Today, America faces security challenges that are exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change. To meet these new challenges more effectively, the Obama administration advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power and enhancing America's whole-of-government (WOG) capabilities. Although the need for comprehensive integration and coordination of civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental, national and international capabilities to improve efficiency and effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts is widely recognized, Washington has been criticized for its attempts at creating WOG responses to international crises and conflicts for overcommitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and personnel, competition between agencies, ambiguous mission objectives, ..
What is "grand strategy," and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades. It explains why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategy--the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970s--and provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.
The subject of U.S. grand strategy has been getting increasing attention from the policy and academic communities. But too often the debate suffers from being too reductionist, limiting America's choices to worldwide hegemony or narrow isolation. There is a wide spectrum of choices before Washington that lie "somewhere in the middle." Too often not enough thought is given to how such alternative strategies should be designed and implemented. The future cannot be known, and earlier predictions of American decline have proven to be premature. However, there is a shift in wealth and power to the extent that America may not be able to hold on to its position as an unrivalled unipolar superpower. Therefore, it is worth thinking about how the United States could shape and adjust to the changing landscape around it. What is more, there are a number of interlocking factors that mean such a shift would make sense: transnational problems needing collaborative efforts...
Developing a U.S. national security strategy for Latin America is a daunting task in an era of scarce resources. Yet, it is important at this historical juncture that the effort be undertaken. The demise of the Cold War has produced not an "End of History" but a "New World Disorder," which may well become more tumultuous in the decades ahead. Thus, it is crucial at this turn of the millennium to reconsider the prospects for regional security, the challenges that both new and old dangers may pose to U.S. interests, and the kind of strategy and policies that might enable the United States to both better cope with current problems and head off those that are just over the horizon. In this report, Dr. Donald E. Schulz first analyzes U.S. security interests in Latin America. He then surveys the primary challenges to those interests, and how well U.S. strategy and policy are equipped to cope with them. But he does not stop there. He suggests how the security environment is likely to change over the next quarter century, both in terms of the new dangers that may arise and the evolution of problems that already exist. His conclusion that we are not strategically equipped to face the future is a disturbing one, for Latin America's importance to the United States is growing fast even as our attention is flagging. Will we have the insight to recognize our own interests, the will to commit sufficient resources to attain them, and the intellectual wherewithal to relate our means to our ends?
This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The fourth edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy's core courses: "Theory of War and Strategy" and "National Security Policy and Strategy." Like previous editions, this one is largely an expansion of its predecessor rather than a major rewriting. About a quarter of the chapters are new, and several others have undergone significant rewrites or updates. However, approximately half of the book remains unchanged. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America's future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition adds several short case studies that can be used to illustrate the primary material in the volume.
At a time of fiscal constraint and global uncertainty, should the United States retrench geopolitically or seek to reinvigorate its international leadership? This collection of essays puts this pressing question in historical and theoretical context. The contributors to this text examine past episodes in which U.S. policymakers confronted similar choices, and draw insights from the strategies that they fashioned in response. The essays also consider the major theoretical and policy debates pertaining to the issues of retrenchment and renewal today. Historians, political scientists, military strategists and international relations scholars may value the historical, theoretical, and comparative policies contained within this text. Related products: New Spring 2017!-- The Pivot to Asia: Can it Serve as the Foundation for American Grand Strategy in the 21st Century is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01207-5 Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01180-0 The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01608-0 New Spring 2017! Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01231-8 Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security print format can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01617-9 --ePub format can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01617-9 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976 can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/044-000-02655-4 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/044-000-02641-4 American Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives; Proceedings, A Workshop Sponsored by the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Newport, Rhode Island, 13-15 May 2009 can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01594-6 Do Fewer Resources Mean Less Influence?: A Comparative Historical Case Study of Military Influence in a Time of Austerity can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01101-0?ctid=1609
This paper presents an analytic framework that builds from previous work to yield the systematic and defendable readiness analysis that must underlie decisions ranging from budget allocation to force employment and even strategy development. To manage readiness, the Department of Defense must balance the supply and demand of deployable forces around the world. The readiness of an individual unit is the result of a series of time-intensive force generation processes that ultimately combine qualified people, working equipment, and unit training to produce military capabilities suitable for executing the defense strategy. While this discussion is a basic tenet of production theory, it had not been commonly applied to readiness management until recently. The important point here is that understanding how the readiness of military capabilities is generated provides the clearest picture of the current readiness status and whether that status is likely to change over time. Furthermore, it provides the best shot at identifying effective management policies to ensure that DOD can generate the capabilities that the Nation asks of it. This paper argues that traditional unit-level readiness metrics are useful as part of a larger readiness management construct, but by themselves they do not provide enough information to proactively manage strategically. This approach provides a clear explanation of the causes of readiness degradations and options for how to mitigate them that can be traced to precise resource investments"--Page 1.
U.S. military strategy is undergoing its most serious examination since the end of the Cold War. Led by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this process is designed to assess every dimension of the strategy, including its most basic assumptions and concepts. For the first time in over a decade, everything about U.S. military strategy is subject to question. One of the most important elements of U.S. military strategy for the past ten years has been the belief that a force able to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTW) of the DESERT STORM type would be capable of dealing with the full gamut of security challenges that the United States is likely to face. Now nearly every expert on U.S. military strategy agrees that this force shaping paradigm needs a relook.
Any significant homeland response event requires Americans to work together. This is a complex challenge. The authors assert that the principal obstacle to effective homeland response is a recurring failure to achieve unity of effort across a diverse and often chaotic mix of participating federal, state, and local government and nongovernmental organizations. Despite a decade of planning since the terror attacks of September 2001, unity of effort still eludes us-particularly in the largest and most dangerous of crises. The authors examine how the military's joint doctrine system affected joint military operational capabilities, concluding that a similar national homeland response doctrinal system is needed to create and sustain unity of effort. Doctrine performs a vital unifying function in complex operations, standardizing ways and means.
September 11, 2001 changed many things in the United States not the least of which was our national defense policy and military strategy. The challenges facing the defense establishment in the United States at the beginning of the 21st century are daunting indeed; however, the thoughtful essays included in this volume by students at the U.S. Army War College provide insights into those trials that will prove useful to policymakers both in and out of uniform. Offi cers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) during their year at the U.S. Army War College wrote these chapters. The ASAP is a unique program that offers selected students a rigorous course of instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in theory, doctrine, and history, the program provides those students a rich professional experience that includes staff rides, exercises, and the best instructional expertise available. The program is designed to provide the Joint team with the military's best theater strategists.
This monograph examines the strategic importance of Egypt for the United States by exploring Egypt's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, its geographical role (providing air and naval access) for U.S. military assets heading to the Persian Gulf, and joint training programs. With so much at stake in the Middle East, the idea of "losing" Egypt as a strategic ally would be a significant setback for the United States. The Egyptian revolution of early 2011 was welcomed by U.S. officials because the protestors wanted democratic government which conformed to U.S. ideals, and the institution that would shepherd the transition, the Egyptian military, had close ties with the United States. To bolster the U.S.-Egyptian relationship and help keep Egypt on the democratic path, the monograph recommends that U.S. military aid should not be cut, economic aid should be increased, and U.S. administration officials should not oppose congressional conditions tying aid...
The following three papers comprise one of the panels form a conference on U.S.-Russia relations that SSI co-sponsored with the Carnegie Council at Pocantico, NY, from June 1-3, 2011, Carnegie Council's Program on "U.S. Global Engagement: A Two-Year Retrospective." The papers offer three contrasting looks at one of the major issues in today's arms control agenda, namely the future of the Conventional forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The three papers are by leading experts in the field from the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia and provide a revealing glimpse into the very different assessments that are being made by those three governments and the difficult issues involved in attempting to regenerate the process that led to the original treaty in 1990. They also implicitly contribute to a better understanding of the intractabilities facing the major players in any effort to advance not only arms control but also European stability.
Cyber is now recognized as an operational domain, but the theory that should explain it strategically is, for the most part, missing. It is one thing to know how to digitize; it is quite another to understand what digitization means strategically. The author maintains that, although the technical and tactical literature on cyber is abundant, strategic theoretical treatment is poor. He offers four conclusions: (1) cyber power will prove useful as an enabler of joint military operationsl; (2) cyber offense is likely to achieve some success, and the harm we suffer is most unlikely to be close to lethally damaging; (3) cyber power is only information and only one way in which we collect, store, and transmit information; and (4) it is clear enough today that the sky is not falling because of cyber peril. As a constructed environment, cyberspace is very much what we choose to make it.
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