Examines how terrorists make technology choices and how the United States can discourage terrorists' use of advanced conventional weapons. Concludes that the United States should urgently start discussions with key producer nations and also decide on an architecture needed to impose technical controls on new mortar systems that should enter development soon.
The U.S. military is ill-equipped to strike at extremists who hide in populations. Using deadly force against them can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U.S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a "continuum of force"--a suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras. These technologies are available but have received insufficient attention.
In the coming decade, NATO faces growing fiscal austerity and declining defense budgets. This study analyzes the impact of planned defense budget cuts on the capabilities of seven European members of NATO: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland. The authors assess the implications of the cuts for NATO capabilities and strategy and for U.S. policy.
A legend in the folk music community, John Jacob Niles enjoyed a lengthy career as a balladeer, folk collector, and songwriter. Ever close to his Kentucky roots, he spent much of his adulthood searching for the most well-loved songs of the southern Appalachia. The Ballad Book of John Jacob Niles brings together a wealth of songs with the stories that inspired them, arranged by a gifted performer. This new edition includes all of the melodies, text, commentary, and illustrations of the 1961 original and features a new introduction by Ron Pen, director of the John Jacob Niles Center for American Music at the University of Kentucky.
Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.
As the United States seeks ways to stretch its defense dollars, pursue the Global War on Terrorism, and meet other national-security challenges, it is highly likely that policymakers will increase their reliance on aircraft carriers, using them more often and in more situations than they have in the past, especially if the vessels have the additional capabilities to respond appropriately. The current and expected use of aircraft carriers led the United States Navy in fall 2004 to commission RAND to explore new and nontraditional ways that the United States might be able to employ aircraft carriers in pursuit of traditional and emerging military and homeland defense missions. Over six months, RAND created and convened two Concept Options Groups (COGs)-small groups of experienced military and civilian experts, defense analysts, and potential users who work together to identify promising ways to employ military might in nontraditional ways-to explore possible nontraditional roles for aircraft carriers. One COG explored and identified new ways that aircraft carriers could be used in combat operations; the second COG examined ways that the vessels could be used in noncombat, homeland security missions or to help the nation recover from terrorist attacks or natural disasters in U.S. territories. Among the combat recommendations to come from the COG insights are that abilities need to be enhanced to reconfigure carrier air wings; among noncombat recommendations are that the availability of nonready carriers to respond to unforeseen crises needs to be improved. This monograph summarizes the activities, findings, and recommendations of both carrier COGs. It should be of special interest to the Navy and to uniformed and civilian decisionmakers with responsibilities related to naval and carrier operations, maritime domain awareness, or homeland security.
The U.S. Navy faces uncertainty about the degree to which it will have to prepare for a high-end future conflict versus the so-called Long War. To help the Navy understand how critical near-, mid-, and far-term trends in the United States, China, and Iran might influence U.S. security decisions in general and the Navy's investments in particular, RAND examined emerging domestic and regional nonmilitary trends in each of the three countries.
The U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier fleet must meet the forward presence requirements of theater commanders. With a decreasing fleet size, planners must balance the timing of maintenance, training, and deployment with presence and surge demands. Evaluating multiple one- and two-deployment scenarios per cycle, RAND examines the feasibility of different cycle lengths, their effect on carrier forward presence, and their impact on shipyard workloads.
This provocative book seeks to answer a most crucial—and embarrassing—question concerning the U.S. military: why the United States is so often stymied in military confrontations with seemingly weaker opponents, despite its "superpower" status. This fascinating book examines a question that continues to puzzle soldiers, statesmen, and scholars: why do major powers—including the ostensible superpower United States—repeatedly perform poorly against seemingly overmatched adversaries? And what can they, and the United States, do to better achieve their military objectives? How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military Power argues that beyond relying solely on overwhelming military might, the United States needs to focus more on exploiting weaknesses in their adversaries—such as national will, resource mobilization, and strategic miscues—just as opposing forces have done to gain advantage over our military efforts. The author tests the "vulnerability theory" by revisiting six conflicts from the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to the ongoing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, showing again and again that victory often depends more on outthinking the enemy than outmuscling them.
Using a case study based on the Army's new Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the authors explore how the Army might improve its ability to contribute to prompt, global power projection, that is, strategically responsive early-entry forces for time-critical events. The authors examine options to reach a dual goal: to initiate deployment of the right force capabilities, and then get those capabilities where they need to be as quickly as possible.
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