In this volume, the authors present their view of cognition. They propose that unlike the classical paradigm that takes the mind to be a computer, the mind is best understood as a dynamical system realized in a neural network.
The present work is a continuation of the authors' acclaimed multi-volume APractical Logic of Cognitive Systems. After having investigated the notion ofrelevance in their previous volume, Gabbay and Woods now turn to abduction. Inthis highly original approach, abduction is construed as ignorance-preservinginference, in which conjecture plays a pivotal role. Abduction is a response to acognitive target that cannot be hit on the basis of what the agent currently knows.The abducer selects a hypothesis which were it true would enable the reasoner to attain his target. He concludes from this fact that the hypothesis may be conjectured. In allowing conjecture to stand in for the knowledge he fails to have, the abducer reveals himself to be a satisficer, since an abductive solution is not a solution from knowledge. Key to the authors' analysis is the requirement that a conjectured proposition is not just what a reasoner might allow himself to assume, but a proposition he must defeasibly release as a premiss for further inferences in the domain of enquiry in which the original abduction problem has arisen.The coverage of the book is extensive, from the philosophy of science tocomputer science and AI, from diagnostics to the law, from historical explanation to linguistic interpretation. One of the volume's strongest contributions is its exploration of the abductive character of criminal trials, with special attention given to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.Underlying their analysis of abductive reasoning is the authors' conception ofpractical agency. In this approach, practical agency is dominantly a matter of thecomparative modesty of an agent's cognitive agendas, together with comparatively scant resources available for their advancement. Seen in these ways, abduction has a significantly practical character, precisely because it is a form of inference that satisfices rather than maximizes its response to the agent's cognitive target.The Reach of Abduction will be necessary reading for researchers, graduatestudents and senior undergraduates in logic, computer science, AI, belief dynamics, argumentation theory, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, linguistics, forensic science, legal reasoning and related areas.Key features:- Reach of Abduction is fully integrated with a background logic of cognitive systems.- The most extensive coverage compared to competitive works.- Demonstrates not only that abduction is a form of ignorance preservinginference but that it is a mode of inference that is wholly rational.- Demonstrates the satisficing rather than maximizing character ofabduction.- The development of formal models of abduction is considerably more extensive than one finds in existing literature. It is an especially impressive amalgam of sophisticatedconceptual analysis and extensive logical modelling.· Reach of Abduction is fully integrated with a background logic of cognitive systems.· The most extensive coverage compared to competitive works· Demonstrates not only that abduction is a form of ignorance preservinginference but that it is a mode of inference that is wholly rational.· Demonstrates the satisficing rather than maximizing character ofabduction.· The development of formal models of abduction is considerably more extensive than one finds in existing literature. It is an especially impressive amalgam of sophisticatedconceptual analysis and extensive logical modelling.
John Bickle presents a new type of reductionism, one that is stronger than one-way dependency yet sidesteps the arguments that sank classical reductionism.
How do we transmit or distribute knowledge, as distinct from generating or producing it? In this book John Greco examines the interpersonal relations and social structures which enable and inhibit the sharing of knowledge within and across epistemic communities. Drawing on resources from moral theory, the philosophy of language, action theory and the cognitive sciences, he considers the role of interpersonal trust in transmitting knowledge, and argues that sharing knowledge involves a kind of shared agency similar to giving a gift or passing a ball. He also explains why transmitting knowledge is easy in some social contexts, such as those involving friendship or caregiving, but impossible in contexts characterized by suspicion and competition rather than by trust and cooperation. His book explores phenomena that have been undertheorized by traditional epistemology, and throws new light on existing problems in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony.
This book provides a detailed review of much of the existing research on visual perception and sports performance. It summarises and integrates the findings of up to five hundred articles from areas as diverse as cognitive and ecological psychology.
Over a distinguished academic career, the Canadian philosopher and scholar John Woods has written on a rich variety of topics central to contemporary philosophy. These include the history and philosophy of logic, deviant logics, inductive and abductive reasoning, informal reasoning, fallacy theory, the logic of fiction, epistemology, and abortion and euthanasia. Not only has Woods' work been significant in itself, it has also stimulated others working in these fields. Mistakes of Reason is a tribute to Woods and contains twenty-six new essays by leading Canadian and international philosophers. The essays are accompanied by commentaries by Woods himself, creating a unique dialogue between Woods and his colleagues. Editors Kent A. Peacock and Andrew D. Irvine have grouped the works under the themes of Reality, Knowledge, Logic and Language, Reasoning, and Values. The essays evaluate Woods' work and celebrate the generous contribution that he has made to Canada's intellectual development over the past forty years.
It is natural to distinguish, for any thinking creature, those events and states that are internal to the creature -- its brain states, for example -- from those that are not. Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central question in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s has been whether there is a kind of mental content that is narrow in this sense. One important line of thought -- by 'externalists' -- has been that so-called intentional states, such as wishing that they sky were blue and believing that the sky is blue, are, perhaps surprisingly, not internal: there could be twins who are exactly alike on the inside but differ with respect to such intentional states. In the face of this wave of externalism, many philosophers have argued that there must be some good sense in which our intentional states are internal after all, and that such narrow content can play various key explanatory roles relating, inter alia, to epistemology and the explanation of action. This book argues that this is a forlorn hope, and defends a thoroughgoing externalism. The entanglement of our minds with the external world runs so deep that no internal component of mentality can easily be cordoned off.
Richard John Kosciejew explores the goals of any scientific enterprise and analyzes the strategies employed in reaching those goals in this well-researched book. The philosophy of science offers a perspective from which we can examine and potentially evaluate the endeavors of cognitive science. Philosophy of mind offers substantive theses about the nature of the mind and of mental activity. While these theses have not resulted from empirical investigation, they have been applied to empirical investigations in cognitive science and its predecessors. However, the roles philosophy plays in cognitive science are quite different and must be examined independently. Some philosophical views about science presented in this book are no longer widely accepted by philosophers of science, but that doesnt change the fact that they have been, and in some cases remain, influential outside of philosophy. Some of these older ideas have also provided starting points for current philosophical thinking. Join the author as he examines the connections between philosophy and science and the ideas of Newton, Einstein, Copernicus, Galileo, and other great thinkers in The Pursuing Presence of Facts.
Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge and conception of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: even if the things we experience (apples, tables, trees, etc), are mind-independent how does our sensory experience of them enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? George Berkeley thought that sensory experience can only provide us with the conception of mind-dependent things, things which cannot exist when they aren't being perceived. It's easy to dismiss Berkeley's conclusion but harder to see how to avoid it. In this book, John Campbell and Quassim Cassam propose very different solutions to Berkeley's Puzzle. For Campbell, sensory experience can be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things because it is a relation, more primitive than thought, between the perceiver and high-level objects and properties in the mind-independent world. Cassam opposes this 'relationalist' solution to the Puzzle and defends a 'representationalist' solution: sensory experience can give us the conception of mind-independent things because it represents its objects as mind-independent, but does so without presupposing concepts of mind-independent things. This book is written in the form of a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience. Although Berkeley's Puzzle frames the debate, the questions addressed by Campbell and Cassam aren't just of historical interest. They are among the most fundamental questions in philosophy.
Sport Psychology is an essential introduction to the field's key issues, suitable for psychology, sport science and sport studies students at all levels. Encompassing the history of sport psychology to more recent distinctions between sport and exercise psychology, it is ideal reading for students looking to learn about issues such as motivation, concentration and anxiety and the connection between physical activity and psychological well-being. This new edition provides updated case studies, guidance on further reading, study questions and brand new content on self-harm in sport and metaimagery. Real-life examples put the theory into practice, and the authors' focus on the freshest theories shows how the discipline has evolved in recent years.
Language lies at the heart of the way we think, communicate and view the world. Most people on this planet are in some sense multilingual. The Multilingual Mind explores, within a processing perspective, how languages share space and interact in our minds. The mental architecture proposed in this volume permits research across many domains in cognitive science to be integrated and explored within one explanatory framework, recasting compatible insights and findings in terms of a common set of terms and concepts. The MOGUL framework has already proven effective for shedding light on the relationship between processing and learning, metalinguistic knowledge, consciousness, optionality, crosslinguistic influence, the initial state, 'UG access', ultimate attainment, input enhancement, and even language instruction. This groundbreaking work will be essential reading for linguists working in language acquisition, multilingualism, and language processing, as well as for those working in related areas of psychology, neurology and cognitive science.
Most philosophical theories of language have assumed that statements (products of assertion) and propositions (objects of belief) are the same things. John L. Pollock denies this, maintaining that even when the speaker is perfectly sincere, what he is thinking need not be the same thing as what he is saying. Originally published in 1982. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Professionals striving for accident reduction must deal with systems in which both technical and human elements play equal and complementary roles. However, many of the existing techniques in ergonomics and risk management concentrate on plant and technical issues and downplay human factors and "subjectivity." Safety Management: A Qualitative Systems Approach describes a body of theories and data that addresses safety by drawing on systems theory and applied psychology, stressing the importance of human activity within systems. It explains in detail the central roles of social consensus and reliability and the nature of verbal reports and functional discourse. This text presents a new approach to safety management, offering a path to both greater safety and to economic savings. It presents a series of methodological tools that have proven to be reliable through extensive use in the rail and nuclear industries. These methods allow organizational and systems failures to be analyzed much more effectively in terms of quantity, precision, and usefulness. The concepts and tools described in this book are particularly valuable for reliability engineers, risk managers, human factors specialists, and safety managers and professionals in safety-critical organizations.
This is the first book-length presentation and defense of a new theory of human and machine cognition, according to which human persons are superminds. Superminds are capable of processing information not only at and below the level of Turing machines (standard computers), but above that level (the "Turing Limit"), as information processing devices that have not yet been (and perhaps can never be) built, but have been mathematically specified; these devices are known as super-Turing machines or hypercomputers. Superminds, as explained herein, also have properties no machine, whether above or below the Turing Limit, can have. The present book is the third and pivotal volume in Bringsjord's supermind quartet; the first two books were What Robots Can and Can't Be (Kluwer) and AI and Literary Creativity (Lawrence Erlbaum). The final chapter of this book offers eight prescriptions for the concrete practice of AI and cognitive science in light of the fact that we are superminds.
The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence; intelligibility; analog and digital systems and supervenience; presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation; and the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood.
We began by perceiving the world through the lenses of symbolic categories, to construct similarities and differences in terms of categorical oppositions and to organize our lives according to themes and narratives. Living in this new symbolic universe, the modern humans had a large compulsion to codify and then recodify their experiences, to translate everything into representation, and to seek out the deeper hidden logic that eliminates inconsistencies and ambiguities. The appending presumption is that sometimes it is taken for granted as fact. However, its decisions are based on the fundamental principles whose assumptions are based on or upon the nature of which were presented by surmising of the one-to-one correspondence having to exist between every element of physical reality and physical theory. This may serve to bridge the gap between mind and world for those who use physical theories. But it also suggests that the Cartesian division is inseparably integrated and structurally real, least of mention, as impregnably formidable for physical reality as it is based on ordinary language. That explains in no small part why the radical separation between mind and world as sanctioned by classical physics and formalized by Descartes, yet it remains, as philosophical postmodernism attests, as one of the most pervasive features of Western intellectual thought.
In this volume, the authors present their view of cognition. They propose that unlike the classical paradigm that takes the mind to be a computer, the mind is best understood as a dynamical system realized in a neural network.
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