This short treatise looks at how we construct a social reality from our sense impressions; at how, for example, we construct a ‘five-pound note’ with all that implies in terms of value and social meaning, from the printed piece of paper we see and touch. In The Construction of Social Reality, eminent philosopher John Searle examines the structure of social reality (or those portions of the world that are facts only by human agreement, such as money, marriage, property, and government), and contrasts it to a brute reality that is independent of human agreement. Searle shows that brute reality provides the indisputable foundation for all social reality, and that social reality, while very real, is maintained by nothing more than custom and habit.
There are few more important philosophers at work today than John Searle, a creative and contentious thinker who has shaped the way we think about mind and language. Now he offers a profound understanding of how we create a social reality--a reality of money, property, governments, marriages, stock markets and cocktail parties. The paradox he addresses in Making the Social World is that these facts only exist because we think they exist and yet they have an objective existence. Continuing a line of investigation begun in his earlier book The Construction of Social Reality, Searle identifies the precise role of language in the creation of all "institutional facts." His aim is to show how mind, language and civilization are natural products of the basic facts of the physical world described by physics, chemistry and biology. Searle explains how a single linguistic operation, repeated over and over, is used to create and maintain the elaborate structures of human social institutions. These institutions serve to create and distribute power relations that are pervasive and often invisible. These power relations motivate human actions in a way that provides the glue that holds human civilization together. Searle then applies the account to show how it relates to human rationality, the freedom of the will, the nature of political power and the existence of universal human rights. In the course of his explication, he asks whether robots can have institutions, why the threat of force so often lies behind institutions, and he denies that there can be such a thing as a "state of nature" for language-using human beings.
John R. Searle has made profoundly influential contributions to three areas of philosophy: philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of society. This volume gathers together in accessible form a selection of his essays in these areas. They range widely across social ontology, where Searle presents concise and informative statements of positions developed in more detail elsewhere; artificial intelligence and cognitive science, where Searle assesses the current state of the debate and develops his most recent thoughts; and philosophy of language, where Searle connects ideas from various strands of his work in order to develop original answers to fundamental questions. There are also explorations of the limitations of phenomenological inquiry, the mind-body problem, and the nature and future of philosophy. This rich collection from one of America's leading contemporary philosophers will be valuable for all who are interested in these central philosophical questions.
In Freedom and Neurobiology, John Searle discusses the possibility of free will within the context of contemporary neurobiology. He begins by explaining the relationship between human reality and the more fundamental reality as described by physics and chemistry. Then he proposes a neurobiological resolution to the problem by demonstrating how various conceptions of free will have different consequences for the neurobiology of consciousness. In the second half of the book, Searle applies his theory of social reality to the problem of political power, explaining the role of language in the formation of our political reality. [...] He argues that consciousness and rationality are the result of the biological evolution of our species. In conclusion, he addresses the problem of free will within the context of a neurobiological conception of consciousness and rationality, and he addresses the problem of political power within the context of this analysis. -- from back cover.
A dozen problems in the philosophy of mind - The turn to materialism - Arguments against materialism - Consciousness and the mind-body problem - The structure of consciousness and neurobiology - Intentionality - Mental causation - Free will - The unconscious and the explanation of behavior - Perception - The self.
John R Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searles philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by John R Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality". "I think Münster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R Searle
Six lectures discuss the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, the workings of the brain, the mental aspect of human action, prediction of human behavior, and free will.
One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe includes brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical particles in fields of force? The essays in this collection are related to this broad overarching issue that unites the diverse strands of Searle's work. As many as these essays have previously only been available in relatively obscure books and journals, this collection will be of particular interest to philosophers and those in psychology and linguistics. Since 1959, John R. Searle has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, where he is now the Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language. His many books include Mind Language and Society, (Basic, 1998). The Construction of Social Reality, (Free Press, 1997), and Speech Acts, (Cambridge, 1969). His works have been translated in 21 languages. Seale has received many prizes, awards and honors, including the Fulbright Award (twice), the Guggenheim, and ACLS Fellowships.
The renowned philosopher John Searle reveals the fundamental nature of social reality. What kinds of things are money, property, governments, nations, marriages, cocktail parties, and football games? Searle explains the key role played by language in the creation, constitution, and maintenance of social reality. We make statements about social facts that are completely objective, for example: Barack Obama is President of the United States, the piece ofpaper in my hand is a twenty-dollar bill, I got married in London, etc. And yet these facts only exist because we think they exist. How is it possible that we can have factual objective knowledge of a reality that is created by subjective opinions? This is part of a much larger question: How can wegive an account of ourselves, with our peculiar human traits DS mind, reason, freedom, society - in a world that we know independently consists of mindless, meaningless particles? How can we account for our social and mental existence in a realm of brute physical facts? In answering this question, Searle avoids postulating different realms of being, a mental and a physical, or worse yet, a mental, a physical, and a social. There is just one reality: Searle shows how the human realityfits into that one reality. Mind, language, and civilization are natural products of the basic facts of the physical world described by physics, chemistry and biology. Searle explains how language creates and maintains the elaborate structures of human social institutions. These institutions serveto create and distribute power relations that are pervasive and often invisible. These power relations motivate human actions in a way that provides the glue that holds human civilization together. Searle shows how this account illuminates human rationality, free will, political power, and human rights. Our social world is a world created and maintained by language.
At an international conference held in 1981 at the Universidada Estudual of Campinas (Brazil), a controversial lecture was given by John Searle which presented two conceptual theses: that conversation does not have an intrinsic structure about which a relevant theory can be formulated, and that conversations are not subject to (constitutive) rules. This lecture was first published in 1986 under the title Notes on Conversation, and was revised several times afterwards. The present volume offers the most recent version. Because of the importance of the article for conversation analysis, and for pragmatics in general, the editors have put together Searle's target article, along with eight original comments. The volume closes with a 'reply to replies' by Searle. In sociolinguistic studies, intralingual code-switching has been given less attention than most other areas, and linguists' attitudes towards the use of non-standard varieties still often suffer from fallacies of prescriptivism. Czech, a clear case of a language having a Standard and a strong central vernacular with intensive shifting between them, offers many points of general interest to sociolinguists.
It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is now, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences": What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body? In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books, John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scientists and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and Israel Rosenfield. He challenges claims that the mind works like a computer, and that brain functions can be reproduced by computer programs. With a sharp eye for confusion and contradiction, he points out which avenues of current research are most likely to come up with a biological examination of how conscious states are caused by the brain. Only when we understand how the brain works will we solve the mystery of consciousness, and only then will we begin to understand issues ranging from artificial intelligence to our very nature as human beings.
At an international conference held in 1981 at the Universidada Estudual of Campinas (Brazil), a controversial lecture was given by John Searle which presented two conceptual theses: that conversation does not have an intrinsic structure about which a relevant theory can be formulated, and that conversations are not subject to (constitutive) rules. This lecture was first published in 1986 under the title “Notes on Conversation”, and was revised several times afterwards. The present volume offers the most recent version. Because of the importance of the article for conversation analysis, and for pragmatics in general, the editors have put together Searle's target article, along with eight original comments. The volume closes with a 'reply to replies' by Searle. In sociolinguistic studies, intralingual code-switching has been given less attention than most other areas, and linguists' attitudes towards the use of non-standard varieties still often suffer from fallacies of prescriptivism. Czech, a clear case of a language having a Standard and a strong central vernacular with intensive shifting between them, offers many points of general interest to sociolinguists.
The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects, writes John Searle, in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false. One of the world's most eminent thinkers, Searle dismantles these theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. He begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind - which he calls Descartes and Other Disasters - problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as materialism, consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, mental causation, free will, and the self. The book offers a refreshingly direct and engaging introduction to one of the most intriguing areas of philosophy.
Revised and updated to reflect recent theoretical developments in the field, Semantics, 4th Edition, presents an engaging and accessible introduction to the study of meaning in language for students new to the field of semantics. Covers all of the basic concepts and methods of the field of semantics, as well as some of the most important contemporary lines of research Features a series of new exercises, along with their solutions, that are arranged by level of difficulty Addresses componential theory, formal semantics, and cognitive semantics, the three main current theoretical approaches to semantics Includes revisions and updates that reflect the most recent theoretical developments
First published in 1984, this book examines corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry. Based on extensive research, including interviews with 131 senior executives of pharmaceutical companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Guatemala, the book is a major study of white-collar crime. Written in the 1980s, it covers topics such as international bribery and corruption, fraud in the testing of drugs and criminal negligence in the unsafe manufacturing of drugs. The author considers the implications of his findings for a range of strategies to control corporate crime, nationally and internationally.
This is the second volume of John McDowell's selected papers. These 19 essays collectively report on McDowell's involvement with questions about the interface between the philosophies of language and mind and with issues in general epistemology.
Uncertainty surrounds the use of publicity as a means of controlling corporate crime. On the one hand, some agree with Justice Brandeis's dictum that light is "the best of disinfectants...the most efficient policeman." On the other hand, many believe that corporations' internal affairs are effectively shrouded with a thick fog that prevents the light of public scrutiny from reaching them. The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders is the first study to go beyond the rhetoric, through an examination of corporate experience. Fisse and Braithwaite have carried out a qualitative inquiry concerning 17 large corporations involved in publicity crises. Based mainly on interviews, the inquiry includes company employees and former employees, union officials, officers of government regulatory agencies, competitors, independent accountants, government prosecutors, public interest activists, judicial officers, stockbrokers, and other experts.
The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental–physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of ‘Non-Cartesian Dualism’, along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind’s place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of the Fourth Edition Includes a new chapter, 'Emergence and Panpsychism' (Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation' (Chapter 8), which was excised from the previous edition Updates 'Descartes' Legacy' (Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E. J. Lowe's arresting 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind’s place in nature Updated 'Suggested Reading' lists at the end of each chapter
When social scientists and social theorists turn to the work of philosophers for intellectual and practical authority, they typically assume that truth, reality, and meaning are to be found outside rather than within our conventional discursive practices. John G. Gunnell argues for conventional realism as a theory of social phenomena and an approach to the study of politics. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s critique of “mentalism” and traditional realism, Gunnell argues that everything we designate as “real” is rendered conventionally, which entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional. The terms “reality” and “world” have no meaning outside the contexts of specific claims and assumptions about what exists and how it behaves. And rather than a mysterious source and repository of prelinguistic meaning, the “mind” is simply our linguistic capacities. Taking readers through contemporary forms of mentalism and realism in both philosophy and American political science and theory, Gunnell also analyzes the philosophical challenges to these positions mounted by Wittgenstein and those who can be construed as his successors.
We began by perceiving the world through the lenses of symbolic categories, to construct similarities and differences in terms of categorical oppositions and to organize our lives according to themes and narratives. Living in this new symbolic universe, the modern humans had a large compulsion to codify and then recodify their experiences, to translate everything into representation, and to seek out the deeper hidden logic that eliminates inconsistencies and ambiguities. The appending presumption is that sometimes it is taken for granted as fact. However, its decisions are based on the fundamental principles whose assumptions are based on or upon the nature of which were presented by surmising of the one-to-one correspondence having to exist between every element of physical reality and physical theory. This may serve to bridge the gap between mind and world for those who use physical theories. But it also suggests that the Cartesian division is inseparably integrated and structurally real, least of mention, as impregnably formidable for physical reality as it is based on ordinary language. That explains in no small part why the radical separation between mind and world as sanctioned by classical physics and formalized by Descartes, yet it remains, as philosophical postmodernism attests, as one of the most pervasive features of Western intellectual thought.
Today’s organizations are embedded in global and local network relationships that demand more. They have to consider the importance to customers, investors and employees of being respected in wider society and behaving ethically, so it is increasingly important for companies to reflect systematically on how to balance profits with other criteria when making decisions and acting. In short, they need to learn how to become The Balanced Company. Requiring sustainability in production processes and ethical employment of the work force in suppliers' production facilities, at home and abroad, has resulted in new challenges. Strategists need to make balanced choices about long-term goals and the allocation of resources. They must analyse, understand and adjust strategies to market, political, value and technology-related changes. Communication specialists need to take the value systems and assumptions of stakeholders into consideration. Change specialists need to balance continuity and change. Meanwhile, managers make balanced decisions about control or trust; human resources design jobs to make them attractive as well as motivating, and marketers must consider what is important to consumers and stakeholders. Last but not least, leaders have to acknowledge that there are times when organizations have to be taken out of balance during change. The Balanced Company provides answers to corporately responsible and ethically driven balanced decision making. Read it to help your company and stakeholders identify what can be achieved and what to avoid, and about the processes by which values are taken into account and applied in practice.
This book is the first major study of political correctness in post compulsory education to be published in the UK. For readers in the UK unfamiliar with the nature of the controversies in US college campuses this book offers a comprehensive assessment of the key themes, including who and what was behind key campaigns. For readers in the US unfamiliar with how this cultural export has faired in the UK, this book looks at the significant similarities and differences in the ways that the phrase has been used in both societies.
Taylor provides an in-depth analysis of possessive constructions in English in terms of Cognitive Grammar, as developed by Ronald Langacker and others. He also provides a wide-ranging critique of alternative analyses, especially those derived from the Chomskyan school.
A philosophic-cum-romantic novel in which a young writer becomes involved with the wife of an influential publisher and ends-up paying the price, as does a certain philosopher friend of his, whose double-dealing in connection with a mutual girlfriend proves more difficult to manage than he had at first suspected, putting him at cross-purposes with them both, to their mutual disadvantage!
What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 10th Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AI'97, held in Perth, Australia, in November/December 1997. The volume presents 48 revised full papers selected from a total of 143 submissions. Also included are three keynote talks and one invited paper. The book is divided into topical sections on constraint satisfaction and scheduling, computer vision, distributed AI, evolutionary computing, knowledge-based systems, knowledge representation and reasoning, learning and machine vision, machine learning, NLP and user modeling, neural networks, robotics and machine recognition, and temporal qualitative reasoning.
Information and Consciousness: An Exploration connects information and consciousness in ways that will open up potential inquiry into what information is, how it works, and its relationship to human consciousness. Information has been taken to mean many things in the past; the risk has been that, if it is taken to mean everything, it may mean nothing. In this book, information’s definition is restricted to the inclusion of meaning and truth in discursive action. Consciousness, for its part, has frequently been taken to refer to the material workings of the brain. Recent inquiry has led to a broadening to embrace the human body and the environment in extended consciousness. Using these two conceptions, the connections between information and consciousness are explored. The book includes a unique definition of information that centers on discursive action, meaning, and truth; the role of sign systems—semiotics—and how it is connected to what information is; a critique of the standard model of consciousness, and an investigation of alternatives; an alternative to embodied/extended consciousness as a preferred model, and an exploration of its role with respect to information; and more. The book aims to make connections between what informs humans and what humans are conscious of. Anyone who is concerned with how people identify what informs will be interested in the entirety of the work. The author provides readers with the foundation they need to understand the most common conceptions of what information and consciousness are. Information and Consciousness also looks into the future for enquiry. Presenting a different way of conceiving information and consciousness, the book shows a way forward for enquiry and education.
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