Digitalization is reshaping economic activity, shrinking the role of cash, and spurring new digital forms of money. Central banks have been pondering wheter and how to adapt. One possibility is central bank digital currency (CBDC)-- a widely accessible digital form of fiat money that could be legal tender. This discussion note proposes a conceptual framework to assess the case for CBDC adoption from the perspective of users and central banks. It discusses possible CBDC designs, and explores potential benefits and costs, with a focus on the impact on monetary policy, financial stability, and integrity. This note also surveys research and pilot studies on CBDC by central banks around the world.
This paper examines key considerations around central bank digital currency (CBDC) for use by the general public, based on a comprehensive review of recent research, central bank experiments, and ongoing discussions among stakeholders. It looks at the reasons why central banks are exploring retail CBDC issuance, policy and design considerations; legal, governance and regulatory perspectives; plus cybersecurity and other risk considerations. This paper makes a contribution to the CBDC literature by suggesting a structured framework to organize discussions on whether or not to issue CBDC, with an operational focus and a project management perspective.
Digitalization of the economy provides both challenges and opportunities. Central banks should ensure that they have the capacity to continue to meet their policy objectives in the digital age. It is in this context that central bank digital currency (CBDC) should be evaluated. If designed appropriately, CBDCs could allow central banks to modernize payment systems and future-proof central bank money as the pace and shape of digitalization continues to evolve. However, the decision to proceed with CBDC exploration and an eventual launch would need to be jurisdiction specific, depending on the degree of digitalization of the economy, the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the central bank’s internal capacity. This paper proposes a dynamic decision-making framework under which the central bank can make decisions under uncertainty. A phased and iterative approach could allow central banks to adjust the pace, scale, and scope of their CBDC projects as the domestic and international environment changes.
Central banks are increasingly pondering whether to issue their own digital currencies to the general public, so-called retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). The majority of IMF member countries are actively evaluating CBDCs, with only a few having issued CBDCs or undertaken extensive pilots or tests. This paper shines the spotlight on the handful of countries at the frontier in the hope of identifying and sharing insights, lessons, and open questions for the benefit of the many countries following in their footsteps. Clearly, what can be gleaned from these experiences does not necessarily apply elsewhere. The sample of countries remains small and country circumstances differ widely. However, the insights in this paper may inspire further investigation and allow countries to gain time by building on the experience of others. Importantly, the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the courses taken by different jurisdictions, but to study and discuss their key experiences and lessons. The paper studies six advanced CBDC projects, drawing on collaboration and exchanges with the respective central banks to get insights beyond what has previously been published. Unless a specific published source is cited, all information stems from interviews and workshops with members of CBDC project teams in each jurisdiction.
This paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of life expectancy assumptions on the liabilities of private U.S. defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Using detailed actuarial and financial information provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, we construct a longevity variable for each pension plan and then measure the impact of varying life expectancy assumptions across plans and over time on pension plan liabilities. The results indicate that each additional year of life expectancy increases pension liabilities by about 3 to 4 percent. This effect is not only statistically highly significant but also economically: each year of additional life expectancy would increase private U.S. DB pension plan liabilities by as much as $84 billion.
We find that Credit Rating Agencies (CRA)'s opinions have an impact in the cost of funding of sovereign issuers and consequently ratings are a concern for financial stability. While ratings produced by the major CRAs perform reasonably well when it comes to rank ordering default risk among sovereigns, there is evidence of rating stability failure during the recent global financial crisis. These failures suggest that ratings should incorporate the obligor's resilience to stress scenarios. The empirical evidence also supports: (i) reform initiatives to reduce the impact of CRAs' certification services; (ii) more stringent validation requirements for ratings if they are to be used in capital regulations; and (iii) more transparency with regard to the quantitative parameters used in the rating process.
What is in Creating Lean Dealers? Creating Lean Dealers is a DIY guide to enable dealers to achieve such a step-change for themselves. It works through, using examples, diagrams and detailed instructions, how to transform performance in service and repair. Then it goes on to describe how the same logic can be applied to all other areas of the dealer business to give a win-win-win for customers, dealer staff and shareholders. The journey to becoming a Lean dealer begins by getting a real understanding of two things: The ability of the processes in the dealership to deliver right first time on time at every step - a measure that authors David Brunt and John Kiff call ‘Customer Fulfilment’ because it is the core of what customers value. The actual demand on those processes and separating it into different types. The next step is to use these measures, together with a map of the ‘current state’ of the process, to define and prioritise what the problems are and then address them, with the teams who do the work, in a structured way using the Plan-Do-Check-Act method of improvement. A series of questions then guides the dealer to develop a ‘future state’ map of the process - a picture of what the process will look like, typically in 6 months time, when the problems have been addressed and some of the wastes eliminated so that more of the time is spent creating the value that customers want - what Lean thinkers call ‘Flow’. An accompanying action plan lists the ‘bite-sized steps’ needed to achieve the transformation. But like every transformational change, management plays a critical role. Without a fully committed CEO leading from the top improvements are almost certainly doomed to fail. It soon becomes apparent that management has to question and sometimes ‘unlearn’ many of its traditional management methods. Core to this is shifting the mind-set from managing results to managing processes using visual progress boards (rather than computers) on a daily or even an hourly basis - because good results are a direct product of good processes.
Credit derivative markets are largely unregulated, but calls are increasingly being made for changes to this "hands off" stance, amidst concerns that they helped to fuel the current financial crisis, or that they could be a cause of the next one. The purpose of this paper is to address two basic questions: (i) do credit derivative markets increase systemic risk; and (ii) should they be regulated more closely, and if so, how and to what extent? The paper begins with a basic description of credit derivative markets and recent events, followed by an assessment of their recent association with systemic risk. It then reviews and evaluates some of the authorities' proposed initiatives, and discusses some alternative directions that could be taken.
Credit rating agencies face a difficult trade-off between delivering both accurate and stable ratings. In particular, its users have consistently expressed a preference for rating stability, driven by the transactions costs induced by trading when ratings change frequently. Rating agencies generally assign ratings on a through-the-cycle basis whereas banks' internal valuations are often based on a point-in-time performance, that is they are related to the current value of the rated entity's or instrument's underlying assets. This paper compares the two approaches and assesses their impact on rating stability and accuracy. We find that while through-the-cycle ratings are initially more stable, they are prone to rating cliff effects and also suffer from inferior performance in predicting future defaults. This is because they are typically smooth and delay rating changes. Using a through-the-crisis methodology that uses a more stringent stress test goes halfway toward mitigating cliff effects, but is still prone to discretionary rating change delays.
Back in 2009, G-20 leaders have called for all standardized over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives to be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). By now, 18 of the 24 Financial Stability Board (FSB) member jurisdictions have provided for mandatory central clearing frameworks in place, covering at least 90 percent of all standardized OTC derivatives in their jurisdictions. However, the authorities in several countries remain confronted with the hows and wherefores of mandatory central clearing, also in light of the international dimension of OTC derivatives contracts. This paper examines the policy options available to countries that have yet to fully conform to the clearing mandate, centered on the setup of local CCPs or on the use of foreign CCPs, and elaborates on their feasibility, risks and benefits from an economic, legal and tax viewpoint.
This paper builds on recent research by Fender and Mitchell (2009) who show that if financial institutions securitize loans, retaining an interest in the equity tranche does not always induce the securitizer to diligently screen borrowers ex ante. We first determine the conditions under which this scenario becomes binding and further illustrate the implications for capital requirements. We then propose an extension to the existing model and also solve for optimal retention size. This also allows us to capture feedback effects from capital requirements into the maximization problem. Preliminary results show that equity tranche retention continues to best incentivize loan screening.
December 1945, and the Russian submarine Shtshuka mis-manoeuvres, becoming snagged in a trawler's nets. Whilst trying to free the vessel, two crewmen fall into the cold North Sea and are unable to get back to their sub.
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