The story of Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of consistent support and involvement but of varying levels of military and diplomatic engagement. Canada in NATO, 1949–2019 provides the first analysis of Canada’s involvement in the Atlantic Alliance – from the negotiations leading to the alliance’s charter in 1949 to NATO’s seventieth anniversary – exploring how the country’s role in NATO has evolved over the years. As one of NATO’s early, foremost participants, Canada was a major force contributor in the 1950s. Briefly deploying more modern fighter aircrafts in Europe than the United States had, as well as a naval commitment that would have been responsible for 10 per cent of ship escorts across the North Atlantic, Canada became the “odd man out” of the western alliance as the Cold War wore on due to its spotty military contributions. Yet Canada eventually re-emerged as a significant member through its contributions to NATO peace enforcement operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and its heavy contributions to operations in Afghanistan in the early twenty-first century, finding itself in the unfamiliar position of criticizing many of the allies by which it had for so long been criticized. As the lead nation for the alliance’s “enhanced forward presence” in Latvia, Canada still plays an important and highly visible role in NATO’s efforts in Eastern Europe today. Canada in NATO, 1949–2019 sheds light on how NATO profoundly shaped Canadian defence and foreign policy, while also serving vital Canadian security and diplomatic interests.
The story of Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of consistent support and involvement but of varying levels of military and diplomatic engagement. Canada in NATO, 1949–2019 provides the first analysis of Canada’s involvement in the Atlantic Alliance – from the negotiations leading to the alliance’s charter in 1949 to NATO’s seventieth anniversary – exploring how the country’s role in NATO has evolved over the years. As one of NATO’s early, foremost participants, Canada was a major force contributor in the 1950s. Briefly deploying more modern fighter aircrafts in Europe than the United States had, as well as a naval commitment that would have been responsible for 10 per cent of ship escorts across the North Atlantic, Canada became the “odd man out” of the western alliance as the Cold War wore on due to its spotty military contributions. Yet Canada eventually re-emerged as a significant member through its contributions to NATO peace enforcement operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and its heavy contributions to operations in Afghanistan in the early twentieth century, finding itself in the unfamiliar position of criticizing many of the allies by which it had for so long been criticized. As the lead nation for the alliance’s “enhanced forward presence” in Latvia, Canada still plays an important and highly visible role in NATO’s efforts in Eastern Europe today. Canada in NATO, 1949–2019 sheds light on how NATO profoundly shaped Canadian defence and foreign policy, while also serving vital Canadian security and diplomatic interests.
This book focuses on the critical issues shaping the bilateral defense relationship of the U.S. and Canada, including the future of ballistic missile defense, the increased deployment of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the growing debate within Canada over security relations with the US.
In April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tactitus to Force XXI. Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and strategy traditionally have been made in times of penury. During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a strategy of commitment. Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has adopted a strategy of choice derived from Canadian national interests. The document upon which Canada bases its defense policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr. Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security. Canada and the United States have stood together for more than half a century; allies and partners in war and peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues that confront them.
This book, first published in 1991, provides a major analysis of the prelude to the US’s Cold War maritime strategy, showing how NATO’s maritime forces were organised in the period. It examines how the United States Navy and allied navies, particularly the Royal Navy, were incorporated into the Alliance’s nuclear and conventional deterrent forces. It looks at the structure of the main naval commands, the growth of Soviet maritime forces and the impact of the flexible response strategy on NATO’s naval posture in the 1970s. Drawing upon many declassified documents, this account fills an important gap in postwar literature on American seapower and its relation to European security. It also addresses important aspects of NATO strategy and organisation.
This book focuses on the critical issues shaping the bilateral defense relationship of the U.S. and Canada, including the future of ballistic missile defense, the increased deployment of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the growing debate within Canada over security relations with the US.
This book, first published in 1991, provides a major analysis of the prelude to the US’s Cold War maritime strategy, showing how NATO’s maritime forces were organised in the period. It examines how the United States Navy and allied navies, particularly the Royal Navy, were incorporated into the Alliance’s nuclear and conventional deterrent forces. It looks at the structure of the main naval commands, the growth of Soviet maritime forces and the impact of the flexible response strategy on NATO’s naval posture in the 1970s. Drawing upon many declassified documents, this account fills an important gap in postwar literature on American seapower and its relation to European security. It also addresses important aspects of NATO strategy and organisation.
In April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tactitus to Force XXI. Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and strategy traditionally have been made in times of penury. During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a strategy of commitment. Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has adopted a strategy of choice derived from Canadian national interests. The document upon which Canada bases its defense policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr. Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security. Canada and the United States have stood together for more than half a century; allies and partners in war and peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues that confront them.
A cynic might claim that Canada should have no difficulties adjusting to strategy during the lean years. In the first place, the Ottawa government has never had to worry about formulating its own national security strategy. Since confederation in 1867, in war and peace it simply adopted the strategy of its allies. And in the second, with the exception of the world wars and the early years of the Cold War, the Canadian Forces (CF) have known little else but lean times. Indeed, it has been charged that Canada began collecting its peace dividend? the first time the Cold War ended, during the detente of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For the last 20 years it has spent only 2 per cent of Gross National Product (GDP) on defense. The so-called commitment-capability gap has plagued the CF into the 1980s, while heightened peacekeeping duties have continued to place a strain on resources in the first 5 years of the post-Cold War era. The latest White Paper on defense, released in December 1994, seeks to chart a course that will allow Canada to better cope with the transformed international security environment that it faces abroad and the stark fiscal realities that it faces at home. These realities were brought home by the Federal budget reductions in February 1995. Here, too, the past practice may foster a measure of scepticism. The three previous White Papers, and the budgets to fund them, proved to be poor predictors of both global and domestic trends. Their policy prescriptions seemed to be more appropriate to the situations which preceded their release rather than those which followed. As a result, they had extremely short lives as guides to subsequent defense policy and force posture decisions.
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