It is the new way of war: Everywhere our military tries to make inroads, insurgents flout us—and seem to get the better of the strategists making policy and battle plans. In this book, an expert with both scholarly and military experience in the field looks at cases of counterinsurgency gone wrong. By examining the failures of strategies against insurgents in Algeria, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel James S. Corum offers rare and much-needed insight into what can go wrong in such situations—and how these mistakes might be avoided. In each case, Corum shows how the conflict could have been won by the major power if its strategy had addressed the underlying causes of the insurgency it faced; not doing so wastes lives and weakens the power’s position in the world. Failures in counterinsurgency often proceed from common mistakes. Bad Strategies explores these at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Above all, Corum identifies poor civilian and military leadership as the primary cause for failure in successfully combating insurgencies. His book, with clear and practical prescriptions for success, shows how the lessons of the past might apply to our present disastrous confrontations with insurgents in Iraq.
Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces is understood in counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, relatively little research has been conducted concerning how this mission should be carried out. Hopefully, this monograph will help fill some of the information gap on this vital subject. There are several major questions that need to be addressed: How can the supporting or governing power best organize the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency? What level of training do security forces need to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations? What is the role of the police in counterinsurgency? What is the role of home guards or irregular security organizations? What kinds of training programs produce effective police and military leaders? These are very relevant questions today as the U.S. military revises its counterinsurgency doctrine. Currently, U.S. forces are engaged in campaigns against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are providing advice and support to the Philippine and Colombian governments in their battles against insurgents. In all of these countries, the U.S. military is engaged in training and supporting the local police and military force for counterinsurgency operations. As the Global War on Terror continues, the U.S. military will certainly see many more missions to train and support indigenous security forces.
The German invasion of Norway was a pivotal moment in modern warfare, the first joint campaign that featured air power as an equal element of all operations. It was, in fact, the superior use of their air force that gave the Germans the decisive margin of victory and ensured the failure of the Allied counter-offensive in central Norway in April and May 1940. All aspects of air power were employed in Norway, from long-range bombing and reconnaissance to air transport, with the Luftwaffe's ability to transport large numbers of troops and supply ground forces over great distances being particularly important. Norway was the first campaign in history in which key targets were seized by airborne forces, and the first in which air superiority was able to overcome the overwhelming naval superiority of an enemy. Researched from primary sources, this engaging history by air power expert Dr James Corum skilfully draws out where and why air power made the difference in Norway, and analyses the campaign's influence on the coming months and years of World War II.
A clear-headed, historically grounded strategy for fighting and defeating the greatest threat facing America today: “non-state” enemies such as insurgents and terrorists.
This wide-ranging collection of articles by some of the most renowned names in the subject explores the tumultuous events of the final year of the First World War. In 2018, the world commemorated the centenary of the end of the First World War. In many ways, 1918 was the most dramatic year of the conflict. After the defeat of Russia in 1917, the Germans were able to concentrate their forces on the Western Front for the first time in the war, and the German offensives launched from March 1918 onward brought the Western Allies close to defeat. Having stopped the German offensives, the Entente started its counter-attacks on all fronts with the assistance of fresh US troops, driving the Germans back and, by November 1918, the Central Powers had been defeated. This study is a multi-author work containing ten chapters by some of the best historians of the First World War from around the world writing today. It provides an overview and analysis of the different levels of war for each of the main armies involved within the changing context of the reality of warfare in 1918. It also looks in detail at the war at sea and in the air, and considers the aftermath and legacy of the First World War.
The bombing of Guernica has become a symbol of Nazi involvement in the Spanish Civil War, but the extent of the German commitment is often underestimated. The Luftwaffe sent 20,000 officers and men to Spain from 1936 to 1939, and the Condor Legion carried out many missions in support of the Spanish Nationalist forces and played a lead role in many key campaigns of the war. Aircraft that would play a significant role in the combat operations of World War II (the Heinkel 11 bomber, the Me 109 fighter, and others) saw their first action in Spain, fighting against the modern Soviet fighters and bombers that equipped the Republican Air Force. Condor Legion bombers attacked Republican logistics and transport behind the lines as well as bombing strategic targets, German bombers and fighters provided highly effective close air support for the front-line troops, and German fighters and anti-aircraft units ensured Nationalist control of the air. The experience garnered in Spain was very important to the development of the Luftwaffe. The war allowed them to hone and develop their tactics, train their officers, and to become the most practised air force in the world at conducting close support of ground troops. In effect, the Spanish Civil War proved to be the training ground for the Blitzkrieg which would be unleashed across Europe in the years that followed. In this rigorous new analysis, Legion Condor expert James Corum explores both the history and impact of the Luftwaffe's engagement during the Spanish Civil War and the role that engagement played in the development of the Luftwaffe strategy which would be used to such devastating effect in the years that followed.
Front flap copy: Terrorists and insurgents, not foreign governments, now pose the greatest threat to America--and how to fight and defeat such "non-state" enemies is the single most urgent and vexing question confronting our military today. This timely book has some answers. Drawing on decades of experience with counterinsurgency--as a scholar, a strategist, and a military officer--James S. Corum brings unique insight to the problems we face. His book offers a deeply informed, closely reasoned and--most valuably--eminently sensible account of how circumstances and our actions (or inaction) have contributed to our present dilemma. With the lessons of recent history in clear view, Corum "lays out a workable strategy for meeting the often-overlapping threat raised by terrorist groups and insurgents. Critical to understanding the nature of modern-day warfare, Fighting the War on Terror" has broad implications for the future course of military, intelligence, and foreign policymaking. No one with an interest in the nation's security can afford to overlook it. Back flap copy: James S. Corum, PhD, is an associate professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was recently a visiting fellow at Oxford University's All Souls College. While serving as a professor at the Air University, Corum developed and taught the course Terrorism and Small Wars. He is a member of the editorial boards of the Journal of Strategic Studies and Airpower Journal and the author of four books. A Lieutenant Colonel, Corum recently retired from the U.S. Army Reserve after six years of active duty and twenty-two years of reserve service, including duty in Iraq in 2004.
It is the new way of war: Everywhere our military tries to make inroads, insurgents flout us—and seem to get the better of the strategists making policy and battle plans. In this book, an expert with both scholarly and military experience in the field looks at cases of counterinsurgency gone wrong. By examining the failures of strategies against insurgents in Algeria, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel James S. Corum offers rare and much-needed insight into what can go wrong in such situations—and how these mistakes might be avoided. In each case, Corum shows how the conflict could have been won by the major power if its strategy had addressed the underlying causes of the insurgency it faced; not doing so wastes lives and weakens the power’s position in the world. Failures in counterinsurgency often proceed from common mistakes. Bad Strategies explores these at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Above all, Corum identifies poor civilian and military leadership as the primary cause for failure in successfully combating insurgencies. His book, with clear and practical prescriptions for success, shows how the lessons of the past might apply to our present disastrous confrontations with insurgents in Iraq.
This new book examines the development of Soviet thinking on the operational employment of their Air Force from 1918 to 1945, using Soviet theoretical writings and contemporary analyses of combat actions.
The German invasion of Norway was a pivotal moment in modern warfare, the first joint campaign that featured air power as an equal element of all operations. It was, in fact, the superior use of their air force that gave the Germans the decisive margin of victory and ensured the failure of the Allied counter-offensive in central Norway in April and May 1940. All aspects of air power were employed in Norway, from long-range bombing and reconnaissance to air transport, with the Luftwaffe's ability to transport large numbers of troops and supply ground forces over great distances being particularly important. Norway was the first campaign in history in which key targets were seized by airborne forces, and the first in which air superiority was able to overcome the overwhelming naval superiority of an enemy. Researched from primary sources, this engaging history by air power expert Dr James Corum skilfully draws out where and why air power made the difference in Norway, and analyses the campaign's influence on the coming months and years of World War II.
Understanding Modern Warfare has established itself as the leading introduction to the issues, ideas, concepts and context necessary to understand the theory and conduct of warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is an invaluable text for military professionals and students of military history. Key features include: incisive coverage of the debates surrounding contemporary and future warfare; accessible, yet sophisticated, discussion across the land, sea, and air environments; and coverage of contemporary topics such as drones, cyber warfare, and hybrid warfare. The book makes extensive use of text boxes to explain key concepts and to reference extended examples, and it includes annotated guides to further reading and key questions to promote the reader's further thinking. This second edition has been fully revised and updated to take into account new debates and recent events in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, and it has also been restructured to further improve its usefulness as a teaching tool.
Researched from original-language primary sources, this is a uniquely well-informed and multi-faceted history of the World War I air campaign of Bloody April. Researched from original German-, French-, and English-language sources, and written by an authority on both air and ground military operations, author, Dr James S Corum examines how Bloody April caused Allied forces to reassess their approach to the use of airpower. Considering well-known problems such as technology and training doctrine, but also how the artillery-aircraft combination ideally had to work in late-WW I ground offensives, Dr Corum analyses what each side got wrong and why. He describes little-known parts of the April campaigns, such as both sides' use of strategic bombing with heavy aircraft, and considers the German use of advanced high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft with oxygen and heated suits while detailing the exploits of the infamous 'Red Baron', Manfred von Richthofen. Lessons from Bloody April not only served to improve the coordination of Allied artillery and aircraft but subsequently aircraft played a much larger role in supporting ground troops in attack mode. Bloody April paved the way for the airpower revolution that, by 1918, would make the Allies masters of the sky on the Western Front.
This work comprises an effort to answer the question of how an airman can be qualified to be a Joint Force Commander, using the biographical example of General Roy S. Geiger, USMC. Geiger was the fifth designated Marine Aviator, earning his wings in June of 1917. He then served as a squadron commander in the First Marine Aviation Force in World War I (WW I), where he flew combat sorties and earned his first Navy Cross. In the interwar years, he served in multiple command billets, acted as head of Marine Aviation, and performed with distinction as a student at the Army Command and General Staff School and the Army and Navy War Colleges. During World War II, Geiger commanded the First Marine Aircraft Wing and the CACTUS Air Force in the dark days of the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942, where at age fifty-seven he again flew in combat, earning his second Navy Cross. He went on to serve as an Amphibious Corps Commander in the Pacific Theater, where he led campaigns at Bougainville, Guam, and Peleliu. Finally, he distinguished himself in the battle of Okinawa as the only Marine ever to command a field Army, the Tenth Army. After World War II, Lieutenant General Geiger continued to shape the Marine Corps in command of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific until his premature death in 1947. The study is a chronological account of the life of Roy Geiger, with a focus on his leadership traits, extensive professional military education, remarkable joint relationships, and innovation, all of which contributed to his success as a Joint Force Commander. The author argues that Geiger was the most influential Marine aviator and among the most successful operational commanders in the history of the United States Marine Corps. Roy Geiger was the prototype for a Joint Force Commander.
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