation that markedly altered the rules that govern public procurement in the Philippines. The study attempts to distill operationally useful lessons for managing the politics of a reform process.
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