In coming decades, China will undergo a notable demographic transformation, with its old-age dependency ratio doubling to 24 percent by 2030 and rising even more precipitously thereafter. This paper uses the permanent income hypothesis to reassess national savings behavior, with greater prominence and more careful consideration given to the role played by changing demography. We use a forward-looking and dynamic approach that considers the entire population distribution. We find that this not only holds up well empirically but may also be superior to the static dependency ratios typically employed in the literature. Going further, we simulate global savings behavior based on our framework and find that China’s demographics should have induced a negative current account in the 2000s and a positive one in the 2010s given the rising share of prime savers, only turning negative around 2045. The opposite is true for the United States and Western Europe. The observed divergence in current account outcomes from the simulated path appears to have been partly policy induced. Over the next couple of decades, individual countries’ convergence toward the simulated savings pattern will be influenced by their past divergences and future policy choices. Other implications arising from China’s demography, including the growth model, the pension system, the labor market, and the public finances are also briefly reviewed.
This paper uses the Shapley Value decomposition technique to assess the factors behind the rise of inequality in China. It finds that, in many ways, inequality may have been an inevitable by-product of China’s investment and export-led growth model. Between Chinese households, we find that the most important factors explaining income inequality are location, education, access to health insurance, and labor market variables, including the sector of employment and enterprise size. Across China’s provinces, divergences in per capita incomes are driven by the relative level of capital-intensity, public spending, financial access, privatization, and urbanization. In addition, excess liquidity may have exacerbated inequality in the last decade, by driving up property prices and the wealth gap. Based on these results, policies that could help broaden the benefits of growth in China include maintaining prudent monetary and credit policies, a more progressive fiscal tax and expenditure system, higher public spending on health and education, deregulation and reforms to increase competition, measures to raise labor incomes and assist vulnerable workers, and better access to finance for both households and SMEs, including in rural areas. Not surprisingly, given the argued nexus between China’s growth strategy and inequality, many of these reforms are the same ones that would help rebalance its economy toward consumption and household incomes.
This paper discusses how Malaysia can better protect itself from future shocks and avoid another crisis while it seeks to regain its position as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. To these ends, its strategy should include continued structural reforms to achieve healthy balance sheets of the banking and corporate sectors; further deregulation to promote competition and efficiency; and consistent macroeconomic policies to maintain financial stability and sustainable fiscal and external positions. Malaysia's economic structure and performance were relatively strong prior to the crisis. Malaysia’s initial low level of short-term external debt enabled it to maintain foreign reserves at a reasonably high level, and this contributed to relatively robust external and domestic confidence early on in the crisis. As a consequence of financial vigilance exercised through prudential regulation of capital movements, the exposure of the financial and corporate systems was contained. Stock market capitalization in Malaysia grew to an extremely high level prior to the crisis, reflecting both the fast expansion of the capital market and liberal capital account regime.
Now close to 50 percent of GDP, this paper assesses the appropriateness of China’s current investment levels. It finds that China’s capital-to-output ratio is within the range of other emerging markets, but its economic growth rates stand out, partly due to a surge in investment over the last decade. Moreover, its investment is significantly higher than suggested by cross-country panel estimation. This deviation has been accumulating over the last decade, and at nearly 10 percent of GDP is now larger and more persistent than experienced by other Asian economies leading up to the Asian crisis. However, because its investment is predominantly financed by domestic savings, a crisis appears unlikely when assessed against dependency on external funding. But this does not mean that the cost is absent. Rather, it is distributed to other sectors of the economy through a hidden transfer of resources, estimated at an average of 4 percent of GDP per year.
This paper proposes a possible framework for identifying excessive investment. Based on this method, it finds evidence that some types of investment are becoming excessive in China, particularly in inland provinces. In these regions, private consumption has on average become more dependent on investment (rather than vice versa) and the impact is relatively short-lived, necessitating ever higher levels of investment to maintain economic activity. By contrast, private consumption has become more self-sustaining in coastal provinces, in large part because investment here tends to benefit household incomes more than corporates. If existing trends continue, valuable resources could be wasted at a time when China’s ability to finance investment is facing increasing constraints due to dwindling land, labor, and government resources and becoming more reliant on liquidity expansion, with attendant risks of financial instability and asset bubbles. Thus, investment should not be indiscriminately directed toward urbanization or industrialization of Western regions but shifted toward sectors with greater and more lasting spillovers to household income and consumption. In this context, investment in agriculture and services is found to be superior to that in manufacturing and real estate. Financial reform would facilitate such a reorientation, helping China to enhance capital efficiency and keep growth buoyant even as aggregate investment is lowered to sustainable levels.
Preface Ⅰ.A Study to Analyze CostBenefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to the United States (Marcus Noland) 1. Unification Scenarios and Interests of the United States 2. General Equilibrium Calibration of Unification 3. Implications for the United States from the Gravity Model 4. Policy Issues Ⅱ.A Study to Analyze CostBenefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to China (Jin Jingyi et al.) 1. Introduction 2. Ideal Condition of the Korean Peninsula within China’s Development Strategy in Northeast Asia 3. Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Economic Benefits for China 4. Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Security Benefits for China 5. Sino-Korean Cooperation Strategies for Korean Unification 6. Conclusion Ⅲ.A Study to Analyze CostBenefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to Japan (Kyoji Fukao et al.) 1. Introduction 2. Scenarios of Economic Development after Unification 3. Increase in GDP and Employment in Japan and Other Major Economies 4. A ‘Super Korea’ as Japan’s Rival in the East Asian Division of Labor 5. Financing North Korea’s Infrastructure 6. Role of Japanese Private Firms in Supporting the Infrastructure Projects Ⅳ.A Study to Analyze CostBenefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to the Russian Federation (Alexander Zhebin et al.) 1. Factors Determining Russia’s Korean Policy 2. Major Shortcomings of the Existing Reunification Scenarios 3. Cost-Benefits of 5 Unification Scenarios 4. Suggestions for South Korea’s Unification Policy Ⅴ. The Effects of Economic Integration between South and North Korea(Sung Hankyoung) 1. Introduction 2. Changes due to Economic Integration 3. Model and Scenario 4. Analysis of Results by Scenario 5. Comparative Analysis of Scenario Results 6. Policy Implications Ⅵ.Gradual Economic Integration between South and North Korea and Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Kang Moonsung et al.) 1. Introduction 2. Fundamental Directions for Achieving Economic Integration of North andSouth Korea 3. North and South Korean Economic Integration and Effects on NortheastAsian Division of Labor 4. North and South Korean Economic Integration and Northeast AsianEconomic Cooperation 5. Gradual Achievement of South and North Korean Economic Integration Ⅶ.Analysis on Diplomatic and Security Benefits of Unification and Strategies for Unification (Chun Chae-sung et al.) 1. Introduction 2. International Politics in the Current East Asian Region 3. Position on the Unification in the Korean Peninsula of Countries US, China,Japan and Russia 4. Unification Diplomacy Strategies for the Unified Korean Peninsula vis-à-visNeighboring Countries Those of us living in the contemporary times have a common mission to achieve unification in the Korean peninsula for the joint progress of South and North Korea based on the support of the international society and Northeast Asian cooperation. Korean unification is also an historical imperative for the Koreans who have been one nation and one people for a long time. Therefore it is necessary to present to the government strategies and policy alternatives through in-depth research on ‘when’ and ‘how’ unification would be achieved, and ‘what’ kinds of impact it would have, rather than ‘if’ it will happen. In this respect, this book is a summary of 7 studies conducted under the ‘Research Project on the Unified Korea and Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation’. Its main contents include analyses on the costs and benefits of the unification of Korea in the perspective of its four neighboring countries—US, China, Japan, and Russia; effects of inter-Korean economic integration in Korea’s perspective, and analysis of diplomatic/security benefits of unification. The world is now more interconnected than ever, and Korean unification will invariably impact its neighbors. In this regard, the cost-benefit analyses of the four countries are quite meaningful in that 12 overseas Korea specialists analyze the benefits of Korean unification and provide policy suggestions to maximize these benefits from the perspective of their own respective countries. In addition, the three research projects conducted by 11 domestic experts which provide advice on the effects of economic integration along with strategies for Northeast Asian cooperation based on their analysis on inter-Korean economic integration and diplomatic/security benefits of unification are also extremely valuable. The research projects conducted by researchers from 4 major countries present four unification scenarios-status-quo, North Korea’s reform and opening-up, absorption of the North by South Korea, and peaceful unification. In the case of peaceful unification, which is preferable to all parties involved, the US, China, Japan, and Russia will all witness an increase of $7.6 to 48.5 billion in their GDPs, and creation of 210,000 to 5,640,000 new jobs, resulting in positive ripple impacts for all 4 countries. According to the analyses, China will be the biggest benefactor of Korean unification, the US and Japan will reap similar benefits, and Russia will benefit the least. In the event of Korean unification, China’s three northeast provinces will become a vibrant logistics center and hub for the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific region. According to the study by Japanese researchers, a ‘Super Korea’ will emerge after Korean unification, rivaling Japan. The russian researchers analyzed that if energy exports increases; and the Siberian railway and gas pipeline were connected all the way to the Korean peninsula as a result of unification, it will lead to an economic boom in the Far East. Domestic researchers show that unification will bring changes in factors of production, market expansion, decrease in military spending, and improvement in international credit rating. According to their various unification scenarios, North and South Korea’s GDP growth rates will increase 16%p and 1%p respectively between 2016 and 2030. In the early stages of unification, independent currencies should be used but One Korea Indexed Unit of Account (OKU) must also be introduced; and in order to make use of North Korea’s human resources, disparity of wages between South and North Korea is unavoidable. They also analyze that a unified Korea will contribute to the resolution of the security dilemma in Northeast Asia by buffering the competition for economic and military hegemony between major powers such as the US vis-a-vis China and China vis-a-vis Japan, facilitating cooperation. Also, North Korea’s denuclearization alone will, in and of itself, significantly benefit neighboring countries. Those of us living in the contemporary times have a common mission to achieve unification in the Korean peninsula for the joint progress of South and North Korea based on the support of the international society and Northeast Asian cooperation. Korean unification is also an historical imperative for the Koreans who have been one nation and one people for a long time. Therefore it is necessary to present to the government strategies and policy alternatives through in-depth research on ‘when’ and ‘how’ unification would be achieved, and ‘what’ kinds of impact it would have, rather than ‘if’ it will happen. In this respect, this book is a summary of 7 studies conducted under the ‘Research Project on the Unified Korea and Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation’. Its main contents include analyses on the costs and benefits of the unification of Korea in the perspective of its four neighboring countries—US, China, Japan, and Russia; effects of inter-Korean economic integration in Korea’s perspective, and analysis of diplomatic/security benefits of unification. The world is now more interconnected than ever, and Korean unification will invariably impact its neighbors. In this regard, the cost-benefit analyses of the four countries are quite meaningful in that 12 overseas Korea specialists analyze the benefits of Korean unification and provide policy suggestions to maximize these benefits from the perspective of their own respective countries. In addition, the three research projects conducted by 11 domestic experts which provide advice on the effects of economic integration along with strategies for Northeast Asian cooperation based on their analysis on inter-Korean economic integration and diplomatic/security benefits of unification are also extremely valuable. The research projects conducted by researchers from 4 major countries present four unification scenarios-status-quo, North Korea’s reform and opening-up, absorption of the North by South Korea, and peaceful unification. In the case of peaceful unification, which is preferable to all parties involved, the US, China, Japan, and Russia will all witness an increase of $7.6 to 48.5 billion in their GDPs, and creation of 210,000 to 5,640,000 new jobs, resulting in positive ripple impacts for all 4 countries. According to the analyses, China will be the biggest benefactor of Korean unification, the US and Japan will reap similar benefits, and Russia will benefit the least. In the event of Korean unification, China’s three northeast provinces will become a vibrant logistics center and hub for the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific region. According to the study by Japanese researchers, a ‘Super Korea’ will emerge after Korean unification, rivaling Japan. The russian researchers analyzed that if energy exports increases; and the Siberian railway and gas pipeline were connected all the way to the Korean peninsula as a result of unification, it will lead to an economic boom in the Far East. Domestic researchers show that unification will bring changes in factors of production, market expansion, decrease in military spending, and improvement in international credit rating. According to their various unification scenarios, North and South Korea’s GDP growth rates will increase 16%p and 1%p respectively between 2016 and 2030. In the early stages of unification, independent currencies should be used but One Korea Indexed Unit of Account (OKU) must also be introduced; and in order to make use of North Korea’s human resources, disparity of wages between South and North Korea is unavoidable. They also analyze that a unified Korea will contribute to the resolution of the security dilemma in Northeast Asia by buffering the competition for economic and military hegemony between major powers such as the US vis-a-vis China and China vis-a-vis Japan, facilitating cooperation. Also, North Korea’s denuclearization alone will, in and of itself, significantly benefit neighboring countries.
Monetary aggregates are now much less used as policy instruments as identifying the right measure has become difficult and interest rate transmission has worked well in an increasingly complex financial system. In this process, little attention was paid to the potential spillover of excess liquidity. This paper suggests a notional level of "optimal" liquidity beyond which asset prices will start to rise faster than the GDP deflator, thereby creating a gap between the face value and the real purchasing value of financial assets and widen the wedge in income between those with capital stock and those living on salaries. Such divergence will eventually lead to an abrupt and disorderly adjustment of the asset value, with repercussions on the real sector.
The contribution of the information and communication technology (ICT) sector to growth in Asian economies is clearly evident from the expenditure side (net exports) and became particularly significant in the second half of the 1990s. This paper employs an extension of the standard growth accounting framework, using estimates of stock of ICT capital (hardware, software, and telecommunications equipment), to estimate the direct contributions to growth. The contribution of ICT to growth in Asia during the 1990s is found to be mainly from capital deepening. Total factor productivity (TFP) is also decomposed (using the dual-or revenue-based-approach) into the contributions of non-ICT capital stock, ICT capital stock, and labor. TFP growth is found to be relatively small in most Asian countries.
The paper explores the linkages between the global and domestic monetary gaps, and estimates the effects of monetary gaps on output growth, inflation, and net saving rates using panel data for 20 Asian countries for 1980-2008. We find a significant pass-through of the global monetary gap to domestic monetary gaps, which in turn affect output growth and inflation, in individual emerging market and developing countries in Asia. Notably, we provide evidence that the global monetary condition is partly responsible for the current account surplus in Asia. We also draw implications for monetary policy coordination for global rebalancing.
This paper uses the Shapley Value decomposition technique to assess the factors behind the rise of inequality in China. It finds that, in many ways, inequality may have been an inevitable by-product of China’s investment and export-led growth model. Between Chinese households, we find that the most important factors explaining income inequality are location, education, access to health insurance, and labor market variables, including the sector of employment and enterprise size. Across China’s provinces, divergences in per capita incomes are driven by the relative level of capital-intensity, public spending, financial access, privatization, and urbanization. In addition, excess liquidity may have exacerbated inequality in the last decade, by driving up property prices and the wealth gap. Based on these results, policies that could help broaden the benefits of growth in China include maintaining prudent monetary and credit policies, a more progressive fiscal tax and expenditure system, higher public spending on health and education, deregulation and reforms to increase competition, measures to raise labor incomes and assist vulnerable workers, and better access to finance for both households and SMEs, including in rural areas. Not surprisingly, given the argued nexus between China’s growth strategy and inequality, many of these reforms are the same ones that would help rebalance its economy toward consumption and household incomes.
Monetary aggregates are now much less used as policy instruments as identifying the right measure has become difficult and interest rate transmission has worked well in an increasingly complex financial system. In this process, little attention was paid to the potential spillover of excess liquidity. This paper suggests a notional level of "optimal" liquidity beyond which asset prices will start to rise faster than the GDP deflator, thereby creating a gap between the face value and the real purchasing value of financial assets and widen the wedge in income between those with capital stock and those living on salaries. Such divergence will eventually lead to an abrupt and disorderly adjustment of the asset value, with repercussions on the real sector.
This paper proposes a possible framework for identifying excessive investment. Based on this method, it finds evidence that some types of investment are becoming excessive in China, particularly in inland provinces. In these regions, private consumption has on average become more dependent on investment (rather than vice versa) and the impact is relatively short-lived, necessitating ever higher levels of investment to maintain economic activity. By contrast, private consumption has become more self-sustaining in coastal provinces, in large part because investment here tends to benefit household incomes more than corporates. If existing trends continue, valuable resources could be wasted at a time when China’s ability to finance investment is facing increasing constraints due to dwindling land, labor, and government resources and becoming more reliant on liquidity expansion, with attendant risks of financial instability and asset bubbles. Thus, investment should not be indiscriminately directed toward urbanization or industrialization of Western regions but shifted toward sectors with greater and more lasting spillovers to household income and consumption. In this context, investment in agriculture and services is found to be superior to that in manufacturing and real estate. Financial reform would facilitate such a reorientation, helping China to enhance capital efficiency and keep growth buoyant even as aggregate investment is lowered to sustainable levels.
The paper explores the linkages between the global and domestic monetary gaps, and estimates the effects of monetary gaps on output growth, inflation, and net saving rates using panel data for 20 Asian countries for 1980-2008. We find a significant pass-through of the global monetary gap to domestic monetary gaps, which in turn affect output growth and inflation, in individual emerging market and developing countries in Asia. Notably, we provide evidence that the global monetary condition is partly responsible for the current account surplus in Asia. We also draw implications for monetary policy coordination for global rebalancing.
The contribution of the information and communication technology (ICT) sector to growth in Asian economies is clearly evident from the expenditure side (net exports) and became particularly significant in the second half of the 1990s. This paper employs an extension of the standard growth accounting framework, using estimates of stock of ICT capital (hardware, software, and telecommunications equipment), to estimate the direct contributions to growth. The contribution of ICT to growth in Asia during the 1990s is found to be mainly from capital deepening. Total factor productivity (TFP) is also decomposed (using the dual-or revenue-based-approach) into the contributions of non-ICT capital stock, ICT capital stock, and labor. TFP growth is found to be relatively small in most Asian countries.
Overview -- Issues and challenges of international monetary reform -- East Asia perception of the global safety net, IMF -- Use of national currencies for trade settlement in East Asia : a proposal -- Shaping the future of the IMS : regionalization of selected Asian currencies -- Conclusion
This paper discusses how Malaysia can better protect itself from future shocks and avoid another crisis while it seeks to regain its position as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. To these ends, its strategy should include continued structural reforms to achieve healthy balance sheets of the banking and corporate sectors; further deregulation to promote competition and efficiency; and consistent macroeconomic policies to maintain financial stability and sustainable fiscal and external positions. Malaysia's economic structure and performance were relatively strong prior to the crisis. Malaysia's initial low level of short-term external debt enabled it to maintain foreign reserves at a reasonably high level, and this contributed to relatively robust external and domestic confidence early on in the crisis. As a consequence of financial vigilance exercised through prudential regulation of capital movements, the exposure of the financial and corporate systems was contained. Stock market capitalization in Malaysia grew to an extremely high level prior to the crisis, reflecting both the fast expansion of the capital market and liberal capital account regime.
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