Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide describes a critical chapter in the Vietnam conflict, the first eighteen months of combat by the U.S. Army's ground forces. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, John M. Carland focuses on initial deployments and early combat and takes care to present a well-balanced picture by discussing not only the successes but also the difficulties endemic to the entire effort. This fine work presents the war in all of its detail: the enemy's strategy and tactics, General William C. Westmoreland's search and destroy operations, the helicopters and airmobile warfare, the immense firepower American forces could call upon to counter Communist control of the battlefield, the out-of-country enemy sanctuaries, and the allied efforts to win the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people to the nation's anti-Communist government. Carland's volume demonstrates that U.S. forces succeeded in achieving their initial goals, but unexpected manpower shortages made Westmoreland realize that the transition from stemming the tide to taking the offensive would take longer. Bruising battles with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the Saigon area and in the Central Highlands had halted their drive to conquest in 1965 and, with major base development activities afoot, a series of high-tempo spoiling operations in 1966 kept them off balance until more U.S. fighting units arrived in the fall. Carland credits the improvements in communications and intelligence, the helicopter's capacity to extend the battlefield, and the availability of enormous firepower as the potent ingredients in Westmoreland's optimism for victory, yet realizes that the ultimate issue of how effective the U.S. Army would be and what it would accomplish during the next phase was very much a question mark.
Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide describes a critical chapter in the Vietnam conflict, the first eighteen months of combat by the U.S. Army's ground forces. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, John M. Carland focuses on initial deployments and early combat and takes care to present a well-balanced picture by discussing not only the successes but also the difficulties endemic to the entire effort. This fine work presents the war in all of its detail: the enemy's strategy and tactics, General William C. Westmoreland's search and destroy operations, the helicopters and airmobile warfare, the immense firepower American forces could call upon to counter Communist control of the battlefield, the out-of-country enemy sanctuaries, and the allied efforts to win the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people to the nation's anti-Communist government. Carland's volume demonstrates that U.S. forces succeeded in achieving their initial goals, but unexpected manpower shortages made Westmoreland realize that the transition from stemming the tide to taking the offensive would take longer. Bruising battles with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the Saigon area and in the Central Highlands had halted their drive to conquest in 1965 and, with major base development activities afoot, a series of high-tempo spoiling operations in 1966 kept them off balance until more U.S. fighting units arrived in the fall. Carland credits the improvements in communications and intelligence, the helicopter's capacity to extend the battlefield, and the availability of enormous firepower as the potent ingredients in Westmoreland's optimism for victory, yet realizes that the ultimate issue of how effective the U.S. Army would be and what it would accomplish during the next phase was very much a question mark.
American politics changed forever in January 1973. In the span of 31 days, the Watergate burglars went on trial, the Nixon administration negotiated an end to the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court issued its Roe v. Wade decision, Lyndon Johnson died in Texas (and Harry Truman had just died), and Richard Nixon began his second term. The events had unlikely links and each worked along with the others to create a time of immense transformation. Roe in particular pushed political opponents to the outer reaches of each party, making compromise something that has become more and more difficult. Using newly released Nixon tapes, author and historian James Robenalt provides readers a fly-on-the-Oval-Office-wall look at what happened in the White House, events both fascinating and terrifying, during this monumental month. He also delves into the judge's chambers and courtroom drama during the Watergate break-in trial, and the inner sanctum of the US Supreme Court as it hashed out its decision in Roe v. Wade. A foreword by John W. Dean sets the stage for this unique, insider history. Though the events took place more than forty years ago, they're key to understanding today's political paralysis. James Robenalt is a trial lawyer and the author of The Harding Affair and Linking Rings. He, along with lecture partner John W. Dean, are sought-after speakers on the Watergate scandal. John W. Dean was White House Counsel under Richard Nixon, and is a bestselling author, most recently of The Nixon Defense.
A Vietnam veteran recounts his experience through two tours of duty—early in the conflict and then in its final stages. Fresh out of West Point, John Howard arrived for his first tour in Vietnam in 1965, the first full year of escalation when U.S. troop levels increased dramatically, from 23,000 to 184,000. When Howard returned for a second tour in 1972, troop strength stood at 24,000 and would dwindle to a mere fifty the following year. He thus participated in the very early and very late stages of American military involvement in the Vietnam War. Howard’s two tours—the first as a platoon commander and member of an elite counterguerrilla force, and the second as a senior advisor to the South Vietnamese—provide a fascinating lens through which to view not only one soldier’s experience in Vietnam, but also the country’s.
This is the story of how the United States Army responded to the challenges of the end of the Cold War by transforming itself into the most capable ground force in the world today. It argues that from 1989 through 2005 the U.S. Army attempted, and largely achieved, a centrally directed and institutionally driven transformation relevant to ground warfare that exploited Information Age technology, adapted to post?Cold War strategic circumstances, and integrated into parallel Department of Defense efforts. The process not only modernized equipment, it also substantially altered doctrine, organization, training, administrative and logistical practices, and the service culture. Kevlar Legions further contends that the digitized expeditionary Army has withstood the test of combat, performing superbly with respect to deployment and high-end conventional combat and capably with respect to low-intensity conflict and the counterinsurgency challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan.
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