Johan Van Overtveldt provides comprehensive documentation showing that the political dithering so apparent in the most recent euro crisis has in fact been the hallmark of the euro project from the start. --Anil Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business From noted economic journalist Johan Van Overtveldt, an up-to-the-minute examination of the fate of the Euro. In a process that began with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and concluded on January 1, 1999, 11 Western European countries made the euro the European Union's single currency, and the European Central Bank (ECB) the EU's only policy-making central bank. Bringing together Germany, France, Italy, and other European countries into a monetary union with a single currency and a single monetary policy could only ever result in major imbalances between the member countries, thus threatening the EU itself. This was recognized from the start by many economists and other observers, and the political elite paid elaborate lip service to these warnings. However, no one really followed up on these risks in terms of actions and reforms. Instead, the politicians seemed to indicate, directly and indirectly, that if the EU showed unity, the conditions to turn itself into a well-functioning monetary union would simply come about automatically. Moreover, given the imperative to work together more closely, the monetary-union effort would strengthen the political union among the euro-countries. Thus, in spirit, the process of monetary union was often seen as a means to an end. With that reasoning, the political elite supervising monetary union turned a great idea--the creation of a unified currency for Europe--into a huge gamble. Implicit in their reasoning was the idea that Europe's leading politicians would always be able to come up with an adequate solution to any crisis that might occur. As the former Belgian prime minister and European Union leader Jean-Luc Dehaene repeated relentlessly: "The idea of a unified Europe grows and becomes reality through crises. We need crises to make progress." Dehaene and like-minded European politicians never seriously considered the possibility of an insoluble, catastrophic crisis that could potentially crash the entire EU effort. For ten years, from 1999 to 2008, it seemed that the politicians' claim was vindicated. Although there was little substantial progress toward real political union within the euro area, the euro and the euro countries in general prospered, despite a string of major shocks like the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But things changed dramatically with the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In January 2009 Barry Eichengreen, professor of economics and political science at Berkeley, wrote that "what started as the Subprime Crisis in 2007 and morphed in the Global Credit Crisis in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009." After its immediate impact, the crisis caused the financial and capital markets to worry about the so-called sovereign risks, i.e. countries running the risk of becoming insolvent. Although budget deficits in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom were much larger than the aggregate data for the euro area, markets started to home in on the risks posed by countries inside the European monetary union. Markets recognized that the enormous problem facing everyone in the union was the long-term working of the monetary union itself. Eichengreen's "Euro Crisis" is all about the sustainability of EMU and the single currency. By early 2009 the structural imbalances within the euro area and especially the untenable situations building up in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were there for everybody to see. The first reaction of the political leadership was denial of any structural problem whatsoever. The second reaction was recognition of the crisis situation, but absolute denial of any link between that crisis and the workings of the monetary union. Eventually, a third phase set in: the search for external villains to blame. Those villains were found in the greed, speculation, and irresponsibility of the financial markets. As the French saying goes: "les excuses sont fait pour s'en server" ("excuses are made to take advantage of"). Fundamentally, however, the gigantic problems facing the EMU, and the euro as a currency, have little to do with either alleged criminal behavior in the financial markets or with the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis of 2009-2010 was an accident waiting to happen. It could have happened earlier, or the clash could have been postponed for several more years; but given the the basic characteristics of the EMU-set-up, a major crisis was simply unavoidable. Untenable imbalances within the monetary union were enshrined in the different treaties, pacts, and political agreements that led to the creation of the euro in the first place, and guided its first ten years. That politicians never acted on this reality to make them the prime culprits of the long and highly painful death agony of the euro. The structure of this book is as follows: Chapter I gives an overview of the birth of the euro. Understanding this history is essential to understand the anomalies built into the project from the beginning. These anomalies form the subject of Chapter II, along with an analysis of how they led to the situation that turned Greece, Portugal, and Spain into euro-destroying economic disaster areas. Chapter III shows how this was not an unforeseeable situation, as Europe's history is filled with earlier failed attempts to build monetary unions. Chapter IV is focused on Germany, by far the most important country within EMU, and why the chances of Germany leaving the union are much higher than is generally assumed. The book concludes with an analysis of what lies in wait for the remains of the monetary union--and for a deeply divided and troubled continent in general. Either the EMU transforms itself fundamentally or it disintegrates, and the likeliest outcome is the latter.
This “admirably detailed and thoroughly welcome history” provides a fascinating examination of a pivotal moment in the evolution of economic theory (The Economist). When Richard Nixon said “We are all Keynesians now” in 1971, few could have predicted that the next three decades would result in a complete transformation of the global economic landscape. The transformation was led by a small, relatively obscure group within the University of Chicago’s business school and its departments of economics and political science. These thinkers — including Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, George Stigler, Robert Lucas, and others — revolutionized economic orthodoxy in the second half of the 20th century, dominated the Nobel Prizes awarded in economics, and changed how business is done around the world. Written by a leading European economic thinker, The Chicago School is the first in-depth look at how this remarkable group came together. Exhaustively detailed, it provides a close recounting of the decade-by-decade progress of the Chicago School’s evolution. As such, it’s an essential contribution to the intellectual history of our time.
The world is in turmoil. Whether one looks at Europe, Asia, North America, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America, uncertainty and upheaval seem to be the order of the day. Nevertheless, there seems to be an odd certainty in the minds of many pundits, writers, and citizens in this highly volatile world of geopolitics: the days of the United States as the world's sole superpower are over. The consensus tells us that the United States will not be able to keep a status as a major power among China, the European community, and a resurgent Russia. How realistic is this perspective, though? Is the "air of inevitability" concerning America's demise merely a passing breeze? How solid is the "unstoppable rise" of the Chinese? How likely is it for Europe to right its ship? A Giant Reborn, from critically acclaimed author and leading economic journalist Johan Van Overtveldt, dispels many of these ingrained assumptions and argues that the 21st century will be defined by the country currently best set up to succeed: the United States of America. In the current chaotic political climate it seems risky to say any country will be able to maintain its current status. But Van Overtveldt provides a measured, insightful, and thoroughly engaging examination of the evidence. In his richly detailed style and straightforward explanations, he masterfully lays out a case for why America, against many pundits' best predictions, is set up to continue its 20th-century success into this millennium. A Giant Reborn shows readers that the reports of America's death, to paraphrase the father of American literature, have been greatly exaggerated.
It’s hardly an exaggeration to claim that over the last few decades, central bankers have achieved unprecedented status. Especially since the global financial crisis of 2008, the world holds its breath whenever they announce new policy interventions. Given the opaque nature of the money supply, in the eyes of most citizens, the “mystic hand” of central bankers is felt everywhere. Never before have central bank policies been so decisive, not only for financial markets but also for national economies and public welfare in general. This book traces the way in which central bankers learned, unlearned, relearned and still have to learn the tricks of their trade. The lessons taught by nineteenth-century grands savants like Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot, once instilled, were eventually neglected. This led directly to the policy mistakes that produced the Great Depression of the 1930s. When the financial crisis of 2008 broke out, central bankers the world over summoned Thornton’s and Bagehot’s wisdom and acted accordingly. This re-learning saved the world from a repetition of the Great Depression. But when the worst of the financial crisis and ensuing recession were over, central bankers continued applying unconventional monetary policies—in some areas of the world, this even extended to negative policy interest rates and massive interventions in the bond markets, which resulted in constant injections of liquidity. Once the Covid-19 pandemic arrived, most central bankers doubled down on the intensity of these kinds of policies. While the financial crisis required central bankers to act in decisive ways, it can no longer be denied that the consequences of these expansive monetary policies have become major issues. Central bank policies of the last decade and a half have resulted in a relentless build-up of leverage and debt; led to speculative bubbles in different kinds of markets; undermined the willingness of political authorities to put their fiscal houses in order; stimulated a “zombification” of the economy and the growth of shadow banking activities; and contributed to growing inequality around the world. Central bankers are at a crucial turning point for the future of their profession, and even more for the future of our economy. New lessons have to be learnt. Our future depends on these being the right lessons.
The consensus on Alan Greenspan's performance as Fed chair used to be extremely positive, but more and more it's been called into question. Now, 2008 has seen Ben Bernanke in the eye of a storm that was created largely during Greenspan's tenure. His management of the bubble of all bubbles will be a decisive factor in whether this crisis will be limited in its impact on the real economy or whether it directly leads to a major recession. This is Bernanke's Test. In examining the challenges facing Bernanke, author Johan Van Overtveldt reviews Greenspan's long record as Fed chair, as well as Ben Bernanke's career as an economist prior to replacing Greenspan. The book offers much-needed historical context by exploring the role and reach of the central banker, and how former Fed chairmen — Benjamin Strong, William McChesney Martin, Arthur Burns, and especially Paul Volcker — dealt with the same complex issues Bernanke faces today.
This “admirably detailed and thoroughly welcome history” provides a fascinating examination of a pivotal moment in the evolution of economic theory (The Economist). When Richard Nixon said “We are all Keynesians now” in 1971, few could have predicted that the next three decades would result in a complete transformation of the global economic landscape. The transformation was led by a small, relatively obscure group within the University of Chicago’s business school and its departments of economics and political science. These thinkers — including Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, George Stigler, Robert Lucas, and others — revolutionized economic orthodoxy in the second half of the 20th century, dominated the Nobel Prizes awarded in economics, and changed how business is done around the world. Written by a leading European economic thinker, The Chicago School is the first in-depth look at how this remarkable group came together. Exhaustively detailed, it provides a close recounting of the decade-by-decade progress of the Chicago School’s evolution. As such, it’s an essential contribution to the intellectual history of our time.
Johan Van Overtveldt provides comprehensive documentation showing that the political dithering so apparent in the most recent euro crisis has in fact been the hallmark of the euro project from the start. --Anil Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business From noted economic journalist Johan Van Overtveldt, an up-to-the-minute examination of the fate of the Euro. In a process that began with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and concluded on January 1, 1999, 11 Western European countries made the euro the European Union's single currency, and the European Central Bank (ECB) the EU's only policy-making central bank. Bringing together Germany, France, Italy, and other European countries into a monetary union with a single currency and a single monetary policy could only ever result in major imbalances between the member countries, thus threatening the EU itself. This was recognized from the start by many economists and other observers, and the political elite paid elaborate lip service to these warnings. However, no one really followed up on these risks in terms of actions and reforms. Instead, the politicians seemed to indicate, directly and indirectly, that if the EU showed unity, the conditions to turn itself into a well-functioning monetary union would simply come about automatically. Moreover, given the imperative to work together more closely, the monetary-union effort would strengthen the political union among the euro-countries. Thus, in spirit, the process of monetary union was often seen as a means to an end. With that reasoning, the political elite supervising monetary union turned a great idea--the creation of a unified currency for Europe--into a huge gamble. Implicit in their reasoning was the idea that Europe's leading politicians would always be able to come up with an adequate solution to any crisis that might occur. As the former Belgian prime minister and European Union leader Jean-Luc Dehaene repeated relentlessly: "The idea of a unified Europe grows and becomes reality through crises. We need crises to make progress." Dehaene and like-minded European politicians never seriously considered the possibility of an insoluble, catastrophic crisis that could potentially crash the entire EU effort. For ten years, from 1999 to 2008, it seemed that the politicians' claim was vindicated. Although there was little substantial progress toward real political union within the euro area, the euro and the euro countries in general prospered, despite a string of major shocks like the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But things changed dramatically with the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In January 2009 Barry Eichengreen, professor of economics and political science at Berkeley, wrote that "what started as the Subprime Crisis in 2007 and morphed in the Global Credit Crisis in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009." After its immediate impact, the crisis caused the financial and capital markets to worry about the so-called sovereign risks, i.e. countries running the risk of becoming insolvent. Although budget deficits in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom were much larger than the aggregate data for the euro area, markets started to home in on the risks posed by countries inside the European monetary union. Markets recognized that the enormous problem facing everyone in the union was the long-term working of the monetary union itself. Eichengreen's "Euro Crisis" is all about the sustainability of EMU and the single currency. By early 2009 the structural imbalances within the euro area and especially the untenable situations building up in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were there for everybody to see. The first reaction of the political leadership was denial of any structural problem whatsoever. The second reaction was recognition of the crisis situation, but absolute denial of any link between that crisis and the workings of the monetary union. Eventually, a third phase set in: the search for external villains to blame. Those villains were found in the greed, speculation, and irresponsibility of the financial markets. As the French saying goes: "les excuses sont fait pour s'en server" ("excuses are made to take advantage of"). Fundamentally, however, the gigantic problems facing the EMU, and the euro as a currency, have little to do with either alleged criminal behavior in the financial markets or with the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis of 2009-2010 was an accident waiting to happen. It could have happened earlier, or the clash could have been postponed for several more years; but given the the basic characteristics of the EMU-set-up, a major crisis was simply unavoidable. Untenable imbalances within the monetary union were enshrined in the different treaties, pacts, and political agreements that led to the creation of the euro in the first place, and guided its first ten years. That politicians never acted on this reality to make them the prime culprits of the long and highly painful death agony of the euro. The structure of this book is as follows: Chapter I gives an overview of the birth of the euro. Understanding this history is essential to understand the anomalies built into the project from the beginning. These anomalies form the subject of Chapter II, along with an analysis of how they led to the situation that turned Greece, Portugal, and Spain into euro-destroying economic disaster areas. Chapter III shows how this was not an unforeseeable situation, as Europe's history is filled with earlier failed attempts to build monetary unions. Chapter IV is focused on Germany, by far the most important country within EMU, and why the chances of Germany leaving the union are much higher than is generally assumed. The book concludes with an analysis of what lies in wait for the remains of the monetary union--and for a deeply divided and troubled continent in general. Either the EMU transforms itself fundamentally or it disintegrates, and the likeliest outcome is the latter.
The consensus on Alan Greenspan's performance as Fed chair used to be extremely positive, but more and more it's been called into question. Now, 2008 has seen Ben Bernanke in the eye of a storm that was created largely during Greenspan's tenure. His management of the bubble of all bubbles will be a decisive factor in whether this crisis will be limited in its impact on the real economy or whether it directly leads to a major recession. This is Bernanke's Test. In examining the challenges facing Bernanke, author Johan Van Overtveldt reviews Greenspan's long record as Fed chair, as well as Ben Bernanke's career as an economist prior to replacing Greenspan. The book offers much-needed historical context by exploring the role and reach of the central banker, and how former Fed chairmen — Benjamin Strong, William McChesney Martin, Arthur Burns, and especially Paul Volcker — dealt with the same complex issues Bernanke faces today.
It’s hardly an exaggeration to claim that over the last few decades, central bankers have achieved unprecedented status. Especially since the global financial crisis of 2008, the world holds its breath whenever they announce new policy interventions. Given the opaque nature of the money supply, in the eyes of most citizens, the “mystic hand” of central bankers is felt everywhere. Never before have central bank policies been so decisive, not only for financial markets but also for national economies and public welfare in general. This book traces the way in which central bankers learned, unlearned, relearned and still have to learn the tricks of their trade. The lessons taught by nineteenth-century grands savants like Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot, once instilled, were eventually neglected. This led directly to the policy mistakes that produced the Great Depression of the 1930s. When the financial crisis of 2008 broke out, central bankers the world over summoned Thornton’s and Bagehot’s wisdom and acted accordingly. This re-learning saved the world from a repetition of the Great Depression. But when the worst of the financial crisis and ensuing recession were over, central bankers continued applying unconventional monetary policies—in some areas of the world, this even extended to negative policy interest rates and massive interventions in the bond markets, which resulted in constant injections of liquidity. Once the Covid-19 pandemic arrived, most central bankers doubled down on the intensity of these kinds of policies. While the financial crisis required central bankers to act in decisive ways, it can no longer be denied that the consequences of these expansive monetary policies have become major issues. Central bank policies of the last decade and a half have resulted in a relentless build-up of leverage and debt; led to speculative bubbles in different kinds of markets; undermined the willingness of political authorities to put their fiscal houses in order; stimulated a “zombification” of the economy and the growth of shadow banking activities; and contributed to growing inequality around the world. Central bankers are at a crucial turning point for the future of their profession, and even more for the future of our economy. New lessons have to be learnt. Our future depends on these being the right lessons.
The world is in turmoil. Whether one looks at Europe, Asia, North America, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America, uncertainty and upheaval seem to be the order of the day. Nevertheless, there seems to be an odd certainty in the minds of many pundits, writers, and citizens in this highly volatile world of geopolitics: the days of the United States as the world's sole superpower are over. The consensus tells us that the United States will not be able to keep a status as a major power among China, the European community, and a resurgent Russia. How realistic is this perspective, though? Is the "air of inevitability" concerning America's demise merely a passing breeze? How solid is the "unstoppable rise" of the Chinese? How likely is it for Europe to right its ship? A Giant Reborn, from critically acclaimed author and leading economic journalist Johan Van Overtveldt, dispels many of these ingrained assumptions and argues that the 21st century will be defined by the country currently best set up to succeed: the United States of America. In the current chaotic political climate it seems risky to say any country will be able to maintain its current status. But Van Overtveldt provides a measured, insightful, and thoroughly engaging examination of the evidence. In his richly detailed style and straightforward explanations, he masterfully lays out a case for why America, against many pundits' best predictions, is set up to continue its 20th-century success into this millennium. A Giant Reborn shows readers that the reports of America's death, to paraphrase the father of American literature, have been greatly exaggerated.
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