This report covers the operation of the Terrorism Acts in 2012. It summarises the independent reviewer's observations of the use of the powers during the year. Although the report makes no far-reaching recommendations (unlike in previous years), it does provide a much more detailed picture of the threat to the UK from terrorism and the role of this legislation. The independent reviewer in particular presents a fuller picture of the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom and its nationals, drawing particularly on the period 2010-2012; reviews the operation of all aspects of the Acts during 2012; requests views on possible changes to the definition of terrorism, with a view to making future recommendations; records progress made in relation to previous recommendations (e.g. in relation to proscription); and identifies other important issues (e.g. in relation to Schedule 7, currently subject to parliamentary as well as judicial attention). The Independent Reviewer considers the results of a programme of cautious and selective liberalisation of UK laws for dealing with terrorism are to be positive ones but that the threat from terrorism remains a substantial one. Amongst recommendations made were those relating to the rules relating to proscription (and in particular deproscription), some aspects of schedule 8 detention and the operation of schedule 7 power to stop and examine those travelling through ports
This report covers the operation of the Terrorism Acts in 2012. It summarises the independent reviewer's observations of the use of the powers during the year. Although the report makes no far-reaching recommendations (unlike in previous years), it does provide a much more detailed picture of the threat to the UK from terrorism and the role of this legislation. The independent reviewer in particular presents a fuller picture of the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom and its nationals, drawing particularly on the period 2010-2012; reviews the operation of all aspects of the Acts during 2012; requests views on possible changes to the definition of terrorism, with a view to making future recommendations; records progress made in relation to previous recommendations (e.g. in relation to proscription); and identifies other important issues (e.g. in relation to Schedule 7, currently subject to parliamentary as well as judicial attention). The Independent Reviewer considers the results of a programme of cautious and selective liberalisation of UK laws for dealing with terrorism are to be positive ones but that the threat from terrorism remains a substantial one. Amongst recommendations made were those relating to the rules relating to proscription (and in particular deproscription), some aspects of schedule 8 detention and the operation of schedule 7 power to stop and examine those travelling through ports
The Act under review gives the Treasury power to freeze the assets of individuals and groups thought to be involved in terrorism, whether in the UK or abroad, and to deprive them of access to financial resources. It implements UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and is one of a number of measures at the Government's disposal for preventing the financing of terrorism. At the end of the review period in September 2011: 30 individuals and 8 groups were designated by the Treasury under the Act. This is much reduced from the figure in previous years, owing largely to the removal of duplicate designations. Each of the designated groups had been listed since 2001, as had some of the designated individuals. No individual or group was designated during the review period. No individual or group associated with Northern Ireland was designated, despite continuing terrorist activity there. The prohibitions in the Act applied also to 22 individuals and 25 groups listed by the EU under Regulation 2580/2001. The total quantity of assets frozen, taking the Treasury and EU lists together, was some £100,000. Many of those designated had few if any assets in the United Kingdom. These and other facts make TAFA 2010 is an ancillary rather than a central part of the fight against terrorism. A number of conclusions and recommendations are set out in sections 10 and 11
Control orders were preventative measures, intended to protect members of the public from the risk of terrorism by imposing restraints on those suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity. They have now been replaced with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). Control orders were made against 52 people over the lifetime of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. All were men, suspected of involvement in Islamist terrorism. The duration of the orders was between a few months to more than four-and-a-half years. At the start of the control order regime in 2005, all controlled persons were foreign nationals. By the end of 2011, all were British citizens. The publication is divided into seven chapters with ten annexes: Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2: Control orders in context; Chapter 3: How the system worked; Chapter 4: Use of control orders in 2011; Chapter 5: Terrorism prevention and investigation measures; Chapter 6: Conclusions; Chapter 7: Recommendation.
This is the fourth and final report from the Independent Monitoring Commission on the progress made in the two year programme of security normalisation begun in August 2005. The monitoring is undertaken in the light of two considerations: an assessment of the paramilitary threat, and the British Government's obligation to ensure the safety and security of the community as a whole. The Commission believes the Provisional IRA is committed to the political path and has abandoned terrorism and violence. Dissident republican groups, however, continue to pose a threat to both the security forces and the community at large. Loyalist paramilitaries do not pose a threat, though the Commission notes that the UDA has made no progress in decommissioning weapons. The security normalisation is examined under several headings: the use of military in support of the Police Service of Northern Ireland; the repeal of counter-terrorist legislation particular to Northern Ireland; the police estate; and patterns of police patrolling. Of particular note is the fact that, for the second year running, the parades of 12 July were policed without the need for military assistance. Various annexes detail the closure of towers, observation posts, and military bases, and the monthly troop levels and military helicopter use in Northern Ireland over the two year period. Overall, the Commission finds that the requirements of the programme have been met.
Control orders were preventative measures, intended to protect members of the public from the risk of terrorism by imposing restraints on those suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity. They have now been replaced with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). Control orders were made against 52 people over the lifetime of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. All were men, suspected of involvement in Islamist terrorism. The duration of the orders was between a few months to more than four-and-a-half years. At the start of the control order regime in 2005, all controlled persons were foreign nationals. By the end of 2011, all were British citizens. The publication is divided into seven chapters with ten annexes: Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2: Control orders in context; Chapter 3: How the system worked; Chapter 4: Use of control orders in 2011; Chapter 5: Terrorism prevention and investigation measures; Chapter 6: Conclusions; Chapter 7: Recommendation.
The Act under review gives the Treasury power to freeze the assets of individuals and groups thought to be involved in terrorism, whether in the UK or abroad, and to deprive them of access to financial resources. It implements UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and is one of a number of measures at the Government's disposal for preventing the financing of terrorism. At the end of the review period in September 2011: 30 individuals and 8 groups were designated by the Treasury under the Act. This is much reduced from the figure in previous years, owing largely to the removal of duplicate designations. Each of the designated groups had been listed since 2001, as had some of the designated individuals. No individual or group was designated during the review period. No individual or group associated with Northern Ireland was designated, despite continuing terrorist activity there. The prohibitions in the Act applied also to 22 individuals and 25 groups listed by the EU under Regulation 2580/2001. The total quantity of assets frozen, taking the Treasury and EU lists together, was some £100,000. Many of those designated had few if any assets in the United Kingdom. These and other facts make TAFA 2010 is an ancillary rather than a central part of the fight against terrorism. A number of conclusions and recommendations are set out in sections 10 and 11
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