This Review has established that the police service is currently ill-equipped to respond to possible and probable changes in increasingly specialised crime trends, political accountability, financial resources and the demographics of its workforce. This report covers reforms that may be introduced in the longer term. An earlier report on reforms that could be introduced in the short term published in March 2011 (Cm. 8024, ISBN 9780101802420) and made recommendations for savings of £1.1 billion over 3 years, most of which are being implemented following a determination of the Police Arbitration Panel. This report makes recommendations which could realise gross savings of £1.9 billion with £1.2 billion reinvested in policing. The 121 recommendations cover: employment framework, entry route and promotion; health, fitness and managing the workforce; basic pay, contribution-related pay and role-based pay; negotiating machinery. Each chapter contains a recommended phased process for introduction. The recommendations will provide the police service with the ability to attract and retain high calibre candidates with different skills and experiences, to maintain operational resilience by maximising the deployment of fit and healthy officers, and to manage office numbers according to need and in the public interest. Entry into the police service and advancement within would be according to the sole criterion of merit. The recommendations for reform of the pay review apparatus will have a profound effect, establishing a well-resourced professional pay review body ensuring that officers' pay is determined on sound evidence.
The Chief Inspector was commissioned by the Home Secretary to investigate and report on the level of checks operated at ports of entry to the UK. This followed the disclosure that some checks may have been suspended without the approval of ministers and the subsequent suspension of the then Head of Border Force. The investigation focused particularly on: the Home Office Warnings Index (WI) - used to ascertain whether passengers are of interest to the government agencies; Secure ID - checks passengers' fingerprints at immigration controls against those provided in the visa application process; and the risk-based measures that formed part of the level 2 pilot - where it was no longer routine to open the biometric chip within EEA passports or perform WI checks of EEA children travelling in obvious family or school groups. The number of occasions when checks were suspended depended on the volume of passengers, the level of risk they presented, staff available and the infrastructure of the ports. Overall, the Chief Inspector found poor communication, poor managerial oversight and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities.There was no single framework setting out all potential border security checks, which of these could be suspended, in what circumstances and the level of authority required at Agency or Ministerial level to do so. The Agency now has a stronger grip on checks, but a new framework of security checks is urgently needed, unambiguously specifying checks that must always be carried out and those where there is discretion to suspend.
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.