Hailed by many as the world's greatest harmonica player, John Popper has redefined the instrument. As the lead singer and principal songwriter of Blues Traveler, Popper has performed for more than 30 million people over 2,000 live dates and composed such radio staples as "Hook," "But Anyway," and "Run-Around," the longest-charting single in Billboard history. He has appeared with Eric Clapton and B. B. King at the White House, welcomed the Hungarian ambassador to the stage, and inducted Carlos Santana into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame. In Suck and Blow, Popper shares a candid, spirited account of his life and career. A straight-F student at Princeton High School, Popper's life changed with one serendipitous harmonica solo that captured the attention of his mercurial band teacher (the same teacher whose life was later fictionalized in the Academy Award-winning film Whiplash). After befriending three fellow musicians with whom he would form Blues Traveler, Popper's academic career nearly ended in twelfth grade, until a meeting with the Dean of the New School for Social Research in which Popper pulled out his trusty harp and played his way into college. Popper and Blues Traveler soon became enmeshed in the lower Manhattan music scene of the late 1980s, eventually becoming the house band at the fabled Wetlands Preserve and embarking on a journey that would one day land the group at Madison Square Garden on New Year's Eve. Along the way, Popper and his cohorts commanded the attention of fans and bands alike, through inspired performances and riotous debauchery. Popper's unique perspective on the music business began under the tutelage of Blues Traveler's mentor and manager Bill Graham. After the rock impresario's untimely passing, Popper applied many of Graham's lessons to the formation of the H.O.R.D.E. tour, which John co-owned and hosted over eight years, welcoming such artists as Neil Young, the Allman Brothers Band, Phish, Dave Matthews Band, Ziggy Marley, and his longtime friends the Spin Doctors. Popper also shares a forthright assessment of his longstanding battle with obesity. Plagued by weight problems since childhood, a motorcycle accident a few years into his career confined him to a wheelchair for two years while his weight ballooned to 436 pounds. Angioplasty, gastric bypass surgery, and a tattoo on his chest that reads "I Want to Be Brave" when viewed in the mirror are products of Popper's struggle, compounded by codependency issues and the untimely death of founding Blues Traveler bassist Bobby Sheehan. Popper's personal identity is entwined with his political passions. A staunch supporter of gun rights, he has performed at the National Republican Convention, yet he also maintains liberal positions on social issues. He will reconcile these views and share his encounters with the Bush family, the Clintons, the Gores, and other politicos. The iconoclastic, self-described Johnny Appleharp also dishes on cutting contests, Twitter trolls, party fouls, and prostitutes. In Suck and Blow, John Popper does it all with his signature honesty, humility, and humor. /DIV
John H. Sceski argues that Karl Popper's philosophy offers a radical treatment of objectivity that can reconcile freedom and progress in a manner that preserves the best elements of the Enlightenment tradition. His book traces the development of Popper's account of objectivity by examining his original contributions to key issues in the philosophy of science. Popper's early confrontation with logical positivism, his rarely discussed four-fold treatment of the problem of induction, and his theory of propensities and evolutionary epistemology are linked in a novel way to produce a coherent and philosophically relevant picture of objectivity. Sceski also explores and clarifies many central issues in the philosophy of science such as probabilistic support, verisimilitude, and the relationship between special relativity and indeterminism. He concludes that Popper's account of objectivity can best bridge the gap between Enlightenment aims for science and freedom and post-modern misgivings about 'truth', by developing a philosophy that is non-foundationalist yet able to account for the growth of knowledge.
The relation between body and mind is one of the oldest riddles that has puzzled mankind. That material and mental events may interact is accepted even by the law: our mental capacity to concentrate on the task can be seriously reduced by drugs. Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical events, upon the mind of the recipient of the letter. This is what the authors of this book call the 'interaction of mental and physical events'. We know very little about this interaction; and according to recent philosophical fashions this is explained by the alleged fact that we have brains but no thoughts. The authors of this book stress that they cannot solve the body mind problem; but they hope that they have been able to shed new light on it. Eccles especially with his theory that the brain is a detector and amplifier; a theory that has given rise to important new developments, including new and exciting experiments; and Popper with his highly controversial theory of 'World 3'. They show that certain fashionable solutions which have been offered fail to understand the seriousness of the problems of the emergence of life, or consciousness and of the creativity of our minds. In Part I, Popper discusses the philosophical issue between dualist or even pluralist interaction on the one side, and materialism and parallelism on the other. There is also a historical review of these issues. In Part II, Eccles examines the mind from the neurological standpoint: the structure of the brain and its functional performance under normal as well as abnormal circumstances. The result is a radical and intriguing hypothesis on the interaction between mental events and detailed neurological occurrences in the cerebral cortex. Part III, based on twelve recorded conversations, reflects the exciting exchange between the authors as they attempt to come to terms with their opinions.
On October 25, 1946, in a crowded room in Cambridge, England, the great twentieth-century philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper came face to face for the first and only time. The meeting -- which lasted ten minutes -- did not go well. Their loud and aggressive confrontation became the stuff of instant legend, but precisely what happened during that brief confrontation remained for decades the subject of intense disagreement. An engaging mix of philosophy, history, biography, and literary detection, Wittgenstein's Poker explores, through the Popper/Wittgenstein confrontation, the history of philosophy in the twentieth century. It evokes the tumult of fin-de-siécle Vienna, Wittgentein's and Popper's birthplace; the tragedy of the Nazi takeover of Austria; and postwar Cambridge University, with its eccentric set of philosophy dons, including Bertrand Russell. At the center of the story stand the two giants of philosophy themselves -- proud, irascible, larger than life -- and spoiling for a fight.
If ever a major study of the history of science should have acted like a sudden revolution it is this book, published in two volumes in 1905 and 1906 under the title, Les origines de la statique. Paris, the place of publication, and the Librairie scientifique A. Hermann that brought it be enough of a guarantee to prevent a very different out, could seem to outcome. Without prompting anyone, for some years yet, to follow up the revolutionary vistas which it opened up, Les origines de la statique certainly revolutionized Duhem's remaining ten or so years. He became the single-handed discoverer of a vast new land of Western intellectual history. Half a century later it could still be stated about the suddenly proliferating studies in medieval science that they were so many commentariesonDuhem's countlessfindings and observations. Of course, in 1906, Paris and the intellectual world in general were mesmerized by Bergson's Evolution creatrice, freshly off the press. It was meant to bring about a revolution. Bergson challenged head-on the leading dogma of the times, the idea of mechanistic evolution. He did so by noting, among other things, that to speak of vitalism was at least a roundabout recognition of scientific ignorance about a large number of facts concerning life-processes. He held high the idea of a "vital impetus passing through matter," and indeed through all matter or the universe, an impetus thatcould be detected only through intuitiveknowledge.
Lyndall Popper and John Peacock have combined to come up with a really fresh approach, both from a cookery and a photographic point of view. This book is a melange of recipes -- a fusion of styles which will tempt even the most jaded palate and is designed for the fresh approach of the new millennium.
Central Works of Philosophy" is a major multi-volume collection of essays on the core texts of the Western philosophical tradition. From Plato's "Republic" to the present day, the five volumes range over 2,500 years of philosophical writing covering the best, most representative, and most influential work of some of our greatest philosophers. Each essay has been specially commissioned and provides an overview of the work, clear and authoritative exposition of its central ideas, and an assessment of the work's importance. Together these books provide an unrivaled companion for studying and reading philosophy, one that introduces the reader to the masterpieces of the western philosophical canon. The period, 1900-60, which this volume covers, witnessed changes in logical and linguistic analysis far beyond anything dreamt of in the previous history of the subject. The volume begins with chapters on the key texts of the Cambridge philosophers, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, which together marked the emergence of analytical philosophy. The Vienna Circle of the 1920s, and the development of logical positivism in the 1930s and 1940s are represented by chapters on two fundamental works by Carnap and Ayer. William James' "Pragmatism," which formulated pragmatism's epistemology and made it known throughout the world represents in the volume the distinctive ideas of the American pragmatists. Essays on Husserl's "The Idea of Phenomenology," Heidegger's "Being and Time," Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" and Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" cover the core texts of the hugely significant phenomenological movement. Of the linguistic philosophy that dominated the English-speaking world in the immediate postwar years, Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" and Ryle's "The Concept of the Mind" are discussed in turn. The volume concludes with Karl Popper's influential account of the nature of science. Volume 4 covers the key works of philosophy written in the period 1900-60, which witnessed developments in logical and linguistic analysis far beyond anything dreamt of in the previous history of the subject. The volume includes chapters on central works by the Cambridge philosophers Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, which together contributed to the emergence of analytic philosophy. The ideas of the Vienna Circle of the 1920s, and the logical positivism of the 1930s and 1940s are explored in chapters dealing with the works of Carnap and Ayer, and the distinctive ideas of the American pragmatists are discussed in a chapter on William James' Pragmatism, which propagated pragmatism by presenting its central tenets in a clear and accessible form. Essays on Husserl's "The Idea of Phenomenology," Heidegger's "Being and Time," Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" and Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" cover the core texts of the continental European traditions of phenomenology and existentialism. Of the linguistic philosophy that dominated the English-speaking world in the immediate postwar years, Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" and Ryle's "The Concept of Mind" are discussed in turn. The volume concludes with a chapter on Karl Popper's influential account of the nature of scientific method in his seminal work, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
On 25 October 1946, in a crowded room in Cambridge, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper came face to face for the first and only time. The encounter lasted only ten minutes, and did not go well. Almost immediately, rumours started to spread around the world that the two philosophers had come to blows, armed with red-hot pokers . . .
An epic saga that takes readers into another dimension, the secret world of books. The hero Buddy can step inside any book and bring the pages to life. It is a talent that turns into a nightmare when he stumbles upon a witch's plot to destroy his precious library book with a terrible spell.
An animated TV series has been produced and presented to both BBC and ITV. Each episode highlights the moral lessons of the age-old struggle against adversity and the irrepressible search for a better life. The first story follows the adventures of a bunch of monkeys and a gorilla, who escape from the harsh regime of a seedy zoo in a bid to return to the jungle and the freedom of the wild. Quickly led astray by idle promises and their own naivety, the fugitives learn that grass isn't always greener on the other side of the wall - and jungles come in all shapes and sizes - just like the wild life. Suddenly finding themselves on the run in the very heart of America's concrete jungle, the struggle for survival takes on a new twist among the strange animal tribes down on mean street. And that's where their education and real life adventures are just about to start.
The problem of the relation between our bodies and our minds, and espe cially of the link between brain structures and processes on the one hand and mental dispositions and events on the other is an exceedingly difficult one. Without pretending to be able to foresee future developments, both authors of this book think it improbable that the problem will ever be solved, in the sense that we shall really understand this relation. We think that no more can be expected than to make a little progress here or there. We have written this book in the hope that we have been able to do so. We are conscious of the fact that what we have done is very conjectur al and very modest. We are aware of our fallibility; yet we believe in the intrinsic value of every human effort to deepen our understanding of our selves and of the world we live in. We believe in humanism: in human rationality, in human science, and in other human achievements, however fallible they are. We are unimpressed by the recurrent intellectual fashions that belittle science and the other great human achievements. An additional motive for writing this book is that we both feel that the debunking of man has gone far enough - even too far. It is said that we had to learn from Copernicus and Darwin that man's place in the universe is not so exalted or so exclusive as man once thought. That may well be.
John H. Sceski argues that Karl Popper's philosophy offers a radical treatment of objectivity that can reconcile freedom and progress in a manner that preserves the best elements of the Enlightenment tradition. His book traces the development of Popper's account of objectivity by examining his original contributions to key issues in the philosophy of science. Popper's early confrontation with logical positivism, his rarely discussed four-fold treatment of the problem of induction, and his theory of propensities and evolutionary epistemology are linked in a novel way to produce a coherent and philosophically relevant picture of objectivity. Sceski also explores and clarifies many central issues in the philosophy of science such as probabilistic support, verisimilitude, and the relationship between special relativity and indeterminism. He concludes that Popper's account of objectivity can best bridge the gap between Enlightenment aims for science and freedom and post-modern misgivings about 'truth', by developing a philosophy that is non-foundationalist yet able to account for the growth of knowledge.
This book is the first comprehensive critical study of the work of Paul Feyerabend, one of the foremost twentieth-century philosophers of science. The book traces the evolution of Feyerabend's thought, beginning with his early attempt to graft insights from Wittgenstein's conception of meaning onto Popper's falsificationist philosophy. The key elements of Feyerabend's model of the acquisition of knowledge are identified and critically evaluated. Feyerabend's early work emerges as a continuation of Popper's philosophy of science, rather than as a contribution to the historical approach to science with which he is usually associated. In his more notorious later work, Feyerabend claimed that there was, and should be, no such thing as the scientific method. The roots of Feyerabend's 'epistemological anarchism' are exposed and the weaknesses of his cultural relativism are brought out. Throughout the book, Preston discusses the influence of Feyerabend's thought on contemporary philosophers and traces his stimulating but divided legacy. The book will be of interest to students of philosophy, methodology, and the social sciences.
Economic Methodology explores the status and character of economics as a social science and introduces students to philosophical issues underlying modern science. Approaching the subject as philosophy of science for economists, the authors use the historical developments in philosophy of science to frame this introduction to the field of economic methodology. By doing this they strengthen students' understanding of economics as a science to enhance their reasoning skills, introducing them to the wider philosophical issues surrounding our understanding of the area.
This book identifies and explains far-ranging consequences for methodology as a consequence of the observation that all rationality is social, and highlights the need for methodological reforms in publications and interactions among colleagues and research programs. The idea that all rationality is social needs to be part and parcel of all social scientific theories, which means that their content must be changed. Sociology needs to study the impact of social rules, economics must revise assumptions about how individual rationality impacts financial developments, and cognitive psychology must include social dimensions. In addition, there is also a need for moral theories that explain how social standards of behavior can be improved in specific institutional contexts.
Theories of explanation in the social sciences vacillate between holism and individualism. Wettersten contends that this has been a consequence of theories of rationality which assume that rationality requires coherent theories to be shown to be true. Rejecting these traditional assumptions about rationality Wettersten claims that the traditional explanations of rationality have placed unrealistic demands on both individuals and institutions. Analysing the theories of Weber and Popper, Wettersten shows that Popper made considerable progress in the theory of rationality, but ultimately stayed too close to the ideas of Hayek, he explains how this dilemma leads to difficulties in economics, anthropology, sociology, ethics and political theory, and constructs an alternative theory that rationality is critical problem-solving in institutional contexts. Wettersten contends that 'the critical consideration of theories followed by their improvement' dispenses with the need for justification and sees rationality as a social phenomena with an institutional basis. The main social advantages this view offers is that the degree of rationality individuals achieve may be increased by institutional reform without moralizing and that we can explain how institutions steer events insofar as we understand how they determine the problems which individuals seek to solve. It is argued that the central moral advantage of this view is that rationality is shown to be Spinozistic in the sense that it is natural and furthers morality and peace of mind.
Since Karl Popper‘s fallibilist portrayal of scientific methodology in the 1940s, critical rationalism has developed in many ways, and in many fields. However, some of these developments still leave deep and important possibilities open. One of these is the portrayal of all rational actions as social. This book elucidates the significance of this perspective in regard to psychology, political and social philosophy, the understanding of how scientists can better communicate, and strategies for better living. The importance of the social theory of rationality for psychology arises above all due to the numerous assumptions made in psychological research that rationality is strictly individualist. This is at hand, for example, in its historical portrayal and in important aspects of cognitive psychology. As shown here, these assumptions have damaging consequences for the relationship of rationality with cognitive and social psychology.
Not available since the 1980s, this up-dated edition by the leading political philosopher, John Gray, outlines his new position on Hayek. In a substantial new chapter, Gray assesses how far the historical development of the last ten years can be deployed in a critique of Hayek's thought. His reassessment is not only a provoking study of a classical philosopher. It is also a timely contribution to the debate over the future of conservatism, as Gray argues that Hayekian liberalism - 'the most well-articulated political theory of the new right' - is flawed.
As staff writer for Scientific American, John Horgan has a window on contemporary science unsurpassed in all the world. Who else routinely interviews the likes of Lynn Margulis, Roger Penrose, Francis Crick, Richard Dawkins, Freeman Dyson, Murray Gell-Mann, Stephen Jay Gould, Stephen Hawking, Thomas Kuhn, Chris Langton, Karl Popper, Stephen Weinberg, and E.O. Wilson, with the freedom to probe their innermost thoughts? In The End Of Science, Horgan displays his genius for getting these larger-than-life figures to be simply human, and scientists, he writes, "are rarely so human . . . so at there mercy of their fears and desires, as when they are confronting the limits of knowledge."This is the secret fear that Horgan pursues throughout this remarkable book: Have the big questions all been answered? Has all the knowledge worth pursuing become known? Will there be a final "theory of everything" that signals the end? Is the age of great discoverers behind us? Is science today reduced to mere puzzle solving and adding detains to existing theories? Horgan extracts surprisingly candid answers to there and other delicate questions as he discusses God, Star Trek, superstrings, quarks, plectics, consciousness, Neural Darwinism, Marx's view of progress, Kuhn's view of revolutions, cellular automata, robots, and the Omega Point, with Fred Hoyle, Noam Chomsky, John Wheeler, Clifford Geertz, and dozens of other eminent scholars. The resulting narrative will both infuriate and delight as it mindless Horgan's smart, contrarian argument for "endism" with a witty, thoughtful, even profound overview of the entire scientific enterprise. Scientists have always set themselves apart from other scholars in the belief that they do not construct the truth, they discover it. Their work is not interpretation but simple revelation of what exists in the empirical universe. But science itself keeps imposing limits on its own power. Special relativity prohibits the transmission of matter or information as speeds faster than that of light; quantum mechanics dictates uncertainty; and chaos theory confirms the impossibility of complete prediction. Meanwhile, the very idea of scientific rationality is under fire from Neo-Luddites, animal-rights activists, religious fundamentalists, and New Agers alike. As Horgan makes clear, perhaps the greatest threat to science may come from losing its special place in the hierarchy of disciplines, being reduced to something more akin to literaty criticism as more and more theoreticians engage in the theory twiddling he calls "ironic science." Still, while Horgan offers his critique, grounded in the thinking of the world's leading researchers, he offers homage too. If science is ending, he maintains, it is only because it has done its work so well.
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