Part of a series of technically informative monographs embracing a broad spectrum of internationally renowned buildings. This work deals with the Schnabel Residence in California, and includes a comprehensive set of technical drawings and working details.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized. The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945-1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications. Volume I describes JCS activities during the period 1945-1947 except for activities related to Indochina, which are covered in a separate series. The volume was originally planned by Dr. Ernest R. May, who developed an outline and wrote a preliminary draft. Following a lapse of some years, Dr. May's draft was revised by Dr. Walter S. Poole. Subsequently, Mr. James F. Schnabel reviewed the existing drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote the volume in its present form. Resource constraints have prevented revision to reflect recent scholarship.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized. The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staffand National Policy, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications. Volume III describes the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Korean War; their other activities during the period are covered in Volume IV, except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This volume was originally planned by Mr. Wilber W Hoare, who developed an outline and drafted six of the first seven chapters. Following a lapse of some years, these drafts were revised and expanded by Dr. Walter S. Poole, under the direction of Mr. KennethW Condit. Meanwhile, other chapters, or portions thereof, had been prepared by Miss Martha Derthick, Mr. Morris MacGregor, and Miss Barbara Sorrill. In 1968, Dr. Robert J. Watson was assigned as the responsible author. He reviewed existing drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote Chapters 1 through 9 in essentially their present form. When he was transferred to other duties, Mr. James F. Schnabel assumed responsibility for the volume and planned, researched, and wrote the remaining eight chapters. Subsequently, all of the chapters were reviewed and revised by both Mr. Schnabel and Dr. Watson. Final revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of Dr. Watson in his capacity as Chief, Histories Branch, and of his successor in that position, Mr. Kenneth W. Condit.
This volume describes the initial direction and strategy of the first major though limited war that the United States was to fight on the continent of Asia in the era of global tension that followed World War II. There are marked similarities as well as some basic differences between the war in Korea and the war that would follow a decade later in Southeast Asia, and certainly the study of both is necessary to understand the limitations on armed conflict under the shadow of nuclear holocaust. One can also discern in this volume the importance of individuals in altering the course of human events and the fate of nations, the wider concerns that preclude the massing by a world power of its military strength in one direction, and many other facets of the nation's recent military history it behooves all thoughtful Americans to ponder. Colonel Schnabel's work is the third to appear in a planned 5-volume history of the United States Army in the Korean War. It complements the detailed account of operations from June to November 1950, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, published in 1961, and the sequel to it still in preparation that will cover tactical operations through June 1951. The volume entitled Truce Tent and Fighting Front, published in 1966, covers the last two years of the war, and a logistical history of the Korean conflict is also scheduled to appear. Both military and civilian students and the scholarly reading public should find in this book much that is illuminating and provocative of reflection, and not only about events that happened more than two decades ago. James L. Collins, Jr. Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History
At the time it was fought, the war in Korea was unique in recent American military experience. Unlike World Wars I and II, which were vigorously prosecuted on the battlefield until the enemy surrendered unconditionally, the Korean conflict ended without clear-cut military victory for either side. It was fought with limited means for limited objectives. In fact, political efforts to resolve the conflict at the negotiating table predominated during the last two years of the conflict. During this period, neither side sought a decision by military means. The conflict in Korea also was an important milestone in the "cold war" relations between the Communist and non-Communist nations. By launching an unprovoked attack on a militarily insignificant country located in an area where none of their vital interests were involved, the Communists appeared to leaders of the non-Communist states to be giving proof of their aggressive designs for world domination. As a result, the United States reversed the policy of reducing its military establishment and launched an impressive expansion of its armed forces. At the same time, the United States joined with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to create a military command for the alliance and to incorporate German forces in it. In the Far East, the United States also acted to shore up the defenses of the non-Communist world by entering into treaties with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China. The Korean War provided the first wartime test for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as part of the machinery set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. In this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by with President Truman exercised overall control of war strategy. When the focus shifted from combat to armistice negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role. They participated in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they provided the channel of communications between the Government in Washington and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and his armistice negotiating team in Korea. The focus of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as they were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe the context in which they functioned. To this end, the actions of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning overall military strategy and armistice negotiations have been described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of these actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been sketched in broad outline.
This book is about religion, pacifism, and the nonviolence that informs pacifism in its most coherent form. Pacifism is one religious approach to war and violence. Another is embodied in just war theories, and both pacifism and just war thinking are critically examined. Although moral support for pacifism is presented, a main focus of the book is on religious support for pacifism, found in various religious traditions. A crucial distinction for pacifism is that between force and violence. Pacifism informed by nonviolence excludes violence, but, the book argues, allows forms of force. Peacekeeping is an activity that on the face of it seems compatible with pacifism, and several different forms of peacekeeping are examined. The implications of nonviolence for the treatment of nonhuman animals are also examined. Two models for attaining the conditions required for a world without war have been proposed. Both are treated and one, the model of a biological human family, is developed. The book concludes with reflections on the role of pacifism in each of five possible futurescapes.
Introduction to photochemistry and photophysics. Polymer structure and reactivity. Diffusion and permeability in polymers. Determination of scission and crosslinking in polymers. Photoprocesses in solid polymer matrices. Fluorescence. Excimers and exciplexes. Phosphorescence. Energy transfer and migration in polymers. Photochemistry of carbonyl-containing polymers. Photopolymerization. Photocyclization. Miscellaneous photoprocesses. Photo- and radiation chemistry of polymers.
Many military professionals regard General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as a very polarizing figure in military history, from his strategic use of maneuver to defeat the Japanese at Leyte to his public defiance of the Commander in Chief, President Truman on his policy towards the Korean War. Seen by many as a tactical genius, while others viewed him as an egomaniac, General MacArthur exhibited both sides of this complex character, but the evidence shows that MacArthur possessed a level of military competence that set him apart from his contemporaries. In 1950, MacArthur demonstrated one of his most embarrassing defeats as well as one of his most brilliant successes within the course of ten weeks. MacArthur exemplifies a level of confidence that earned him the modern reputation as an operational artist from his ability to turn the tide of war and restore South Korea’s sovereignty.
This volume covers five emerging areas of advanced device technology: wide band gap devices, terahertz and millimeter waves, nanometer silicon and silicon-germanium devices, nanoelectronics and ballistic devices, and the characterization of advanced photonic and electronic devices. The papers by leading researchers in high speed and advanced electronic and photonic technology presented many firsts and breakthrough results, as has become a tradition with the Lester Eastman Conference, and will allow readers to obtain up-to-date information about emerging trends and future directions of these technologies. Key papers in each section present snap-shot and mini reviews of state-of-the-art and hot off the press results making the book required reading for engineers, scientists, and students working on advanced and high speed device technology.
There has been heightened interest and prolific publication by missiologists about contextualization since the term was first coined in 1972. There has been ongoing debate, particularly amongst evangelicals themselves regarding which of these meanings, methods, and models of contextualization are acceptable to use. Much of the debate has been carried out by academics and practitioners whose observations and conclusions have been largely shaped by the social sciences and practical theology. In contrast, the disciplines of biblical studies and Christian thought have not featured significantly in the debate. The purpose of this research is to establish that biblical studies and Christian thought in general (and Scripture and the church fathers in particular) have an essential contribution to make in the contextualization debate and should form part of an evangelical approach to contextualization of the gospel alongside the social sciences and practical theology. Following a review of the literature on contextualization over the past forty years, the research examines the book of Acts as representative of Scripture, and the work of John Chrysostom as a representative church father. Contextual principles that are consistent with an evangelical approach to contextualization of the gospel are drawn from each work, establishing the value of biblical studies and Christian thought in contextualization.
Apart from a few famous stories, like Peter walking on water, most readers of the Bible have only a vague notion of who Jesus’ apostles were and what exactly they did. Yet, without knowing their adventurous lives, the full story of the Apostolic Age fades into a Sunday school cliché. Even the most popular books on the subject fail to fit all the puzzle pieces together. This book, gleaned from over a decade of teaching and study, takes you alongside the apostles, reveals the world through their eyes, and accurately retraces every known step of their lives. Imprisoned in Nero’s Rome, Paul wrote, “I am an ambassador in chains.” “Apostle” means ambassador, and these long-suffering ambassadors of Christ bore the gospel over tens of thousands of miles from Jerusalem to Africa, Europe, and Asia. They planted churches, had heavenly encounters, worked miracles, wrote all-time best-sellers, were shipwrecked, flogged, imprisoned, and martyred, and yet they turned empires and kingdoms upside down. Open this book and begin a journey of discovery, back to the first century, experiencing how, against all odds, these embattled and triumphant ambassadors in chains so perfectly fulfilled Jesus’ Great Commission.
Reprint of the original, first published in 1858. The publishing house Anatiposi publishes historical books as reprints. Due to their age, these books may have missing pages or inferior quality. Our aim is to preserve these books and make them available to the public so that they do not get lost.
Did Paul urge Christians to engage in mission? What would that have meant in his setting? What should the church be doing now? This essential study examines Paul's letter to the Philippians in its ancient Jewish context, making a convincing case that Paul expected churches to continue the work of spreading the gospel. Published in hardcover by Brill, it is now available as an affordable paperback.
Anabaptists and the Sword (1972; revised edn. 1976) is the first book to challenge the consensus, dating from the seventeenth century, that sixteenth-century Anabaptists were nonresistants, or Christian pacifists. While recognizing the importance of the nonresistance tradition among Anabaptists, the book gives equal attention to more militant elements in Anabaptism. It is also pioneering in giving attention to Anabaptist practice as well as Anabaptist teaching on this subject.
James Ellman digs deep, connects the dots, and concludes that General Douglas MacArthur was decidedly not a military genius. One of America's most controversial generals, Douglas MacArthur’s rise through the U.S. Army’s ranks was meteoric. However, he did not lead large formations of men in combat until he assumed command of forces in the Philippines in 1941. When war commenced with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, MacArthur’s performance on the battlefield was a failure: he underestimated the Japanese, and his poorly trained forces were outmaneuvered and outfought by a much smaller invading force. However, in what became a repeating hallmark of his career, he successfully portrayed his actions to much of the American people as brilliant and heroic regardless of victory or defeat. After fleeing to Australia, MacArthur famously announced, “I will return,” and followed through on a quest to retake Manila regardless of its impact on Allied global strategy or its cost in American, Australian, and Filipino blood. In his subsequent role as America’s shogun in Tokyo, MacArthur was again surprised by an enemy he underestimated. The Korean War yielded his greatest victory, at Inchon, but also his greatest defeat, along the Yalu River. Unwilling to accept anything but complete victory, he openly defied President Truman: MacArthur fatally undermined chances for an early peace, planned to seed a great swath of enemy territory with radioactive cobalt, and attempted to widen a conflict which threatened to become a third world war. Raging against his subsequent firing, he only truly faded away after he was publicly criticized by a panoply of America’s greatest WWII generals. Today, MacArthur still polarizes. Many biographies agree he was a great and patriotic leader marred by a few failures. Ellman argues the opposite: MacArthur was a lackluster battlefield commander who suffered stunning defeats while undermining the command structure of our military.
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