Machines who think—how utterly preposterous," huff beleaguered humanists, defending their dwindling turf. "Artificial Intelligence—it's here and about to surpass our own," crow techno-visionaries, proclaiming dominion. It's so simple and obvious, each side maintains, only a fanatic could disagree. Deciding where the truth lies between these two extremes is the main purpose of John Haugeland's marvelously lucid and witty book on what artificial intelligence is all about. Although presented entirely in non-technical terms, it neither oversimplifies the science nor evades the fundamental philosophical issues. Far from ducking the really hard questions, it takes them on, one by one. Artificial intelligence, Haugeland notes, is based on a very good idea, which might well be right, and just as well might not. That idea, the idea that human thinking and machine computing are "radically the same," provides the central theme for his illuminating and provocative book about this exciting new field. After a brief but revealing digression in intellectual history, Haugeland systematically tackles such basic questions as: What is a computer really? How can a physical object "mean" anything? What are the options for computational organization? and What structures have been proposed and tried as actual scientific models for intelligence? In a concluding chapter he takes up several outstanding problems and puzzles—including intelligence in action, imagery, feelings and personality—and their enigmatic prospects for solution.
At his death in 2010, the Anglo-American analytic philosopher John Haugeland left an unfinished manuscript summarizing his life-long engagement with Heidegger’s Being and Time. As illuminating as it is iconoclastic, Dasein Disclosed is not just Haugeland’s Heidegger—this sweeping reevaluation is a major contribution to philosophy in its own right.
The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence; intelligibility; analog and digital systems and supervenience; presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation; and the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood.
The nature of representation is a central topic in philosophy. This is the first book to connect problems with understanding representational artifacts, like pictures, diagrams, and inscriptions, to the philosophies of science, mind, and art. Can images be a source of knowledge? Are images merely conventional signs, like words? What is the relationship between the observer and the observed? In this clear and stimulating introduction to the problem John V. Kulvicki explores these questions and more. He discusses: the nature of pictorial experience and "seeing in" recognition, resemblance, pretense, and structural theories of depiction images as aids to scientific discovery and understanding mental imagery and the nature of perceptual content photographs as visual prostheses. In so doing he assesses central problems in the philosophy of images, such as how objects we make come to represent other things, and how we distinguish kinds of representation - pictures, diagrams, graphs - from one another. Essential reading for students and professional philosophers alike, the book also contains chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary.
Kulvicki shows that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. This book explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs and other kinds of non-linguistic representation.
The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental–physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of ‘Non-Cartesian Dualism’, along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind’s place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of the Fourth Edition Includes a new chapter, 'Emergence and Panpsychism' (Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation' (Chapter 8), which was excised from the previous edition Updates 'Descartes' Legacy' (Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E. J. Lowe's arresting 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind’s place in nature Updated 'Suggested Reading' lists at the end of each chapter
An account of the creation of new forms of life and intelligence in cybernetics, artificial life, and artificial intelligence that analyzes both the similarities and the differences among these sciences in actualizing life.The Allure of Machinic Life
An attempt at a new story of our emergence from the violence of the ancient cities. Those cities spun the cocoon in which our civilization matured. The human self is like a butterfly emerging from its cocoon. In this study author and religious scholar John William Kuckuk traces the path of human evolution and what it means for the world today. He examines the advantages our ancestors had that helped them survive, considering how the brain developed. From Greek and biblical beginnings the human self grew more self-conscious as Europe developed. Through the Renaissance, the late Middle Ages, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, our culture developed a new appreciation of the human self. He also relates how philosophy, media, and religion steered the course of Western history and how culture continues to evolve. The complex dynamics among species, peoples, and schools of thought have led to violence, misunderstandings, and the repression of the human spirit. As humanity continues to evolve, we can work toward a better future by understanding our past.
In Knowledge-Based Programming for Music Research, Schaffer and McGee explore expert systems for applications in artificial intelligence (AI). The text concerns (1) basic principles for knowledge-based programming, (2) concepts and strategies for programming these systems, (3) a "universal data" model for music analysis, and (4) examples that concern specific aspects of design and application. The authors also investigate Prolog (programming in logic), one of the most widely used computer languages for AI, and base some of their applications on the recent implication-based theories of Eugene Narmour. Of the applications for programming a knowledge-based system, music analysis has the most potential. Beyond identifying isolated elements, it is possible to create programs that extend to chord structures and other, more complex structures. This kind of programming allows the authors to embed the rules of composition in the application and then extend the analysis throughout the musical work. It also allows them to arrive at the underlying principles for a given composition. As a tool for music analysis, such programming has profound implications for further growth. The text is designed for musicians at various levels and could also be used in courses on computer-music programming. Parts of the book have been successfully used in courses on computer programming for music research, with which the authors have direct experience. The text includes extensive examples of code for use in individual Prolog applications and a comprehensive bibliography.
Ranging over 2,500 years of philosophical writing, this five-volume collection of essays is an unrivalled companion to the study and reading of philosophy. Central Works of Philosophy provides both an overview of particular works and clear and authoritative expositions of their central ideas, giving readers the resources and confidence to read the works themselves. These books offer remarkable insights into the ideas out of which our present ways of thinking emerged and without which they cannot fully be understood.
In this volume, the authors present their view of cognition. They propose that unlike the classical paradigm that takes the mind to be a computer, the mind is best understood as a dynamical system realized in a neural network.
This is the first book-length presentation and defense of a new theory of human and machine cognition, according to which human persons are superminds. Superminds are capable of processing information not only at and below the level of Turing machines (standard computers), but above that level (the "Turing Limit"), as information processing devices that have not yet been (and perhaps can never be) built, but have been mathematically specified; these devices are known as super-Turing machines or hypercomputers. Superminds, as explained herein, also have properties no machine, whether above or below the Turing Limit, can have. The present book is the third and pivotal volume in Bringsjord's supermind quartet; the first two books were What Robots Can and Can't Be (Kluwer) and AI and Literary Creativity (Lawrence Erlbaum). The final chapter of this book offers eight prescriptions for the concrete practice of AI and cognitive science in light of the fact that we are superminds.
John Kulvicki offers an account of the many ways in which pictures can be meaningful which is inspired by the philosophy of language. Pictures are important parts of communicative acts, along with language, gesture, facial expressions, and props. They express wide ranges of thoughts, make assertions, offer warnings, instructions, and commands. Pictures are also representations. They have meanings, which help explain the range of communicative uses to which they can be put. Modelling the meanings of pictures is accounting for the ways in which pictures manage to be meaningful, with an eye toward how those meanings let us use them as we do. By framing pictures with the philosophy of language, we acquire new perspectives on the many things we can do with them. Sometimes, pictures are used as descriptions—he looks like this!—while sometimes they are used more like singular terms—find him!, while showing a mug shot. Most picture-making cultures also have iconographies, but this is usually put to one side in discussions of pictures, if it is mentioned at all. Likewise, some uses of pictures, especially in advertising, are metaphorical, and very little has been said about metaphor in pictures. Pictures are also related in important ways to other kinds of representations like maps, and this book provides a new way of understanding what makes them alike and different. By showing that pictures are very different from languages, this book also shows that the tools developed with language in mind are not actually specific to linguistic phenomena.
The roots of cognitivism lie deep in the history of Western thought, and to develop a genuinely post-cognitivist psychology, this investigation goes back to presuppositions descended from Platonic/Cartesian assumptions and beliefs about the nature of thought.
One: Nuts and Bolts.- 1. Mental Representation.- Symbolism: The Classical Paradigm.- Cracks in the Symbolic Paradigm.- Connectionism: The Other Paradigm.- Methods of Models.- Assessing Theories of Mental Representation.- 2. Partitioned Representations.- General Overview.- The Contents of Spaces.- Parochial Reasoning.- Primary Contexts.- Partitioned Semantics.- Coherence.- Consolidation.- Secondary Contexts.- A Typology of Spaces.- Where Partitioned Representations Get Their Power.- Summary and Conclusions.- 3. Language: Process and Structure.- A Simple Philosophy of Language.- Linguistic Explanation.- The Process of Language Understanding.- Linguistic Evidence for Mental Representations.- 4. Three Levels of Language Processing.- Parochial Processing.- Distribution.- Contextualization.- An Example Discourse.- Conclusions.- Two: Studies in Language.- 5. Pedro's Donkey and Oedipus's Mother.- Some Common Parochial Linguistic Processes.- Some Common Cases of Distribution.- Interaction of Distribution and Parochial Processes.- Summary and Conclusions.- 6. Satisfying Presuppositions in Discourse.- The Problem of Presupposition.- Presupposition and Parochial Processing.- What Happens in Complex Sentences?.- Conclusions.- 7. Space Frogs and Henry Ford.- Linguistic Evidence for Contextualization.- The Semantic Contributions of Space Cues.- Summary.- 8. Temporal Aspect.- Reference Time: Temporal Perspective.- Semantics and Construction.- Reference Time: Contextualization.- The Case of the Present Perfect.- Conclusion.- 9. General Conclusions.- An Assessment of Partitioned Representations.- Prospectus.- The Importance of Partitioned Representations.- Appendices: Formal Models.- 10. A Logic of Partitioned Representations.- The Syntax of PR.- Rules of Inference for PR.- The Semantics of PR.- Soundness.- Conclusions.- 11. Generalized Natural Deduction.- Generalized Natural Deduction.- Time and Action.- Frames.- Summary and Conclusions.- 12. A Computational Model.- The Design of Spaceprobe.- Customizing Digestion.- Restructuring Rules for Distribution.- Handling Queries.- Language Understanding in Spaceprobe.- Summary.- References.- Author Index.
In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing more—no rule following, no mental information processing or mental models, no language of thought, and no universal grammar. Mental events are themselves features of the brain, "like liquidity is a feature of water." Beginning with a spirited discussion of what's wrong with the philosophy of mind, Searle characterizes and refutes the philosophical tradition of materialism. But he does not embrace dualism. All these "isms" are mistaken, he insists. Once you start counting types of substance you are on the wrong track, whether you stop at one or two. In four chapters that constitute the heart of his argument, Searle elaborates a theory of consciousness and its relation to our overall scientific world view and to unconscious mental phenomena. He concludes with a criticism of cognitive science and a proposal for an approach to studying the mind that emphasizes the centrality of consciousness to any account of mental functioning. In his characteristically direct style, punctuated with persuasive examples, Searle identifies the very terminology of the field as the main source of truth. He observes that it is a mistake to suppose that the ontology of the mental is objective and to suppose that the methodology of a science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively observable behavior; that it is also a mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behavior; that behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena; and that it is inconsistent with what we know about the universe and our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us.
Central Works of Philosophy is a major multi-volume collection of essays on the core texts of the Western philosophical tradition. From Plato's Republic to the present day, the five volumes range over 2,500 years of philosophical writing covering the best, most representative, and most influential work of some of our greatest philosophers. Each essay has been specially commissioned and provides an overview of the work, clear and authoritative exposition of its central ideas, and an assessment of the work's importance. Together these books provide an unrivaled companion for studying and reading philosophy, one that introduces the reader to the masterpieces of the western philosophical canon. The period, 1900-60, which this volume covers, witnessed changes in logical and linguistic analysis far beyond anything dreamt of in the previous history of the subject. The volume begins with chapters on the key texts of the Cambridge philosophers, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, which together marked the emergence of "analytical" philosophy. The Vienna Circle of the 1920s, and the development of logical positivism in the 1930s and 1940s are represented by chapters on two fundamental works by Carnap and Ayer. William James's Pragmatism, which formulated pragmatism's epistemology and made it known throughout the world represents in the volume the distinctive ideas of the American pragmatists. Essays on Husserl's The Idea of Phenomenology, Heidegger's Being and Time, Sartre's Being and Nothingness and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception cover the core texts of the hugely significant phenomenological movement. Of the linguistic philosophy that dominated the English-speaking world in the immediate postwar years, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Ryle's The Concept of the Mind are discussed in turn. The volume concludes with Karl Popper's influential account of the nature of science..
This book brings together chapters from investigators on the leading edge on this new research area to explore on the leading edge on this new research area to explore common theoretical issues, empirical findings, technical problems, and outstanding questions. This book will serve as a blueprint for work on the interface of vision, language, and action over the next five to ten years.
At his death in 2010, the Anglo-American analytic philosopher John Haugeland left an unfinished manuscript summarizing his life-long engagement with Heidegger’s Being and Time. As illuminating as it is iconoclastic, Dasein Disclosed is not just Haugeland’s Heidegger—this sweeping reevaluation is a major contribution to philosophy in its own right.
This comprehensive textbook, written by a leading author in the field, provides a survey of mainstream conceptions of the nature of mind accessible to readers with little or no background in philosophy. Included are the dualist, behaviourist, and functionalist accounts of the nature of mind, along with a critical assessment of recent trends in the subject. The problem of consciousness, widely thought to be the chief roadblock to our understanding of the mind, is addressed throughout the book and there is also material to interest those with a professional interest in the topic - philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists - as well as the general reader. Unique features of Philosophy of Mind: * provides a comprehensive survey of basic concepts and major theories * contains many lucid examples to support ideas * cites key literature in annotated suggested reading and a full bibliography * contains a full index including the location of key terms and concepts.
Through lucid theoretical analysis and his own extensive experience in these areas, he demonstrates that the outcomes of rationally conceived programs are usually at odds with the intended result. Eisenberg traces this failure to an intrinsic logical incompatibility between what reason tries to do and what it can do. Rational method is premised on the possibility of conceiving and correlating all operative factors in a given process. However, all such factors cannot be taken into account. Using a social variation of the "principle of indeterminancy," the author notes that reason cannot take itself into account any more than the eye can see itself seeing or the hand can grasp itself grasping. Similarly, reason cannot control how institutional structure affects social behavior, nor how legal language determines social reality. Eisenberg locates an intrinsic indeterminacy in society that precludes total or even substantial understanding and control of our destinies
The history of science reveals that scientific knowledge and method did not spring from a fully-bloomed blossom for which the minds of the ancient Greeks did any more than language and culture emerged fully formed in the minds of The Homo sapiens sapient. Scientific knowledge is an extension of ordinary language into greater levels of abstraction and precision through reliance upon geometric and numerical relationships. We speculate that the seeds of the scientific imagination were planted in ancient Greece, as opposed to Chinese or Babylonian culture, partly because the social, political, and an economic climate in Greece was more open to the pursuit of knowledge with marginal cultural utility. Another important factor was that the special character of Homeric religion allowed the Greeks to invent a conceptual framework that would prove useful in future scientific investigation.
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is arguably one of the most influential books of the twentieth century and a key text in the philosophy and history of science. Kuhn transformed the philosophy and history of science in the twentieth century in an irrevocable way and still provides an important alternative to formalist approaches in the philosophy of science. In Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions': A Reader's Guide, John Preston offers a clear and thorough account of this key philosophical work. The book offers a detailed review of the key themes and a lucid commentary that will enable readers to rapidly navigate the text. The guide explores the complex and important ideas inherent in the text and provides a cogent survey of the reception and influence of Kuhn's work.
The New Principia Book 2 deals with the start of the New Principia — important scientific work — related to questions such as “How to find God,” “How to travel in Time”, “How to win games and the problems with the 'Newtonian Casino',” and more with proper explanations and some working methods for handling Ouija Boards, Near Death Experiences, Astral Projection, Hypnosis, Consciousness, Super-intelligent Machines and others. With The New Principia the sky is not the limit.
The issue of the transfer of learning from one domain to another is a classic problem in psychology and an educational question of great importance, which this book sets out to solve through a theory of transfer based on a comprehensive theory of skill acquisition.
The Moral Psychology Handbook offers a survey of contemporary moral psychology, integrating evidence and argument from philosophy and the human sciences. The chapters cover major issues in moral psychology, including moral reasoning, character, moral emotion, positive psychology, moral rules, the neural correlates of ethical judgment, and the attribution of moral responsibility. Each chapter is a collaborative effort, written jointly by leading researchers in the field.
Readers will find this adumbration of Friedrich Hayek's social, political and legal theory both stimulating and controversial. On the one hand, the author highlights Hayek's Kantian and Humean roots and demonstrates the relevance of Hayek's project to contemporary debates in economics, psychology, political and moral philosophy and the philosophy of law. On the other hand, Touchie's effort to embed his own human rights construal in the Hayekean "Great Society's" spontaneously generated rules of just conduct will be of particular interest, both to those who regard rights as antecedent to civil society and to those who do not.' - Timothy P. Roth, The University of Texas at El Paso, US Why are discussions of human rights largely absent from Hayek's writings? Focusing primarily on Hayek's writings in law and politics, the author examines the building blocks of Hayek's legal theorizing: the notions of coercion, the Rule of Law ideal, justice, negative duties, and liberal as opposed to majoritarian constitutionalism, arguing that each element of Hayek's writing contributes to his overall perspective on human rights. The author concludes by summarizing the relationship between the twin themes that drive Hayek's work: his understanding of the consequences of the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft forms of social interaction and the implications of an increasing degree of functional specialization in society. Hayek's vision of the political and economic future has to a remarkable extent come to pass, and his writings can now be seen to contain much that is orthodox and widely accepted. The tight weaving of insights from diverse academic disciplines into a coherent social theory make his work of heightened relevance today, and many of the core constructs and concerns of his theorizing are useful for discussions of human rights. Students and scholars interested in a multidisciplinary approach to libertarian or liberal theory, legal and political theory, or market liberalism, will find this an insightful reading of one of our great thinkers.
Pollock describes an exciting theory of rationality and its partial implementation in OSCAR, a computer system whose descendants will literally be persons.
In this short monograph, John Horty explores the difficulties presented for Gottlob Frege's semantic theory, as well as its modern descendents, by the treatment of defined expressions. The book begins by focusing on the psychological constraints governing Frege's notion of sense, or meaning, and argues that, given these constraints, even the treatment of simple stipulative definitions led Frege to important difficulties. Horty is able to suggest ways out of these difficulties that are both philosophically and logically plausible and Fregean in spirit. This discussion is then connected to a number of more familiar topics, such as indexicality and the discussion of concepts in recent theories of mind and language. In the latter part of the book, after introducing a simple semantic model of senses as procedures, Horty considers the problems that definitions present for Frege's idea that the sense of an expression should mirror its grammatical structure. The requirement can be satisfied, he argues, only if defined expressions--and incomplete expressions as well--are assigned senses of their own, rather than treated contextually. He then explores one way in which these senses might be reified within the procedural model, drawing on ideas from work in the semantics of computer programming languages. With its combination of technical semantics and history of philosophy, Horty's book tackles some of the hardest questions in the philosophy of language. It should interest philosophers, logicians, and linguists.
A distinctive feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work after 1930 was his turn to a conception of philosophy as a form of social inquiry, John G. Gunnell argues, and Thomas Kuhn's approach to the philosophy of science exemplified this conception. In this book, Gunnell shows how these philosophers address foundational issues in the social and human sciences, particularly the vision of social inquiry as an interpretive endeavor and the distinctive cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter. Gunnell speaks directly to philosophers and practitioners of the social and human sciences. He tackles the demarcation between natural and social science; the nature of social phenomena; the concept and method of interpretation; the relationship between language and thought; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and the character of descriptive and normative judgments about practices that are the object of inquiry. Though Wittgenstein and Kuhn are often criticized as initiating a modern descent into relativism, this book shows that the true effect of their work was to undermine the basic assumptions of contemporary social and human science practice. It also problematized the authority of philosophy and other forms of social inquiry to specify the criteria for judging such matters as truth and justice. When Wittgenstein stated that "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he did not mean that philosophy would be left as it was or that philosophy would have no impact on what it studied, but rather that the activity of inquiry did not, simply by virtue of its performance, transform the object of inquiry.
The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." One of the world's most eminent thinkers, Searle dismantles these theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. He begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"--problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as materialism, consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, mental causation, free will, and the self. The book offers a refreshingly direct and engaging introduction to one of the most intriguing areas of philosophy.
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