During the middle and late 1970s, the United States Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama produced a series of 17 monographs that detailed the history of the Vietnam War. These studies were classified as being Top Secret for many years and were only recently released to the public. The core of these monographs is the series that deal with the political, operational and technical development of the Air Force participation in the Vietnam War. These remarkable documents contain a wealth of historical data that explain the background and reasoning behind many controversial decisions. This compilation has taken these monographs and assembled them into a single narrative. The documents have been painstakingly remastered and reset to the printed page but their editorial integrity has been scrupulously preserved.
More than fifty years have passed since the twin crises of Lebanon and Taiwan dominated the news. These two events have faded into history and are often regarded as being, at best, footnotes in the histories of the Cold War. The world in which they took place seems to have passed away a long, long time ago. Yet, when reading these monographs, it become apparent that these two crises were profoundly important in terms of the effects they were to have on American strategy throughout the rest of the century. Those effects are still in play today and even now they are affecting how the United States perceives the world and reacts to developments within it. Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 and Air Operations in theLebanon Crisis of 1958 were prepared by the USAF Historical Division . This book is a compilation of those reports with substantial additional material that updates and complements the original material. However, the integrity of the original text has been scrupulously preserved.
Includes over 100 maps, plans and illustrations The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation’s military power. Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war. Readers of this volume will also want to read the sequel, Wayne Thompson’s To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973, which tells the more encouraging story of how the Air Force employed airpower to far greater effect using a combination of better doctrine, tactics, technology, and training.
This recently declassified study from June 1965 outlines the role of Headquarters USAF in aiding the South Vietnamese effort to defeat the communist-led Viet Cong. The author begins by discussing general U.S. policy leading to increased military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. He then describes the principal USAF deployments and augmentations, Air Force efforts to obtain a larger military planning role, some facets of plans and operations, the Air Force-Army divergencies over the use and control of air power in combat training and in testing, defoliation activities, and USAF support for the Vietnamese Air Force. The study ends with an account of events leading to the overthrow of the Diem government in Saigon late in 1963.
Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces from North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began with photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. U.S. Air Force leaders and aircrews flying interdiction missions over Laotian territory faced a unique set of challenges. Their efforts were plagued by political controversies, daunting weather, rugged terrain, a tenacious foe, and above all a bewildering array of rules of engagement limiting the effectiveness of air operations. Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960-1968 examines this complex operational environment. Many of these issues-particularly those relevant to conducting a politically sensitive, limited war from foreign bases, with a commitment to minimizing civilian casualties-are still relevant today and for the foreseeable future as the modern Air Force meets its responsibilities in an ever-changing global environment. Richard P. Hallion Air Force Historian
First published in 1968, this study reviews the political background and top level discussions leading to the renewed bombing campaign in early 1966, the restrictions still imposed on air operations, and the positions taken on them by the military chiefs. It discusses the various studies and events which led to the president's decision to strike at North Vietnam's oil storage facilities and the results of those mid-year attacks. It also examines the increasing effectiveness of enemy air defenses and the continuing assessments of the air campaign under way at year's end.
More than fifty years have passed since the twin crises of Lebanon and Taiwan dominated the news. These two events have faded into history and are often regarded as being, at best, footnotes in the histories of the Cold War. The world in which they took place seems to have passed away a long, long time ago. Yet, when reading these monographs, it become apparent that these two crises were profoundly important in terms of the effects they were to have on American strategy throughout the rest of the century. Those effects are still in play today and even now they are affecting how the United States perceives the world and reacts to developments within it. Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 and Air Operations in theLebanon Crisis of 1958 were prepared by the USAF Historical Division . This book is a compilation of those reports with substantial additional material that updates and complements the original material. However, the integrity of the original text has been scrupulously preserved.
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