The Chief Inspector was commissioned by the Home Secretary to investigate and report on the level of checks operated at ports of entry to the UK. This followed the disclosure that some checks may have been suspended without the approval of ministers and the subsequent suspension of the then Head of Border Force. The investigation focused particularly on: the Home Office Warnings Index (WI) - used to ascertain whether passengers are of interest to the government agencies; Secure ID - checks passengers' fingerprints at immigration controls against those provided in the visa application process; and the risk-based measures that formed part of the level 2 pilot - where it was no longer routine to open the biometric chip within EEA passports or perform WI checks of EEA children travelling in obvious family or school groups. The number of occasions when checks were suspended depended on the volume of passengers, the level of risk they presented, staff available and the infrastructure of the ports. Overall, the Chief Inspector found poor communication, poor managerial oversight and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities.There was no single framework setting out all potential border security checks, which of these could be suspended, in what circumstances and the level of authority required at Agency or Ministerial level to do so. The Agency now has a stronger grip on checks, but a new framework of security checks is urgently needed, unambiguously specifying checks that must always be carried out and those where there is discretion to suspend.
The Chief Inspector observed 100% compliance with the Border Force Operating Mandate across both immigration and customs work. Stansted was also meeting service standards for passenger queuing times. All passengers who were the subject of high and medium scored intelligence alerts for suspected smuggling were also being met by staff, who showed a great deal of resilience and professionalism in responding to the demands of fluctuating resources. Border Force had a positive relationship with its operating partners, and a good understanding of its operating responsibilities. Further it was using legislation effectively to impose and, more importantly, collect civil penalties on airlines which failed to prevent incorrectly-documented passengers from reaching the UK. A number of recommendations for the Home Office were set out, including: (1) Should assess its priorities and review whether the planned additional recruitment will be sufficient to drive improvement across the whole range of immigration and customs activities; (2) Ensures that staff know their legal powers; (3) Ensures that staff dealing with passengers suspected of swallowing prohibited or restricted drugs are trained about risks to health and safety and the preservation of evidence; (4) Ensures that the re-issued guidance relating to the prosecution of asylum applicants who present forged documents is communicated to all relevant staff; (5) Ensures that searched passengers are requested to self-classify their ethnicity; (6) Stops passengers buying duty-free goods and then leaving the airport without travelling.
The Chief Inspector was commissioned by the Home Secretary to investigate and report on the level of checks operated at ports of entry to the UK. This followed the disclosure that some checks may have been suspended without the approval of ministers and the subsequent suspension of the then Head of Border Force. The investigation focused particularly on: the Home Office Warnings Index (WI) - used to ascertain whether passengers are of interest to the government agencies; Secure ID - checks passengers' fingerprints at immigration controls against those provided in the visa application process; and the risk-based measures that formed part of the level 2 pilot - where it was no longer routine to open the biometric chip within EEA passports or perform WI checks of EEA children travelling in obvious family or school groups. The number of occasions when checks were suspended depended on the volume of passengers, the level of risk they presented, staff available and the infrastructure of the ports. Overall, the Chief Inspector found poor communication, poor managerial oversight and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities.There was no single framework setting out all potential border security checks, which of these could be suspended, in what circumstances and the level of authority required at Agency or Ministerial level to do so. The Agency now has a stronger grip on checks, but a new framework of security checks is urgently needed, unambiguously specifying checks that must always be carried out and those where there is discretion to suspend.
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