This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
On the heels of New Deal administrators, an army of business executives arrived in Washington in 1940 to prepare the nation for war. Among this contingent were two wealthy investment bankers and longtime friends: Ferdinand Eberstadt and James Forrestal. Together they played integral roles in the massive war mobilization program and, later, in the formation of institutions for postwar national security. Jeffery M. Dorwart's research and analysis provide a fresh look at the friendships, connections, and mindsets that steered the growing federal government in the first half of the twentieth century. The result of these relationships was a system of corporatist management for wartime mobilization and for Cold War national security. Eberstadt, a key figure on numerous policy committees, and Forrestal, secretary of the navy during the 1940s and the first secretary of the new Department of Defense, shared a common background all the way to their college days at Princeton. Over the years, their friendship and their ties to a group of like-minded executives, whom Eberstadt termed the "Good Men," substantially shaped government policy. Dorwart's research on Eberstadt's role is especially enlightening, for it reveals how Eberstadt, an outside consultant and not a government employee or elected official, affected policy direction through his design of the National Security Act of 1947. "This is a significant contribution to American military and defense history. The author's use of the `Good Man' idea effectively . . . illustrates how non-military ideas and influences have been fundamental in shaping national security policy."--Jerry Cooper, University of Missouri-St. Louis (formerly of the Command and General Staff College)
New settlements appeared in the pine wilderness of the mainland and on the uninhabited Atlantic Ocean barrier islands. These changes caused social and political conflicts, and new development assaulted the fragile seashore environment. Fishing and shipbuilding were key industries throughout the early history of Cape May County. In addition, familiar industries such as cranberry harvesting and nearly forgotten endeavors such as goldbeating, sugar refining, and cedar shingle mining played vital roles in the county's economic development. Dorwart also traces the origins of the seashore resort industry through the history of the city of Cape May, with its unique architectural styles and heritage, as well as the founding of Wildwood, Ocean City, and the newer resort towns.
It is a rare achievement for a historian to match his account of the history of a major site in terms of its original significance with an equally good study of the site as the subject of historic preservation."--Russell F. Weigley
This book seeks to discover when, why, and how Delaware Valley communities, between 1621, when the Dutch West India Company issued instructions for the security and defense of the Delaware River until 1815, as the region abandoned its Committee of Defense of the Delaware at the end of the War of 1812, first used military force to repel invasion in times of war and suppress insurrection in peacetime. It traces how these mid-Atlantic communities confronted constant threats from real or imagined enemies, invasion and insurrection from earliest seventeenth-century settlement, and articulated ideas and built institutions for security, defense, and war. It argues that from the beginning these Delaware Valley communities failed to differentiate between their concert for defense against external attacks or invasion in wartime with that of providing security for their home communities against internal enemies durins peacetime. Though conflicted about using force both to defend against invasion and suppress insurrection, over time as the Delaware Valley communities moved to the center of colonial wars, revolution, and establishment of a republic and constitutional government, their long experience with security, defense, and war that blurred the lines between military defense in wartime and preserving peacetime security eventually fused into Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to "empower the congress to use the militia to repel invasion and suppress insurrection." Jeffery M. Dorwart is professor of military, naval, and New Jersey history at Rutgers University.
New settlements appeared in the pine wilderness of the mainland and on the uninhabited Atlantic Ocean barrier islands. These changes caused social and political conflicts, and new development assaulted the fragile seashore environment. Fishing and shipbuilding were key industries throughout the early history of Cape May County. In addition, familiar industries such as cranberry harvesting and nearly forgotten endeavors such as goldbeating, sugar refining, and cedar shingle mining played vital roles in the county's economic development. Dorwart also traces the origins of the seashore resort industry through the history of the city of Cape May, with its unique architectural styles and heritage, as well as the founding of Wildwood, Ocean City, and the newer resort towns.
The air force made a huge impact on the events of World War II, but this new force of men and machines did not simply appear out of the blue. There was a long history leading up to the use of air power in military campaigns. When Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933, the leaders of the Army Air Corps wanted to force him, Congress, and the Army General Staff to create an independent air force. Using Billy Mitchell's tactics of public confrontation, exploitation of the air corps's poor condition, and unproven claims about air power, these officers only antagonized the people who could grant them independence. After the air corps failed to carry the air mail in 1934, a number of air corps officers started a concerted effort to promote themselves as "team players" who had given up the caustic, separatist attitudes of Mitchell. By the beginning of World War II, they had convinced Roosevelt, Congress, and the General Staff of the air corps's efficiency, as evidenced by Roosevelt's air corps expansion programs and the army's war plans. After the war in Europe substantiated many of the claims about air power, especially the ability of land-based airplanes to force unprotected naval forces to withdraw, Roosevelt and his military advisors placed increasing emphasis on the role of the air corps. Jeffery S. Underwood's book moves away from the traditional studies of air power. By examining how the leading officers in the air corps developed political skills and used them to win the trust and support of their superiors, it shows that the political and military leaders of the United States were not suddenly forced to accept the importance of air power by the war in Europe. Rather, they had already been awakened to the potential of air power by the efforts of politically astute air corps officers.
In this book, Jeffery M. Dorwart chronicles more than three centuries of Camden County history. He takes readers on a journey, from the earliest days as a Native American settlement, to the county's important roles in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, Camden City's booms and busts, the county's increasing suburbanization, and concluding with current inner-city revitalization efforts. Dorwart details how the earliest European settlers radically changed the local Native American culture and introduced black slavery. In the Revolutionary War, the county's location directly across the Delaware River from Philadelphia placed it at the crossroads of the American Revolution. Dorwart examines the county's conflicted roles during the Civil War, when the older agrarian population, which held traditional social and economic ties to the slave-owing South, clashed with the increasingly industrialized interests of the urban waterfront, which showed strong Unionist tendencies. He explores the changing demographics of the area as waves of European immigrants came to work in the factories. He surveys the rise and fall of first Camden City, then of the suburbs, as both areas experienced population ebbs and flows. Finally, Dorwart looks at the revitalization efforts of 2000 when Camden County began efforts to reinvent the riverfront community where it all began.
On the heels of New Deal administrators, an army of business executives arrived in Washington in 1940 to prepare the nation for war. Among this contingent were two wealthy investment bankers and longtime friends: Ferdinand Eberstadt and James Forrestal. Together they played integral roles in the massive war mobilization program and, later, in the formation of institutions for postwar national security. Jeffery M. Dorwart's research and analysis provide a fresh look at the friendships, connections, and mindsets that steered the growing federal government in the first half of the twentieth century. The result of these relationships was a system of corporatist management for wartime mobilization and for Cold War national security. Eberstadt, a key figure on numerous policy committees, and Forrestal, secretary of the navy during the 1940s and the first secretary of the new Department of Defense, shared a common background all the way to their college days at Princeton. Over the years, their friendship and their ties to a group of like-minded executives, whom Eberstadt termed the "Good Men," substantially shaped government policy. Dorwart's research on Eberstadt's role is especially enlightening, for it reveals how Eberstadt, an outside consultant and not a government employee or elected official, affected policy direction through his design of the National Security Act of 1947. "This is a significant contribution to American military and defense history. The author's use of the `Good Man' idea effectively . . . illustrates how non-military ideas and influences have been fundamental in shaping national security policy."--Jerry Cooper, University of Missouri-St. Louis (formerly of the Command and General Staff College)
This book seeks to discover when, why, and how Delaware Valley communities, between 1621, when the Dutch West India Company issued instructions for the security and defense of the Delaware River until 1815, as the region abandoned its Committee of Defense of the Delaware at the end of the War of 1812, first used military force to repel invasion in times of war and suppress insurrection in peacetime. It traces how these mid-Atlantic communities confronted constant threats from real or imagined enemies, invasion and insurrection from earliest seventeenth-century settlement, and articulated ideas and built institutions for security, defense, and war. It argues that from the beginning these Delaware Valley communities failed to differentiate between their concert for defense against external attacks or invasion in wartime with that of providing security for their home communities against internal enemies durins peacetime. Though conflicted about using force both to defend against invasion and suppress insurrection, over time as the Delaware Valley communities moved to the center of colonial wars, revolution, and establishment of a republic and constitutional government, their long experience with security, defense, and war that blurred the lines between military defense in wartime and preserving peacetime security eventually fused into Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to "empower the congress to use the militia to repel invasion and suppress insurrection." Jeffery M. Dorwart is professor of military, naval, and New Jersey history at Rutgers University.
It is a rare achievement for a historian to match his account of the history of a major site in terms of its original significance with an equally good study of the site as the subject of historic preservation."--Russell F. Weigley
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