There is a widespread belief, among both political scientists and government policymakers, that "democracies don't fight each other." Here Joanne Gowa challenges that belief. In a thorough, systematic critique, she shows that, while democracies were less likely than other states to engage each other in armed conflicts between 1945 and 1980, they were just as likely to do so as were other states before 1914. Thus, no reason exists to believe that a democratic peace will survive the end of the Cold War. Since U.S. foreign policy is currently directed toward promoting democracy abroad, Gowa's findings are especially timely and worrisome. Those who assert that a democratic peace exists typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole. In doing so, they conflate two very different historical periods: the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, Gowa shows that a democratic peace prevailed only during the later period. Given the collapse of the Cold War world, her research calls into question both the conclusions of previous researchers and the wisdom of present U.S. foreign policy initiatives. By re-examining the arguments and data that have been used to support beliefs about a democratic peace, Joanne Gowa has produced a thought-provoking book that is sure to be controversial.
During the Cold War, international trade closely paralleled the division of the world into two rival political-military blocs. NATO and GATT were two sides of one coin; the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were two sides of another. In this book Joanne Gowa examines the logic behind this linkage between alliances and trade and asks whether it applies not only after but also before World War II.
During the Cold War, international trade closely paralleled the division of the world into two rival political-military blocs. NATO and GATT were two sides of one coin; the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were two sides of another. In this book Joanne Gowa examines the logic behind this linkage between alliances and trade and asks whether it applies not only after but also before World War II.
There is a widespread belief, among both political scientists and government policymakers, that "democracies don't fight each other." Here Joanne Gowa challenges that belief. In a thorough, systematic critique, she shows that, while democracies were less likely than other states to engage each other in armed conflicts between 1945 and 1980, they were just as likely to do so as were other states before 1914. Thus, no reason exists to believe that a democratic peace will survive the end of the Cold War. Since U.S. foreign policy is currently directed toward promoting democracy abroad, Gowa's findings are especially timely and worrisome. Those who assert that a democratic peace exists typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole. In doing so, they conflate two very different historical periods: the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, Gowa shows that a democratic peace prevailed only during the later period. Given the collapse of the Cold War world, her research calls into question both the conclusions of previous researchers and the wisdom of present U.S. foreign policy initiatives. By re-examining the arguments and data that have been used to support beliefs about a democratic peace, Joanne Gowa has produced a thought-provoking book that is sure to be controversial.
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that the United States would no longer convert dollars into gold or other primary reserve assets, effectively ending the Bretton Woods regime that had governed post-World War II international monetary relations. Complementing earlier works that emphasize international political and economic factors, Joanne Gowa's book examines the ways in which domestic influences contributed to this crucial action. In Closing the Gold Window, she argues that the mid-1971 decision was the consequence, in part, of the high priority Nixon administration officials assigned to maintaining U.S. freedom of action at home and abroad. She also maintains that the organization of the U.S. government for the conduct of international monetary policy played a role in the decision that ended the Bretton Woods regime.
There is a widespread belief, among both political scientists and government policymakers, that "democracies don't fight each other." Here Joanne Gowa challenges that belief. In a thorough, systematic critique, she shows that, while democracies were less likely than other states to engage each other in armed conflicts between 1945 and 1980, they were just as likely to do so as were other states before 1914. Thus, no reason exists to believe that a democratic peace will survive the end of the Cold War. Since U.S. foreign policy is currently directed toward promoting democracy abroad, Gowa's findings are especially timely and worrisome. Those who assert that a democratic peace exists typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole. In doing so, they conflate two very different historical periods: the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, Gowa shows that a democratic peace prevailed only during the later period. Given the collapse of the Cold War world, her research calls into question both the conclusions of previous researchers and the wisdom of present U.S. foreign policy initiatives. By re-examining the arguments and data that have been used to support beliefs about a democratic peace, Joanne Gowa has produced a thought-provoking book that is sure to be controversial.
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that the United States would no longer convert dollars into gold or other primary reserve assets, effectively ending the Bretton Woods regime that had governed post-World War II international monetary relations. Complementing earlier works that emphasize international political and economic factors, Joanne Gowa's book examines the ways in which domestic influences contributed to this crucial action. In Closing the Gold Window, she argues that the mid-1971 decision was the consequence, in part, of the high priority Nixon administration officials assigned to maintaining U.S. freedom of action at home and abroad. She also maintains that the organization of the U.S. government for the conduct of international monetary policy played a role in the decision that ended the Bretton Woods regime.
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