The Psychology of Thinking is an engaging, interesting and easy-to-follow guide into the essential concepts behind our reasoning, decision-making and problem-solving. Clearly structured into 3 sections, this book will; Introduce your students to organisation of thought including memory, language and concepts; Expand their understanding of reasoning including inference and induction as well as motivation and the impact of mood; Improve their thinking in action, focusing on decision-making and problem-solving. Suitable for any course in which students need to develop their judgement and decision-making skills, this book uses clever examples of real-world situations to help them understand and apply the theories discussed to their everyday thinking.
First published in 1966, The Discipline of the Cave is the first series of a course of Gifford lectures on philosophical issues.. J N Findlay’s lectures use the image of the Cave to show how familiarity is full of restrictions, and involves puzzles and discrepancies unable to be resolved or removed. Such philosophical perplexities may be a result of the misunderstanding and abuse of ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. They may also be a way of ‘drawing us towards being’, providing proof of the absurdity of ordinary thought, speech and experience unless modified and added to in ways which may point beyond it. What may be called a mystical and otherworldly element may need to be introduced into or rendered explicit in all our experience in order to give a viable sense to the most commonplace human utterances and activities.
The Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference is an authoritative reference work in a single volume, designed for the attention of senior undergraduates, graduate students and researchers in all the leading research areas concerned with the logic of practical argument and inference. After an introductory chapter, the role of standard logics is surveyed in two chapters. These chapters can serve as a mini-course for interested readers, in deductive and inductive logic, or as a refresher. Then follow two chapters of criticism; one the internal critique and the other the empirical critique. The first deals with objections to standard logics (as theories of argument and inference) arising from the research programme in philosophical logic. The second canvasses criticisms arising from work in cognitive and experimental psychology. The next five chapters deal with developments in dialogue logic, interrogative logic, informal logic, probability logic and artificial intelligence. The last chapter surveys formal approaches to practical reasoning and anticipates possible future developments. Taken as a whole the Handbook is a single-volume indication of the present state of the logic of argument and inference at its conceptual and theoretical best. Future editions will periodically incorporate significant new developments.
As a subject of inquiry, laws of nature exist in the overlap between metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Over the past three decades, this area of study has become increasingly central to the philosophy of science. It also has relevance to a variety of topics in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology.Readings on Laws of Nature is the first anthology to offer a contemporary history of the problem of laws. The book is organized around three key issues: the matter of distinguishing laws from mere correlations, questions concerning inductive reasoning and laws, and the consideration of whether there are any true laws in science.Designed for class use, the anthology covers a remarkably broad range of views and concerns, and consists exclusively of articles that have proved highly influential in the field. Readings on Laws of Nature will also serve as a valuable research and reference tool for philosophers who do not specialize in the subject, but who have occasion to examine concepts relating to the laws of nature in their own work.
This book contains important technical innovations, including comparative measures for the testable content, depth, and unity of scientific theories. Originally published in 1984. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
A generously illustrated collection of John Baines's influential writings on the role of writing and the importance of visual culture in ancient Egypt. Investigation of these key topics in a comparative study of early civilizations is pursued through a number of case studies, and characterized by a radically interdisciplinary approach.
If the universe is a seamlessly interactive system that evolves to an assigning of some levelling plexuity, and that, the lawful regularities of this universe are emergent properties of this system; we can legibly assume that the cosmos, as a legitimate point of singularity, as an undivided totality in the contributions for making of its whole. In that, for evincing to the 'progressive principal order' of complementarity, as placed within the intertwining relations within its given parts. Minded that this collective and undivided whole exists in some sense within all contributions of its parts, then one can declare positively or firmly maintain that it operates in self-reflective fashion and is the evidence for all emergent plexuities. Since human consciousness evinces self-reflective awareness in the human brain and since this brain is equivalently matched to all physical phenomena, as this can be viewed as an emergent property in the possessive nature of totality, such that it can be found within the whole for existing by its reason of certainty. As, can be feasible as plausibly concluded, that locality presupposes the consciousness of the universe, as 'we' are conscious to its existing conventions within this prevalent response to approaching the expeditions into which of the past-present-future dimensions, allow to some marginal glimpse into the unthinkable.
One of the most firmly entrenched beliefs of contemporary philosophy is that the only way to analyze a concept is to state its truth conditions. In epistemology this has led to the search for reductive analyses, to phenomenalism, behaviorism, and their analogues in other areas of knowledge. Arguing that these attempts at reductive analysis have invariably failed, John L. Pollock defends an alternative theory of conceptual analysis in this book. The author suggests that concepts should be analyzed in terms of their justification conditions rather than their truth conditions. After laying a theoretical foundation for this alternative scheme of analysis, Professor Pollock applies his theory in proposing solutions to a number of traditional epistemological problems. Among the areas of knowledge discussed are perception, knowledge of the past, induction, knowledge of other minds, and a priori knowledge. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The author of discipline-defining studies of human cognition and artificial intelligence, John Haugeland was a charismatic, highly original voice in the contemporary forum of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. At his death in 2010, he left behind an unfinished manuscript, more than a decade in the making, intended as a summation of his life-long engagement with one of the twentieth century’s most influential philosophical tracts, Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927). Dasein Disclosed brings together in a single volume the writings of a man widely acknowledged as one of Heidegger’s preeminent and most provocative interpreters. A labyrinth of notoriously difficult ideas and terminology, Being and Time has inspired copious commentary. Not content merely to explain, Haugeland aspired to a sweeping reevaluation of Heidegger’s magnum opus and its conception of human life as Dasein—a reevaluation focused on Heidegger’s effort to reawaken philosophically dormant questions of what it means “to be.” Interpreting Dasein unconventionally as “the living of a living way of life,” Haugeland put involvement in a shared world, rather than individual persons or their experience, at the heart of Heidegger’s phenomenology of understanding and truth. Individuality, Haugeland insists, emerges in the call to take responsibility for a collective way of being in the world. He traces this thought to Heidegger’s radical conclusion that one does not truly understand philosophical concepts unless that understanding changes how one lives. As illuminating as it is iconoclastic, Dasein Disclosed is not just Haugeland’s Heidegger—it is a major contribution to philosophy in its own right.
Paul Feyeraband famously asked, what's so great about science? One answer is that it has been surprisingly successful in getting things right about the natural world, more successful than non-scientific or pre-scientific systems, religion or philosophy. Science has been able to formulate theories that have successfully predicted novel observations. It has produced theories about parts of reality that were not observable or accessible at the time those theories were first advanced, but the claims about those inaccessible areas have since turned out to be true. And science has, on occasion, advanced on more or less a priori grounds theories that subsequently turned out to be highly empirically successful. In this book the philosopher of science, John Wright delves deep into science's methodology to offer an explanation for this remarkable success story.
In one of the several contributing disciplines of cognitive science, philosophy offers two sorts of contributions. On the one hand, the philosophy of science provides a metatheoretical perspective on the endeavors of any scientific enterprise, analyzing such things as the goals of scientific investigation and the strategies employed in reaching those goals. The philosophy of science thus offers a perspective from which we can examine and potentially evaluate the endeavors of cognitive science. On the other hand, the philosophy of the mind offers substantive theses about nature. Although these theses typically have resulted from empirical investigation, they often have subsequently figured in actual empirical investigations in cognitive science or its predecessors. Because the two roles philosophy plays in cognitive science are quite different, they are introduced as an overview for cognitive science. The strategy for this overview is to present a variety of views from philosophy of science that figured on discussions about cognitive science. Some of these views are no longer widely accepted by philosophers of science. Nonetheless, they have been and, in some cases, have remained influential outside philosophy. Moreover, some older views have provided the starting point for current philosophical thinking that is done against a backdrop of previous endeavors, with a recognition of both their successes and failures.
The outlook for philosophy in our society is buoyant. But philosophy is like music in that, although it has many practical use+s, its supreme value lies not in any of them but in what it is in itself. It may be that from within the confines of our human imitations we will never be able to find the answers to some of our most fundamental questions. But, as this book has tried to show, we can make such worthwhile progress in our understanding of the human situation that even if we never reach any ultimate goal in that respect that we will find that the journey is a hugely enriching experience that is worth undertaking for its own sake. There may be no final answers, but there is a wonderful lot to learn.
A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is a historically oriented introduction to the central themes in philosophy of language. Its narrative arc covers Locke’s ‘idea’ theory, Mill’s empiricist account of math and logic, Frege and Russell’s development of modern logic and its subsequent deployment in their pioneering program of ‘logical analysis’, Ayer and Carnap’s logical positivism, Quine’s critique of logical positivism and elaboration of a naturalist-behaviorist approach to meaning, and later-Wittgenstein’s ‘ordinary language philosophy’-inspired rejection of the project of logical analysis. Thus, it historically situates the two central programs in early twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy -- logical analysis and logical positivism -- and discusses the central critiques they face later in the century in the works of Quine and the later-Wittgenstein. Unlike other secondary studies in philosophy of language, A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is not just a ‘greatest hits album’, i.e., a discontinuous compilation in which classics in the field are presented together with their standard criticisms one after the other. Instead, Fennell develops a particular, historical-thematic narrative in which the figures and ideas he treats are introduced in highly intentional ways. And by cross-referencing them throughout his discussions, he highlights the contributions they make to the narrative they comprise.
The French produced some of the most striking and innovatory interwar cruiser designs. A large amount of new information about these ships has become available over the past twenty years in France, but this book is the first to make this accessible to an English-speaking readership. Part I explains the design philosophy behind each of the classes built after 1922, and outlines the characteristics of each type, accompanied by detailed data tables and a comprehensive set of specially-drawn plans based on official documents, as well as carefully-selected photographs. Coverage includes the De Grasse, laid down in August 1939 and completed postwar as an AA cruiser, and also the heavy cruisers of the Saint Louis class intended to follow her, about which little has been published. Part II deals with the historical side, covering not only the eventful careers of these ships, but also explaining the peacetime organisation of the Marine Nationale, the complex politics of this turbulent period and their impact on the navy. Like its highly successful predecessor, French Battleships, this beautifully presented book subtly blends technical and historical analysis to produce what must become the standard reference work.
John Allen Paulos cleverly scrutinizes the mathematical structures of jokes, puns, paradoxes, spoonerisms, riddles, and other forms of humor, drawing examples from such sources as Rabelais, Shakespeare, James Beattie, René Thom, Lewis Carroll, Arthur Koestler, W. C. Fields, and Woody Allen. "Jokes, paradoxes, riddles, and the art of non-sequitur are revealed with great perception and insight in this illuminating account of the relationship between humor and mathematics."—Joseph Williams, New York Times "'Leave your mind alone,' said a Thurber cartoon, and a really complete and convincing analysis of what humour is might spoil all jokes forever. This book avoids that danger. What it does. . .is describe broadly several kinds of mathematical theory and apply them to throw sidelights on how many kinds of jokes work."—New Scientist "Many scholars nowadays write seriously about the ludicrous. Some merely manage to be dull. A few—like Paulos—are brilliant in an odd endeavor."—Los Angeles Times Book Review
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.