This work discusses the ability of U.S. joint forces to conduct forcible entry operations in the future operational environment. It argues that the Joint Force of 2020 will require a significantly improved capability to conduct such operations in order to support the requirements of national military strategy and advance American interests in the world. In addition, it makes five specific recommendations for improving forcible entry capability in various areas of the Joint Force. The work begins by examining global trends, emerging threats, and evolving military approaches that will make forcible entry operations not only more challenging, but also more necessary, in the future. In so doing, it accounts for the decreasing size and changing posture of the Joint Force as it becomes smaller and more CONUS-based than at any time since 1940. It then describes the requirements of national strategy and offers four plausible vignettes set in the year 2020 in which forcible entry would most likely be needed. After comparing projected capabilities with future requirements, the thesis then outlines the most significant gaps and provides its recommendations. Unified combatant commanders are likely to require the capability for joint forcible entry in a variety of future contingencies. The Joint Staff and senior defense officials should understand these requirements so they can ensure the Services retain essential capabilities currently available and develop or expand those that will be needed in the future. In this way, the Joint Force will be able to offer feasible and acceptable options to the President and Secretary of Defense if and when conflicts arise that demand it while also ensuring the best possible capability with the least risk to the Nation.
The national security problems facing the Joint Force are increasingly ill-defined and can be characterized as “wicked problems” and that these “wicked problems” cannot be solved solely by better planning or decision support processes. The current joint definition of command and control does not adequately address changes introduced through technology trends, our understanding of the global operating environment, and capabilities offered by modern information and communications technology. The inclusion of mission command in joint doctrine as a method to synchronize the actions of tactical elements of the Joint Force is necessary if the Joint Force is to work effectively within the 21st century operational environment. A joint version of the current Army and Marine Corps concept of mission command could provide a more agile and adaptable force - a force capable of achieving unity of effort within the framework of “whole of government” approaches to challenges in the operational environment today and well into the future.
Although media and information have always influenced international and national security, the impact of information has become a dominant factor in the modern security arena. Today's Joint Force enjoys both a positive narrative and good media relations, and it is critical that the Joint Force maintains and bolsters these positive conditions. Despite this, current trends across all levels of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) reflect a system that does not sufficiently focus, prioritize, or address sustaining the ability to deliver a timely, accurate, and tronsparent narrative through cooperative relationships with the media. Because of these shortcomings, military leaders must holistically reexamine the JPME goals and exploit current opportunities in order to provide military leaders career-spanning education focused towards sustaining the military's narrative through positive military-media relations.
The modern means of communication have turned the world into an information fishbowl and, in terms of foreign policy and national security in post-Cold War power politics, helped transform international power politics. Information operations (IO), in which time zones are as important as national boundaries, is the use of modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior. Contemporary IO differs from traditional psychological operations practiced by nation-states, because the availability of low-cost high technology permits nongovernmental organizations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own as well as facilitates damaging cyber-attacks ("hactivism") on computer networks and infrastructure. As current vice president Dick Cheney once said, such technology has turned third-class powers into first-class threats. Conceived as a textbook by instructors at the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School of the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College and involving IO experts from several countries, this book fills an important gap in the literature by analyzing under one cover the military, technological, and psychological aspects of information operations. The general reader will appreciate the examples taken from recent history that reflect the impact of IO on U.S. foreign policy, military operations, and government organization.
The Global War on Terrorism cannot be won without a coherent commitment from national, defense, and military leadership to eradicate extremist organizations. The current National Security Strategy, referred to by one expert as only the third grand strategy in the history of the United States, cannot succeed on its own. An unambiguous military strategy of annihilation not only supports the current National Security Strategy but enables the other elements of national power – diplomatic, informational and economic – increased opportunities to achieve national objectives without the commitment of the military element.This paper proposes the term strategy of annihilation be introduced into the joint lexicon. Strategies of annihilation are perceived as resulting in a high number of casualties and confused with strategies of attrition. Combatant commanders employing a strategy of annihilation at the operational level are able to impact the strategic level of war. However, these strategies may be troop intensive based on the scope of national objectives, and are event, not timeline, driven.The current 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct is not currently supportable given the current U.S. military authorized end strength; specifically, the land components are insufficient when analyzing the nature and locations of future combat operations. However, the American populous' fascination with technology and distrust of large standing Armies, as well as fiscal restraints hinder the expansion of the current military. Consequently, a military strategy of annihilation is difficult.Responsible political and military leaders must reassess the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct to achieve national objectives and address the environment of future conflict.
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.