Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, 2001, the United States has faced daunting challenges in the areas of foreign policy and national security. Threatened by failing states, insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism, the nation has been compelled to re-evaluate its traditional responses to global conflict. In this timely book, John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring present a much-needed strategy for conducting unconventional warfare in an increasingly violent world. In the early 1990s, Manwaring introduced a new paradigm for addressing low-intensity conflicts, or conflicts other than major wars. Termed the Manwaring Paradigm or SWORD (Small Wars Operations Research Directorate) model, it has been tested successfully by scholars and practitioners and refined in the wake of new and significant “uncomfortable wars” around the world, most notably the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Uncomfortable Wars Revisited broadens the definition of the original paradigm and applies it to specific confrontations
Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.
Security policy is a key factor not only of domestic politics in the U.S., but also of foreign relations and global security. This text sets to explain the process of security policy making in the United States by looking at all the elements that shape it, from institutions and legislation to policymakers themselves and historical precedents. To understand national security policy, the book first needs to address the way national security policy makers see the world. It shows that they generally see it in realist terms where the state is a single rational actor pursuing its national interest. It then focuses on how legislative authorities enable and constrain these policy makers before looking at the organizational context in which policies are made and implemented. This means examining the legal authorities that govern how the system functions, such as the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947, as well as the various governmental institutions whose capabilities either limit or allow execution, such as the CIA, NSA, etc. Next, the text analyzes the processes and products of national security policy making, such as reports, showing how they differ from administration to administration. Lastly, a series of case studies illustrate the challenges of implementing and developing policy. These span the post-Cold war period to the present, and include the Panama crisis, Somalia, the Balkans Haiti, the Iraq wars, and Afghanistan. By combining both the theory and process, this textbook reveals all aspects of the making of national security policy in United States from agenda setting to the successes and failures of implementation.
A historical overview of UN and non-UN peace operations, this book provides a theoretical framework for informing U.S. military doctrine as it relates to peacekeeping. The contributors, who are drawn from scholars, soldiers, diplomats, and security consultants, lay out the political and strategic context for peace operations and present case studies on traditional, aggravated, and enforcement operations, including UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, UNFICYP-Cypress, ONUC-Congo. A historical overview of UN and non-UN peace operations, this book provides a theoretical framework for informing U.S. military doctrine as it relates to peacekeeping. The contributors, who are drawn from scholars, soldiers, diplomats, and security consultants, lay out the political and strategic context for peace operations and present case studies on traditional, aggravated, and enforcement operations, including UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, UNFICYP-Cypress, ONUC-Congo.
The U.S. military spends more than 14 countries combined and possesses state-of-the art weapons and equipment, yet after 13 years of effort, $1.4 trillion, and some 6,000 casualties, it still has been unable to defeat its enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The book explains why and how it can be remedied. It first demonstrates the negative effects of four factors that are prerequisites for military success and that have undermined U.S. military performance since the end of the Cold War. These include uneven civil-military relations; an inability to formulate and execute sound campaign plans; a mistaken approach to counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, and stability operations; and inattention to military options other than regime change. It also acknowledges that other factors often also intervene, and that the enemy plays a decisive role in military outcomes. Still, if the United States is to preserve the use of military force as a reasonable (albeit last resort) policy option, it must develop the means to maintain healthy, reliable civil-military relations, design and execute sound campaign plans appropriate to the adversary in question and the threat it poses to U.S. interests, conduct effective counter-insurgency and irregular warfare campaigns suitable given the size and capabilities of today’s all volunteer armed forces, and develop a menu of military options beyond regime change. The intent is to bring attention to the under-performance of the U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere and prescribe remedies. These solutions cannot be left solely in the hands of the Department of Defense and congressional action and oversight will be essential to favorable outcomes. This is a timely survey as the military is facing downsizing in response to budget pressure that will constrain defense and counter-terrorism spending.
Security policy is a key factor not only of domestic politics in the U.S., but also of foreign relations and global security. This text sets to explain the process of security policy making in the United States by looking at all the elements that shape it, from institutions and legislation to policymakers themselves and historical precedents. To understand national security policy, the book first needs to address the way national security policy makers see the world. It shows that they generally see it in realist terms where the state is a single rational actor pursuing its national interest. It then focuses on how legislative authorities enable and constrain these policy makers before looking at the organizational context in which policies are made and implemented. This means examining the legal authorities that govern how the system functions, such as the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947, as well as the various governmental institutions whose capabilities either limit or allow execution, such as the CIA, NSA, etc. Next, the text analyzes the processes and products of national security policy making, such as reports, showing how they differ from administration to administration. Lastly, a series of case studies illustrate the challenges of implementing and developing policy. These span the post-Cold war period to the present, and include the Panama crisis, Somalia, the Balkans Haiti, the Iraq wars, and Afghanistan. By combining both the theory and process, this textbook reveals all aspects of the making of national security policy in United States from agenda setting to the successes and failures of implementation.
Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.