While Fidel Castro maintained his longtime grip on Cuba, revolutionary scholars and policy analysts turned their attention from how Castro succeeded (and failed), to how Castro himself would be succeeded—by a new government. Among the many questions to be answered was how the new government would deal with the corruption that has become endemic in Cuba. Even though combating corruption cannot be the central aim of post-Castro policy, Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López suggest that, without a strong plan to thwart it, corruption will undermine the new economy, erode support for the new government, and encourage organized crime. In short, unless measures are taken to stem corruption, the new Cuba could be as messy as the old Cuba. Fidel Castro did not bring corruption to Cuba; he merely institutionalized it. Official corruption has crippled Cuba since the colonial period, but Castro's state-run monopolies, cronyism, and lack of accountability have made Cuba one of the world's most corrupt states. The former communist countries in Eastern Europe were also extremely corrupt, and analyses of their transitional periods suggest that those who have taken measures to control corruption have had more successful transitions, regardless of whether the leadership tilted toward socialism or democracy. To that end, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, both Cuban Americans, do not advocate any particular system for Cuba's next government, but instead prescribe uniquely Cuban policies to minimize corruption whatever direction the country takes after Castro. As their work makes clear, averting corruption may be the most critical obstacle in creating a healthy new Cuba.
Analysts attempting to assess economic growth in revolutionary Cuba are faced with two formidable obstacles: (1) official macroeconomic indicators published by the government are scarce and sometimes inconsistent because of frequent changes in the method of calculation; and (2) these indicators are not compatible with those produced by market economies because of differences in national income concepts. Because of these obstacles, it is difficult to analyze the performance of Cuba’s economy over time and to compare its economic performance directly with that of other nations. Using a variant of the method developed by Abram Bergson to estimate the growth rates of the Soviet Union and subsequently applied to centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe, Jorge Perez-López has estimated the growth rate of the Cuban economy in real terms for the 1965–1982 period. His estimated indexes suggest that the Cuban economy expanded at a considerably slower pace than would be implied by official data. By constructing yardsticks of economic performance for revolutionary Cuba that are compatible with those used by Western nations, Perez-López provides for the first time a basis for analyzing the real growth of the Cuban economy during the revolutionary period.
The economic crisis of the 1990s has propelled the second economy from behind the scenes to center stage. Not only have black markets mushroomed, but second economy activities connected to the free-market that the Castro government has traditionally discouraged or even prosecuted are now being incorporated into the government's own economic strategy. Self-employment, cultivation of individual plots, and the use of foreign currencies to buy or sell goods, are now promoted with considerable enthusiasm by the leadership.
This book is a study of Cuba's economic development under communism over the last fifty-five years. The authors find that Cuba's socioeconomic development has gone backward since the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The authors conclude that Fidel Castro's revolution has been an economic disaster for Cuba. The book first outlines Cuba's economic position prior to the revolution. It reviews Cuba's rankings with respect to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the 1950s and examines the strength of pre-Castro Cuba's foreign reserves and the health of its monetary system. It also presents pre-Castro Cuba's investments in health care and education and documents the island's development potential in the 1950s. The last few chapters describe the precipitous decline in all of these areas of Cuba's economy under Castro. Despite the socioeconomic catastrophe of the Castro years, the authors envision a post-Castro Cuba, where this book can provide a benchmark to measure the developmental success that the Cuban work-ethic and entrepreneurial spirit can generate in a free-market system.
Sugar, the backbone of the Cuban economic life for centuries, continues to dominate the economy of socialist Cuba. After initial attempts at diversification following the Revolution, the Cuban regime rehabilitated the sugar industry in 1965, making the country again vulnerable to swings in world market prices and the dangers of overdependence on a single agricultural product.Perez-L—pez examines the various efforts at economic planning in the years following the Revolution and provides in-depth analysis of aspects particular to the sugar industry: cultivation, mechanization, energy and transportation, refining and the manufacture of sugar derivatives, production costs, and foreign trade.
Focuses on the use of child labor in the production of apparel for the U.S. market. Reviews the extent to which U.S. apparel importers have established & are implementing codes of conduct or other business guidelines prohibiting the use of child labor in the clothing they sell. Appendices list the companies surveyed & sites visited, provides a sample of the company questionnaire, details codes of conduct provided by the companies surveyed, & includes tables of U.S. apparel imports by region & country (1985-1995). Contains the complete text of the ILO Convention 138. Graphs, charts & tables.
Without doubt, Cuba is facing its most serious economic challenge in nearly thirty-five years of revolutionary rule. There is consensus that as the official, centrally planned economy has faltered, ordinary citizens eke out a living only by engaging in under-the-table, unrecorded, and mostly illegal activities. In fact, this "second economy" is growing by leaps and bounds. This volume sketches the contours of the very complex phenomenon of the second economy of socialist Cuba, and discusses its evolution over time, as well as the role that it may play in the transition to a market economy on the island. The economic crisis of the 1990s has propelled the second economy from behind the scenes to center stage. Not only have black markets mushroomed, but second economy activities connected to the free-market that the Castro government has traditionally discouraged or even prosecuted are now being incorporated into the government's own economic strategy. Self-employment, cultivation of individual plots, and the use of foreign currencies to buy or sell goods, are now promoted with considerable enthusiasm by the leadership. Perez-Lopez examines different ways of thinking about unregulated economic activities that have been set forth in the literature and concludes that the concept of the second economy is the most appropriate for Cuba. He brings together available information from a multitude of sources on the manifestations of the second economy in Cuba and of its operation. Cuba's Second Economy is a timely study of an economic system in crisis. It will be of interest to economists, political scientists, policymakers, and Latin America area scholars.
While Fidel Castro maintains his longtime grip on Cuba, revolutionary scholars and policy analysts have turned their attention from how Castro succeeded (and failed), to how Castro himself will be succeeded - by a new government. This is a comprehensive analysis of corruption in Cuba, and prescriptions for minimizing it in the post-Castro era. While Fidel Castro maintains his longtime grip on Cuba, revolutionary scholars and policy analysts have turned their attention from how Castro succeeded (and failed), to how Castro himself will be succeeded - by a new government. Among the many questions to be answered is how the new government will deal with the corruption that has become endemic in Cuba. Even though combating corruption cannot be the central aim of post-Castro policy, Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez suggest that, without a strong plan to thwart it, corruption will undermine the new economy, erode support for the new government, and encourage organized crime. In short, unless measures are taken to stem corruption, the new Cuba could be as messy as the old Cuba. Fidel Castro did not bring corruption to Cuba; he merely institutionalized it. Official corruption has crippled Cuba since the colonial period, but Castro's state-run monopolies, cronyism, and lack of accountability have made Cuba one of the world's most corrupt states
This volume analyzes Cuban socioeconomic policies and evaluates their performance since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. It provides a brief historical background to the crisis and analyzes in detail the deterioration and incomplete recovery since 1990. Comparing Cuba's performance with that of other Latin American and former socialist countries, it summarizes the views of noted Cuban economists and proposes policies that architects of the Cuban transition might wish to put in place after the passing of Castro.Focusing on economic and social policies and performance during the “Special Period in Time of Peace” (1990-2004), the authors draw on an impressive array of statistics (synthesized in 28 tables) to show that in 2005 Cuba has yet to return to economic levels of the late 1980s, and the access and quality of many of the highly touted social services--education, health care, social security, housing--also have not been restored to the levels achieved prior to the economic crisis triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, they argue, poverty has expanded and unequal access to foreign remittances combined with expanding income differences have exacerbated social inequalities and widened the consumption gap between those with access to hard currency and those without.The authors demonstrate that governmental concerns about a strengthening private sector resulting in loss of political control finally prompted the Cuban leadership to prioritize political over economic ends. It aborted the modest market-oriented reforms of 1993-1996 and actually reversed them in 2003-2004, recentralized the economy, drastically reduced the limited spaces for private economic activity, exerted increasing control over hard currency, prohibited the circulation of the dollar, and stepped up repressive measures on peaceful dissidents. Centralized economic control has been fully restored, even though it will undoubtedly result in further deterioration of economic conditions and declining standards of living.
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