Based on massive new research, a compelling and surprising account of the twentieth century's closest election The 1960 presidential election between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon is one of the most frequently described political events of the twentieth century, yet the accounts to date have been remarkably unbalanced. Far more attention is given to Kennedy's side than to Nixon's. The imbalance began with the first book on that election, Theodore White’s The Making of the President 1960—in which (as he later admitted) White deliberately cast Kennedy as the hero and Nixon as the villain—and it has been perpetuated in almost every book since then. Few historians have attempted an unbiased account of the election, and none have done the archival research that Irwin F. Gellman has done. Based on previously unused sources such as the FBI's surveillance of JFK and the papers of Leon Jaworski, vice-presidential candidate Henry Cabot Lodge, and many others, this book presents the first even-handed history of both the primary campaigns and the general election. The result is a fresh, engaging chronicle that shatters long†‘held myths and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of both candidates.
Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface to the Paperback Edition -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 The Prerequisites for a Congressional Candidate -- 2 Nixon's First Primary -- 3 Nixon Versus Voorhis -- 4 Learning the Congressional Routine -- 5 Nixon and HUAC -- 6 The Herter Committee -- 7 Sharpening Foreign and Domestic Priorities -- 8 Running for Reelection -- 9 Moving Onto the National Stage -- 10 Nixon: Chambers Versus Hiss -- 11 The Pumpkin, Father Cronin, the FBI, and Duggan -- 12 Nixon, Communism, and the Truman Triumph -- 13 Stepping Sideways to Move Up -- 14 The 1950 Primary -- 15 Douglas Versus Nixon: The Issues -- 16 Fifty-one Days in the Fall: Nixon Versus Douglas-Reality and Legend -- 17 Communism and Korea -- 18 Corruption in the Highest Places -- 19 "Electability" and Other Issues -- 20 The 1952 Convention -- Epilogue: Nixon and His Detractors-Whom Should We Believe? -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Glossary of Characters -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z
More than half a century after Eisenhower left office, the history of his presidency is so clouded by myth, partisanship, and outright fraud that most people have little understanding of how Ike's administration worked or what it accomplished. We know—or think we know—that Eisenhower distrusted his vice president, Richard Nixon, and kept him at arm's length; that he did little to advance civil rights; that he sat by as Joseph McCarthy's reckless anticommunist campaign threatened to wreck his administration; and that he planned the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. None of this is true. The President and the Apprentice reveals a different Eisenhower, and a different Nixon. Ike trusted and relied on Nixon, sending him on many sensitive overseas missions. Eisenhower, not Truman, desegregated the military. Eisenhower and Nixon, not Lyndon Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. Eisenhower was determined to bring down McCarthy and did so. Nixon never, contrary to recent accounts, saw a psychotherapist; but while Ike was recovering from his heart attack in 1955, Nixon was overworked, overanxious, overmedicated, and at the limits of his ability to function.
The definitive account of Richard Nixon's congressional career, back in print with a new preface Unsurpassed in the fifteen years since its original publication, Irwin F. Gellman’s exhaustively researched work is the definitive account of Richard Nixon’s rise from political unknown to the verge of achieving the vice-presidency. To document Nixon’s congressional career, Gellman combed the files of Nixon’s 1946, 1948, and 1950 campaigns, papers from the executive sessions of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), and every document dated through 1952 at the Richard Nixon Library. This singular volume corrects many earlier written accounts. For example, there was no secret funding of Nixon’s senate campaign in 1950, and Nixon won universal praise for his evenhandedness as a member of HUAC. The first book of a projected five-volume examination of this complex man’s entire career, this work stands as the definitive political portrait of Nixon as a fast-rising young political star.
Originally published in 1979. American diplomacy during Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency has received much attention, with one notable exception—the United States' relations with Latin America. Irwin Gellman's book corrects this past neglect through a perceptive analysis of FDR's "Good Neighbor" efforts in Latin America. Based on a fresh examination of State Department records and extensive manuscript sources (including an unprecedented use of Nelson Rockefeller's oral history archives), the book points out the complexities of Good Neighbor diplomacy and its intimate relationship to Roosevelt's global strategies. As background to his discussions of FDR's policies, Gellman looks first at how Latin American affairs were handled during the administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, the three Republicans who preceded Roosevelt in office. Good Neighbor diplomacy, Gellman shows, was not a carryover from these administrations; it bore the distinctive mark of FDR's own making. He then describes how Roosevelt's policy of nonintervention worked, particularly how military force was superseded by more subtle diplomatic maneuverings. Turning to a discussion of economic relations with Latin America, Gellman focuses on how the United States' own situation—cut off from international trade by the Depression—encouraged regional expansion. And, finally, he looks at how Roosevelt parlayed the threat of war in Europe and the specter of Nazi penetration in the Americas to further solidify a hemispheric stand. Gellman's account vividly demonstrates that Good Neighbor diplomacy was as much the product of personality as it was of policy. In particular, it emerged out of the rivalries and alliances among three men: Roosevelt; his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; and Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. Gellman (the first to have access to FBI files on Welles) characterizes FDR as an astute politician who saw an opportunity to use pan-Americanism to restore America to world prominence—yet could not handle the personality conflicts among those in his own ranks. Gellman shows how tenuous a government policy can be when so much of it depends on personal control and influence.
Originally published in 1995. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was paralyzed from the waist down, but he concealed the extent of his disability from a public that was never permitted to see him in a wheelchair. FDR's Secretary of State was old and frail, debilitated by a highly contagious and usually fatal disease that was as closely guarded a state secret as his wife's Jewish ancestry. The undersecretary was a pompous and aloof man who married three times but, when intoxicated, preferred sex with railroad porters, shoeshine boys, and cabdrivers. These three legendary figures—Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles—not only concealed such secrets for more than a decade but did so while directing United States foreign policy during some of the most perilous events in the nation's history. Irwin Gellman brings to light startling new information about the intrigues, deceptions, and behind-the-scenes power struggles that influenced America's role in World War II and left their mark on world events, for good or ill, in the half-century that followed. Gellman had unprecedented access to previously unavailable documents, including Hull's confidential medical records, unpublished manuscripts of Drew Pearson and R. Walton Moore, and Sumner Welles's FBI file. Gellman concludes that while Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles usually agreed on foreign policy matters, the events that molded each man's character remained a mystery to the others. Their failure to cope with their secret affairs—to subordinate their personal concerns to the higher good of the nation—eventually destroyed much of what they hoped would be their legacy. Roosevelt never explained his objectives to his vice president, Harry Truman, or to anyone else. Hull never groomed a successor, and Welles kept his foreign assignations as classified as his sexual orientation. Gellman tells the dramatic story of how three Americans—despite private demons and bitter animosities—could work together to lead their nation to victory against fascism. —William T. Walker, Presidential Studies Quarterly
Based on massive new research, a compelling and surprising account of the twentieth century's closest election The 1960 presidential election between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon is one of the most frequently described political events of the twentieth century, yet the accounts to date have been remarkably unbalanced. Far more attention is given to Kennedy's side than to Nixon's. The imbalance began with the first book on that election, Theodore White’s The Making of the President 1960—in which (as he later admitted) White deliberately cast Kennedy as the hero and Nixon as the villain—and it has been perpetuated in almost every book since then. Few historians have attempted an unbiased account of the election, and none have done the archival research that Irwin F. Gellman has done. Based on previously unused sources such as the FBI's surveillance of JFK and the papers of Leon Jaworski, vice-presidential candidate Henry Cabot Lodge, and many others, this book presents the first even-handed history of both the primary campaigns and the general election. The result is a fresh, engaging chronicle that shatters long†‘held myths and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of both candidates.
More than half a century after Eisenhower left office, the history of his presidency is so clouded by myth, partisanship, and outright fraud that most people have little understanding of how Ike’s administration worked or what it accomplished. We know—or think we know—that Eisenhower distrusted his vice president, Richard Nixon, and kept him at arm’s length; that he did little to advance civil rights; that he sat by as Joseph McCarthy’s reckless anticommunist campaign threatened to wreck his administration; and that he planned the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. None of this is true. The President and the Apprentice reveals a different Eisenhower, and a different Nixon. Ike trusted and relied on Nixon, sending him on many sensitive overseas missions. Eisenhower, not Truman, desegregated the military. Eisenhower and Nixon, not Lyndon Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. Eisenhower was determined to bring down McCarthy and did so. Nixon never, contrary to recent accounts, saw a psychotherapist, but while Ike was recovering from his heart attack in 1955, Nixon was overworked, overanxious, overmedicated, and at the limits of his ability to function.
Originally published in 1995. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was paralyzed from the waist down, but he concealed the extent of his disability from a public that was never permitted to see him in a wheelchair. FDR's Secretary of State was old and frail, debilitated by a highly contagious and usually fatal disease that was as closely guarded a state secret as his wife's Jewish ancestry. The undersecretary was a pompous and aloof man who married three times but, when intoxicated, preferred sex with railroad porters, shoeshine boys, and cabdrivers. These three legendary figures—Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles—not only concealed such secrets for more than a decade but did so while directing United States foreign policy during some of the most perilous events in the nation's history. Irwin Gellman brings to light startling new information about the intrigues, deceptions, and behind-the-scenes power struggles that influenced America's role in World War II and left their mark on world events, for good or ill, in the half-century that followed. Gellman had unprecedented access to previously unavailable documents, including Hull's confidential medical records, unpublished manuscripts of Drew Pearson and R. Walton Moore, and Sumner Welles's FBI file. Gellman concludes that while Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles usually agreed on foreign policy matters, the events that molded each man's character remained a mystery to the others. Their failure to cope with their secret affairs—to subordinate their personal concerns to the higher good of the nation—eventually destroyed much of what they hoped would be their legacy. Roosevelt never explained his objectives to his vice president, Harry Truman, or to anyone else. Hull never groomed a successor, and Welles kept his foreign assignations as classified as his sexual orientation. Gellman tells the dramatic story of how three Americans—despite private demons and bitter animosities—could work together to lead their nation to victory against fascism. —William T. Walker, Presidential Studies Quarterly
Originally published in 1979. American diplomacy during Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency has received much attention, with one notable exception—the United States' relations with Latin America. Irwin Gellman's book corrects this past neglect through a perceptive analysis of FDR's "Good Neighbor" efforts in Latin America. Based on a fresh examination of State Department records and extensive manuscript sources (including an unprecedented use of Nelson Rockefeller's oral history archives), the book points out the complexities of Good Neighbor diplomacy and its intimate relationship to Roosevelt's global strategies. As background to his discussions of FDR's policies, Gellman looks first at how Latin American affairs were handled during the administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, the three Republicans who preceded Roosevelt in office. Good Neighbor diplomacy, Gellman shows, was not a carryover from these administrations; it bore the distinctive mark of FDR's own making. He then describes how Roosevelt's policy of nonintervention worked, particularly how military force was superseded by more subtle diplomatic maneuverings. Turning to a discussion of economic relations with Latin America, Gellman focuses on how the United States' own situation—cut off from international trade by the Depression—encouraged regional expansion. And, finally, he looks at how Roosevelt parlayed the threat of war in Europe and the specter of Nazi penetration in the Americas to further solidify a hemispheric stand. Gellman's account vividly demonstrates that Good Neighbor diplomacy was as much the product of personality as it was of policy. In particular, it emerged out of the rivalries and alliances among three men: Roosevelt; his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; and Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. Gellman (the first to have access to FBI files on Welles) characterizes FDR as an astute politician who saw an opportunity to use pan-Americanism to restore America to world prominence—yet could not handle the personality conflicts among those in his own ranks. Gellman shows how tenuous a government policy can be when so much of it depends on personal control and influence.
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