Bruce Metzger calls the Westcott-Hort text "The most noteworthy critical edition of the Greek Testament ever produced by British scholarship." In their monumental critical edition of "The New Testament in the Original Greek," Cambridge professors B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort established the Greek text that has become the essential basis for nearly all subsequent editions and English translations. Through their groundbreaking reconstruction of New Testament textual history and their rigorous reexamination of the manuscript evidence, Westcott and Hort inaugurated a new era of textual study that has set the stage for all subsequent work. Beyond preserving the landmark text, this new edition offers students and scholars alike a handy and affordable Greek Testament for day-to-day use that includes English headings, synoptic parallels, and complete references to Old Testament quotations. This edition also includes a revision and expansion of Alexander Souter's "A Pocket Lexicon of the Greek New Testament." Long a favorite among biblical scholars, Souter's "Pocket Lexicon" offers concise yet clear English definitions and helpful grammatical information on every Greek word used in the New Testament. A Foreword by renowned New Testament textual scholar, Dr. Eldon J. Epp, sets the Westcott-Hort text in historical perspective for contemporary readers. FEATURES - Detailed apparatus comparing the Westcott/Hort text with differences in the 27th edition of Nestle/Aland and Robinson/Pierpont Byzantine editions - Complete references to Old Testament citations and synoptic gospel parallels - English section headings for easy navigation - Revised and expanded Souter Greek dictionary - Bible maps
Why does the United States need European allies, and why is it getting more difficult for those allies to partner with Washington in standing up to China, pushing back against Russia, and pursuing other common interests around the world? This book addresses the economic, demographic, political, and military trends that are fundamentally upending the ability and willingness of European allies to work with Washington. Brexit and its impact on Britain’s economy and its military, Germany’s seemingly relentless economic and political rise, France’s continuing economic malaise, Italy’s aging population and its withdrawal from major overseas operations, and Poland’s demographic decline and single-minded obsession with Russia will combine to make partnership with Washington nearly impossible. In short, the constellation of allies and partners the United States has relied on since 9/11 will look very different a decade from now. How should Washington respond? It doesn’t hold all the cards, but this book offers an array of practical recommendations for American leaders. By leveraging these proposals, U.S. policy-makers can avoid the worst-case scenarios and make the most of limited opportunities.
Relations between the United States and Russia have recently escalated from strained to outright aggressive. From imperial expansion in Ukraine to intervention in Syria to Russian hacking during the US election in 2016, it is clear that the United States must be prepared to defend itself and its NATO allies against Russian aggression. Resurgent Russia, researched and written by six residents and internationally experienced officers at the US Army War College, analyzes the current threat of Russian acts of war—both conventional military attacks and unconventional cyber warfare or political attacks—against the United Stated and NATO. The officers detail how the America can use its international military resources and political influence to both prepare for and deter aggression ordered by Vladimir Putin, making it clear that such an attack would be unsuccessful and therefore keeping the peace. This study provides a clear assessment of how the United States and its allies must utilize their political and military power to deter Russian aggression and maintain the hierarchy of power in today’s world.
The utility of U.S. forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions-and in particular the arguments against forward presence-in the context of a decades' long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others, mistakenly tie forward basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, the author bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. This monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American landpower, particular in this age of austerity.
The maintenance and management of the NATO alliance is a delicate balancing act between responding to security threats and navigating the bargaining positions of the member states. This book highlights how the alliance managed to maintain that balance in an area critical to its operations today around the world - changing its Cold War-era doctrine and structures. Based on his findings, John Deni debates whether the NATO alliance ought to be considered by policy makers to be a political organization first and a military one second. Providing new empirical data valuable to our understanding of NATO's post-Cold War evolution, the book offers a unique perspective on alliance management and maintenance. It sheds light on the continuing debate surrounding NATO's role in security, how the alliance will fight and whether NATO is properly structured to continue providing security for its member states.
For much of the last 25 years, NATO has focused on crisis managementin places such as Kosovo and Afghanistan,resulting in major changes to alliance strategy, resourcing,force structure, and training. Re-embracing collective defense —which lies at the heart of the Treaty of Washington’s Article 5 commitment— is no easy feat, and not something NATO can do through rhetoric and official pronouncements. Nonetheless,this shift is vitally necessary if the alliance is to remain the bulwark of Western defense and security. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally upended the security environment in Europe, thrusting NATO into the spotlight as the primary collective defense tool most European states rely upon to ensure their security. Collective defense is one of the alliance’s threecore missions, along with crisis management and cooperative security. It is defined in Article 5, the most well-known and arguably most important part of NATO’s founding treaty, which states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Although all three missions are vital to the interests of NATO’s many member states, collective defense has become first among equals once again. However,three very significant hurdles stand in the way of the alliance and its member states as they attempt to re-embrace collective defense. These loosely correspond to an ends-waysmeans construct. First is the alliance's strategy toward Russia. Is Russia an adversary,a partner,neither,or both? How should strategy and policies change to place the alliance and its members on more solid ground when it comes to managing Russia? Second are the ongoing disputes over resourcing and burden-sharing. In recent years, it has become commonplace for American leaders to publicly berate European allies in an effort to garner more contributions to the common defense. How might the alliance better measure and more equitably share security burdens? Third is the alliance’s readiness to fulfill its objectives. Many allies have announced or are implementing increases in defense spending. However, governments of European NATO member states are strongly incentivized by domestic politics to favor acquisition of military hardware or spending on personnel salaries and benefits,usually at the expense of readiness. The result is that NATO military forces risk quickly becoming hollow in a way that is often underappreciated, which will prevent the alliance from fulfilling the collective defense promise inherent in Article 5. The book examines all such questions to assess NATO’s return to collective defense and offer a roadmap for overcoming those challenges in both the short and long-term.
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has since authorized more than $1.5 billion for a wide array of weapons destruction, demilitarization, nuclear security, and nonproliferation activities in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.
For much of the last 25 years, NATO has focused on crisis managementin places such as Kosovo and Afghanistan,resulting in major changes to alliance strategy, resourcing,force structure, and training. Re-embracing collective defense —which lies at the heart of the Treaty of Washington’s Article 5 commitment— is no easy feat, and not something NATO can do through rhetoric and official pronouncements. Nonetheless,this shift is vitally necessary if the alliance is to remain the bulwark of Western defense and security. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally upended the security environment in Europe, thrusting NATO into the spotlight as the primary collective defense tool most European states rely upon to ensure their security. Collective defense is one of the alliance’s threecore missions, along with crisis management and cooperative security. It is defined in Article 5, the most well-known and arguably most important part of NATO’s founding treaty, which states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Although all three missions are vital to the interests of NATO’s many member states, collective defense has become first among equals once again. However,three very significant hurdles stand in the way of the alliance and its member states as they attempt to re-embrace collective defense. These loosely correspond to an ends-waysmeans construct. First is the alliance's strategy toward Russia. Is Russia an adversary,a partner,neither,or both? How should strategy and policies change to place the alliance and its members on more solid ground when it comes to managing Russia? Second are the ongoing disputes over resourcing and burden-sharing. In recent years, it has become commonplace for American leaders to publicly berate European allies in an effort to garner more contributions to the common defense. How might the alliance better measure and more equitably share security burdens? Third is the alliance’s readiness to fulfill its objectives. Many allies have announced or are implementing increases in defense spending. However, governments of European NATO member states are strongly incentivized by domestic politics to favor acquisition of military hardware or spending on personnel salaries and benefits,usually at the expense of readiness. The result is that NATO military forces risk quickly becoming hollow in a way that is often underappreciated, which will prevent the alliance from fulfilling the collective defense promise inherent in Article 5. The book examines all such questions to assess NATO’s return to collective defense and offer a roadmap for overcoming those challenges in both the short and long-term.
Why does the United States need European allies, and why is it getting more difficult for those allies to partner with Washington in standing up to China, pushing back against Russia, and pursuing other common interests around the world? This book addresses the economic, demographic, political, and military trends that are fundamentally upending the ability and willingness of European allies to work with Washington. Brexit and its impact on Britain’s economy and its military, Germany’s seemingly relentless economic and political rise, France’s continuing economic malaise, Italy’s aging population and its withdrawal from major overseas operations, and Poland’s demographic decline and single-minded obsession with Russia will combine to make partnership with Washington nearly impossible. In short, the constellation of allies and partners the United States has relied on since 9/11 will look very different a decade from now. How should Washington respond? It doesn’t hold all the cards, but this book offers an array of practical recommendations for American leaders. By leveraging these proposals, U.S. policy-makers can avoid the worst-case scenarios and make the most of limited opportunities.
The maintenance and management of the NATO alliance is a delicate balancing act between responding to security threats and navigating the bargaining positions of the member states. This book highlights how the alliance managed to maintain that balance in an area critical to its operations today around the world - changing its Cold War-era doctrine and structures. Based on his findings, John Deni debates whether the NATO alliance ought to be considered by policy makers to be a political organization first and a military one second. Providing new empirical data valuable to our understanding of NATO's post-Cold War evolution, the book offers a unique perspective on alliance management and maintenance. It sheds light on the continuing debate surrounding NATO's role in security, how the alliance will fight and whether NATO is properly structured to continue providing security for its member states.
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