Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, has a one page summary of the OVERLORD campaign entitled, “OVERLORD: A Classic Joint and Combined Operation.” In the narrative, the author(s) referenced the OVERLORD command structure with its subordinate commands for land, air, and naval forces and “(after much dispute) what we would call today operational control over US and UK strategic air forces.” This paper is an examination of the parenthetical “after much dispute.” Moreover, it is an appreciation of the dynamics surrounding General Dwight Eisenhower’s strategic leadership and his quest to achieve unity of command. Eisenhower believed unity of command was fundamental to the success of OVERLORD; he threatened resignation without it.
The Eisenhower farm was the first and only home that Dwight Eisenhower and his wife, Mamie, called their own. During Eisenhower's military career, he and Mamie lived around the world, but he always hoped to own a piece of property and leave it better than he found it. That wish led to the purchase of the Allen Redding farm in 1950 and the Eisenhowers' thorough renovation of its dwelling. During Eisenhower's presidency, the farm served as a retreat from the Washington pressure cooker. When his presidential term ended, the Eisenhowers embraced a new chapter in their lives together. Eisenhower maintained an active schedule of writing, speechmaking, correspondence, and meetings with a wide range of national and world leaders, as well as supervision of an active farm operation. Mamie and Dwight shared a busy social life in retirement, taking special pleasure in spending time with their son John, daughter-in-law Barbara, and four grandchildren. This book tells the Eisenhowers' Gettysburg story.
Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1955 decision to barter Egyptian cotton for Soviet bloc weaponry thrust Egypt onto center stage in the Cold War in the Middle East. What Egypt needed most, and what the United States was uniquely equipped to provide, was economic aid. For the Egyptian government--eager to take rapid strides toward economic development but crippled by a burgeoning population, a paucity of arable land, and a meager reserve of foreign exchange--American economic aid promised to serve as an enormously important crutch. For American policymakers, economic assistance appeared to be an ideal means of developing American influence in Egypt. Few aid relationships in the last three decades can match the drama and significance of the U.S.-Egyptian experience. This study shows how the American government attempted to use its economic aid program to induce or coerce Egypt to support U.S. interests in the Middle East in the quarter century following the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms agreement. William J. Burns has analyzed recently released government documents and interviews with former policymakers to throw light on the use of aid as a tool of American policy toward the Nasser regime. He also offers valuable observations on the role of the American economic assistance program in the Sadat era.
Ending a war, as Fred Charles Iklé wrote, poses a much greater challenge than beginning one. In addition to issues related to battle tactics, prisoners of war, diplomatic relations, and cease-fire negotiations, ending war involves domestic political calculations. Balancing the tides of public opinion versus policy needs poses a deep and enduring problem for presidents. In a first-of-its-kind study, Resowing the Seeds of War explains how Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Obama managed the political, policy, and bureaucratic challenges that arise at the end of war via a series of rhetorical choices that reframe, modify, or unravel depictions of national enemies, the cause of the conflict, and the stakes for the nation and world. This end-of-war rhetoric justifies ending hostilities, rationalizes postwar national policy, argues for the construction of postwar security arrangements, and often sustains public support for massive financial investment in reconstruction. By tracking presidential manipulations of savage imagery from World War II to the War on Terror, this book concludes that even as metaphoric reframing facilitates exit from conflict, it incurs unexpected consequences that make national involvement in the next conflict more likely.
People who are considered “famous” can be found in many different fields. This book describes 472 museums, historic sites, and memorials about 409 people in 26 categories: Actors Explorers Playwrights Architects First Ladies Poets Artists/Sculptors Frontiersmen Presidents Athletes Journalists/Publishers Public Officials/ Author/Writers Medical Innovators Political Figures Aviators/Astronauts Military Figures Religious Leaders Business/Industrial/Financial Musicians/Singers/ Scientists/Engineers/ Figures Composers Inventors Educators Outlaws Social Activists Entertainers Patriotic Figures Socialites They include such people as Clark Gable, Judy Garland, Georgia O’Keeffe, Norman Rockwell, Ernest Hemingway, Edgar Allan Poe, Sinclair Lewis, Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, Will Rogers, Daniel Boone, Buffalo Bill Cody, William Randolph Hearst, Douglas MacArthur, Robert E. Lee, Louis Armstrong, Elvis Presley, Betsy Ross, Carl Sandburg, Jesse James, Benjamin Franklin, Daniel Webster, Billy Graham, Martin Luther King, Jr., Jane Addams, Frederick Douglass, Doris Duke, Helen Keller, Wilbur and Orville Wright, and all the Presidents, including George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Among the sites of the museums and other tributes are such places as the Katharine Hepburn Museum, Thomas Hart Benton Home and Studio, Babe Ruth Museum, Louisa May Alcott’s Orchard House, Mark Twain House and Museum, Charles A. Lindberg Historic Site, Lincoln Memorial, Morgan Library and Museum, Kit Carson Home and Museum, Clara Barton National Historic Site, Stonewall Jackson’s Home, Marian Anderson Residence/Museum and Birthplace, Stephen Foster Memorial Museum, Tennessee Williams Birthplace/Home, Mount Vernon: George Washington’s Estate and Gardens, Roger Williams National Memorial, Rachel Carson Homestead, Rosa Parks Library and Museum, and Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. In addition to the chapters and directory, the book includes a geographical guide to the sites, selected bibliography, index, and 29 photographs.
At a time when greater transparency is needed, this book advances a novel explanation of America's efforts to advance greater transparency in international relations. Marquardt argues that American statesmen have long sought to secure an American-dominated international system to encourage states to be more open and forthcoming about their internal affairs. Yet the United States routinely uses its calls for military transparency in particular as a policy instrument to discipline its rivals and therefore paradoxically contributes to greater tension in international relations. In contrast to conventional thinking about transparency in relation to overcoming power politics and promoting international cooperation, this book explores the relationship between America's power and international security competition. Though analytically distinct, openness and transparency have served the same strategic goal; ensuring America's position of preponderance in the international system.
Psychological Operations American Style examines the historical use of PSYOP by the Unites States in the twentieth century. Over six years into its War on Terrorism, and over thirty years removed from the Vietnam War, the United States continues to cling to its traditional style of PSYOP. It has remained a tangential weapon in the otherwise conventional arsenal employed by Unites States officials in the War on Terrorism. To the extent that Americans have utilized PSYOP, they have remained wedded to the notion of its use as a tactical offensive weapon meant to instill terror in their enemies. While often successful in the short term for securing defection and surrender, this type of PSYOP does little to win hearts and minds over the long haul. As experience in Vietnam demonstrates, using PSYOP only as a tactical weapon possesses the potential to undermine the nation's position by eroding its credibility. It offers civilian officials and military commanders the means to blur the distinction between information and persuasion in order to achieve immediate and demonstrable results. The use of such tactics by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Vietnam destroyed trust in the information given even at official press conferences. Psychological Operations American Style is ideal for military and diplomatic historians and scholars of the Vietnam War.
H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's former chief of staff, is said to have boasted: "Every president needs a son of a bitch, and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer and I'm his bastard. I get done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him." Richard Ellis explores the widely discussed but poorly understood phenomenon of presidential "lightning rods"-cabinet officials who "take the heat" instead of their bosses. Whether by intent or circumstance, these officials divert criticism and blame away from their presidents. The phenomenon is so common that it's assumed to be an essential item in every president's managerial toolbox. But, Ellis argues, such assumptions can oversimplify our understanding of this tool. Ellis advises against indiscriminate use of the lightning rod metaphor. Such labeling can hide as much as it reveals about presidential administration and policymaking at the cabinet level. The metaphor often misleads by suggesting strategic intent on the president's part while obscuring the calculations and objectives of presidential adversaries and the lightning rods themselves. Ellis also illuminates the opportunities and difficulties that various presidential posts-especially secretaries of state, chiefs of staff, and vice presidents-have offered for deflecting blame from our presidents. His study offers numerous detailed and instructive examples from the administrations of Truman (Dean Acheson); Eisenhower (Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Herbert Brownell, and Ezra Taft Benson); LBJ (Hubert Humphrey); Ford (Henry Kissinger); and Reagan (James Watt). These examples, Ellis suggests, should guide our understanding of the relationship between lightning rods and presidential leadership, policymaking, and ratings. Blame avoidance, he warns, does have its limitations and may even backfire at times. Nevertheless, President Clinton and his successors may need to rely on such tools. The presidency, Ellis points out, finds itself the object of increasingly intense partisan debate and microscopic scrutiny by a wary press. Lightning rods can deflect such heat and help the president test policies, gauge public opinion, and protect his political power and public image. Ellis's book is an essential primer for helping us understand this process.
On June 6, 1944, the Allies launched Operation Overlord, the largest, most hazardous amphibious assault in history. The objective: establishment of a lodgment area in Normandy from which the Allies could strike at the heart of Germany and destroy the German armed forces. Air supremacy over northwest Europe was an absolute prerequisite for the success of the invasion, and to achieve it the U.S. Army Air Forces launched two campaigns aimed at destroying the Germans' transportation advantages in the area. In the months and days leading up to the assault, the Army Air Forces ceaselessly bombed rail centers, rendering most of the railways in northern France and Belgium unusable. Once the actual invasion was underway, the Allies shifted to an interdiction campaign, using precise air attacks on critical transportation installations near the battlefield to neutralize Germany's efforts to resupply and reinforce their troops. This work makes use of many wartime records that had remained classified until recently.
Covers the origin, development, and results of all major national security policies over the last seven decades. A thoroughly interdisciplinary work, the encyclopedia views national security from a historical, economic, political, and technological perspective.
In January of 1949 the aftershocks of the Second World War were still jarring large parts of the globe, although they had greatly diminished in the United States. In Asia, however, turbulence continued to rise as a result of the collapse of Japan, the tottering of the European empires after the war, and the combustion produced by nationalism mixed with communism. Because a segment of American opinion, generally represented in the more conservative wing of the Republican party, was very sensitive to events in Asia, the tremors in the Far East came as harbingers of disturbing political conflict in the United States." Robert J. Donovan's Tumultuous Years presents a detailed account of Harry S. Truman's presidency from 1949-1953.
Handsomely displayed quotations in an easy-to-read format, this inspiring collection contains quotations from every U.S. President from George Washington to George W. Bush, drawn from various addresses, memoirs, proclamations, correspondence, and other sources.
This is a study of TVA management of Tellico Dam. Part of the ambitious New Deal project to bring modernity to Appalachia, TVA planning was far-reaching, often far-sighted, but also controversial, involving mass migration of people from their ancestral homes and threats to species, like the snail darter.
Today, two hundred years after the founding of the republic, the United States finds itself burdened by the highest taxes and largest debts in its history. The crisis presented by these Siamese twins symbolizes the country's inability to govern itself.
Examines the origins, development, and achievements of conservatism in the United States, from the birth of the modern right in the 1920s through the restoration of the conservative consensus at the end of the twentieth century.
Presidential rankings emerged in 1948 when Life Magazine published an article by the prominent historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., who had selected 55 experts on the presidency and asked them to rank the presidents. He asked his respondents to rank presidents into categories of "Great," "Near Great," "Average," "Below Average" and "Failure." The result was a substantial article that attracted wide public attention. His work and similar studies have not escaped criticism, however. Many general works on the presidency have discussed presidential greatness and identified presidents who stood out for good or ill. There are likely unavoidable inadequacies in all ranking schemes, regardless of the complicated measures that many authors employ in their attempts to be "scientific." This book provides useful criticism of these presidential rankings. It is arranged chronologically, and discusses each presidential performance and each ranking study in detail. Perhaps it would be sufficient to say that most who held the office were right for their time.
Essays by a diverse and distinguished group of historians, political scientists, and sociologists examine the alarms, emergencies, controversies, and confusions that have characterized America's Cold War, the post-Cold War interval of the 1990s, and today's "Global War on Terror." This "Long War" has left its imprint on virtually every aspect of American life; by considering it as a whole, The Long War is the first volume to take a truly comprehensive look at America's response to the national-security crisis touched off by the events of World War II. Contributors consider topics ranging from grand strategy and strategic bombing to ideology and economics and assess the changing American way of war and Hollywood's surprisingly consistent depiction of Americans at war. They evaluate the evolution of the national-security apparatus and the role of dissenters who viewed the myriad activities of that apparatus with dismay. They take a fresh look at the Long War's civic implications and its impact on civil-military relations. More than a military history, The Long War examines the ideas, policies, and institutions that have developed since the United States claimed the role of global superpower. This protracted crisis has become a seemingly permanent, if not defining aspect of contemporary American life. In breaking down the old and artificial boundaries that have traditionally divided the postwar period into neat historical units, this volume provides a better understanding of the evolution of the United States and U.S. policy since World War II and offers a fresh perspective on our current national security predicament.
The Presidency and the Economic Policy offers an update on how economic issues have developed and evolved since the first version of the book was published in 1994. This book addresses the extent to which the president influences the domestic and global economy, manages and coordinates the economic policymaking process, and determines various economic issues on the national public policy agenda.
The 1950s evoke images of prosperity, suburbia, a smiling President Eisenhower, cars with elaborate tail fins, Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, and the “golden age” of television—seemingly a simpler time in which the idealized family life of situation comedies had at least some basis in reality. A closer examination, however,recalls more threatening images: the hysteria of McCarthy-ism, the shadow of the atomic bomb, war in Korea, the Soviet threat manifested in the launch of Sputnik and the bombast of Nikita Khruschchev, and clashes over the integration of public buses in Montgomery, Alabama, and a high school in Little Rock, Arkansas. Andrew J. Dunar successfully shows how the issues confronting America in the late twentieth century have roots in the fifties, some apparent at the time, others only in retrospect: civil rights, environmentalism, the counterculture, and “movements” on behalf of women, Chicanos, and Native Americans. The rise of the “Beats,” the continuing development of jazz, the emergence of rock ’n’ roll, and the art of Jackson Pollock reveal the decade to be less conformist than commonly portrayed. While the cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union generated the most concern, Dunar skillfully illustrates how the rise of Nasser in Egypt, Castro in Cuba, and Communist regimes in North Korea, Vietnam, and China signaled new regional challenges to American power.
Bombs are as old as hatred itself. But it was the twentieth century--one hundred years of incredible scientific progress and terrible war--that brought forth the Big One, the Bomb, humanity's most powerful and destructive invention. In The Bomb: A Life, Gerard DeGroot tells the story of this once unimaginable weapon that--at least since 8:16 a.m. on August 6, 1945--has haunted our dreams and threatened our existence. The Bomb has killed hundreds of thousands outright, condemned many more to lingering deaths, and made vast tracts of land unfit for life. For decades it dominated the psyches of millions, becoming a touchstone of popular culture, celebrated or decried in mass political movements, films, songs, and books. DeGroot traces the life of the Bomb from its birth in turn-of-the-century physics labs of Europe to a childhood in the New Mexico desert of the 1940s, from adolescence and early adulthood in Nagasaki and Bikini, Australia and Kazakhstan to maturity in test sites and missile silos around the globe. His book portrays the Bomb's short but significant existence in all its scope, providing us with a portrait of the times and the people--from Oppenheimer to Sakharov, Stalin to Reagan--whose legacy still shapes our world.
CMH Pub 50-1-1. Defense Studies Series. Discusses the evolution of the services' racial policies and practices between World War II and 1965 during the period when black servicemen and women were integrated into the Nation's military units.
We are in the midst of a Dwight Eisenhower revival. Today pundits often look to Eisenhower as a model of how a president can govern across party lines and protect American interests globally without resorting too quickly to the use of force. Yet this mix of nostalgia and frustration with the current polarized state of American politics may mislead us. Eisenhower’s presidency has much to teach us today about how a president might avert crises and showdowns at home or abroad. But he governed under conditions so strikingly different from those a chief executive faces in the early 21st century that we need to question how much of his style could work in our own era. The chapters in this volume address the lessons we might draw from the Eisenhower experience for presidential leadership today. Although most of the authors find much to admire in the Eisenhower record, they express varying opinions on how applicable his approach would be for our own time. On one side, they appreciate his limited faith in the power of his words to move public opinion and his reluctance to turn to the use of force to solve international problems. On the other side, it was plain that Ike’s exercise of “hidden-hand” leadership (in Fred Greenstein’s evocative term) would not be possible in the modern media environment that makes Washington a giant fishbowl and instant revelation an acceptable norm. Both Eisenhower admirers and skeptics (and many of the authors are both) will find much in these essays to reinforce their preconceptions – and much that is unsettling. Eisenhower emerges as an effective but flawed leader. He was in many ways the right man for his time, but limited because he was also a man of his time.
With challenging and entertaining puzzles, Crossword America: The Presidents describes the people who have held the highest office in the nation and the obstacles they faced while in the White House. Developed especially for midgraders, each puzzle features one to three presidents and teaches useful terms and historical facts. Interesting photos are sprinkled throughout.
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