Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author’s successful book “Designing Democracy” from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies. “We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we have done it.” This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms. Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USA In a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA
Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author’s successful book “Designing Democracy” from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies. “We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we have done it.” This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms. Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USA In a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA
This monograph studies multi-member households or, more generally, socio-economic groups from a purely theoretical perspective and within a general equilibrium framework, in contrast to a sizeable empirical literature. The approach is based on the belief that households, their composition, decisions and behavior within a competitive market economy deserve thorough examination. The authors set out to link the formation, composition, decision-making, and stability of households. They develop general equilibrium models of pure exchange economies in which households can have several, typically heterogeneous members and act as collective decision-making units on the one hand and as competitive market participants on the other hand. Moreover, the more advanced models combine traditional exchange (markets for commodities) and matching (markets for people or partners) and develop implications for welfare, social structures, and economic policy. In the field of family economics, Hans Haller and Hans Gersbach have pioneered a ‘market’ approach that applies the tools of general equilibrium theory to the analysis of household behavior. This very interesting book presents an overview of their methods and results. This is an inspiring work. Pierre-André Chiappori, Columbia University, USA The sophisticated, insightful and challenging analysis presented in this book extends the theory of the multi-person household along an important but relatively neglected dimension, that of general equilibrium theory. It also challenges GE theorists themselves to follow Paul Samuelson in taking seriously the real attributes of that fundamental building block, the household, as a social group whose decisions may not satisfy the standard axioms of individual choice. This synthesis and extension of their earlier work by Gersbach and Haller will prove to be a seminal contribution in its field. Ray Rees, LMU Munich, Germany
While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.
The Super-Afrikaners, originally published in South Africa in 1978, scandalised a nation as it exposed the secret workings of a powerful Afrikaner organisation called the Broederbond. Out of print for over three decades, this new edition is available for a new generation and includes an introduction by Max du Preez. Formed in Johannesburg in 1918 by a group of young Afrikaners disillusioned by their role as dispossessed people in their own country, the first triumph of this remarkable organisation was the fact that it was largely responsible for welding together dissident factions within Afrikanerdom and thereby ensuring the accession of the National Party to power in 1948. This highly organised clique of Super-Afrikaners, by sophisticated political intrigue, waged a remarkable campaign to harness political, social and economic forces in South Africa to its cause ... and succeeded. Political journalists Hans Strydom and Ivor Wilkins traced, at great personal risk, its development from its earliest days. The book includes the most comprehensive list of Broeders ever published.
No century in modern European history has built monuments with more enthusiasm than the 19th. Of the hundreds of monuments erected, those which sprang from a nation-wide initiative and addressed themselves to a nation, rather than part of a nation, we may call national monuments. Nelson's Column in London or the Arc de Triomphe in Paris are obvious examples. In Germany the 19th century witnessed a veritable flood of monuments, many of which rank as national monuments. These reflected and contributed to a developing sense of national identity and the search for national unity; they also document an unsuccessful effort to create a «genuinely German» style. They constitute a historical record, quite apart from aesthetic appeal or ideological message. As this historical record is examined, German national monuments of the 19th century are described and interpreted against the background of the nationalism which gave birth to them.
This title provides a compendium to recent work in empirical banking. It follows the structure in 'The Microeconomics of Banking' by Xavier Freixas and Jean Charles Rochet in arranging the relevant methodologies, applications and results to achieve a coherent synthesis between available theory and supporting empirics.
Collective Intentionality is a relatively new label for a basic social fact: the sharing of attitudes such as intentions, beliefs and emotions. This volume contributes to current research on collective intentionality by pursuing three aims. First, some of the main conceptual problems in the received literature are introduced, and a number of new insights into basic questions in the philosophy of collective intentionality are developed (part 1). Second, examples are given for the use of the analysis of collective intentionality in the theory and philosophy of the social sciences (part 2). Third, it is shown that this line of research opens up new perspectives on classical topics in the history of social philosophy and social science, and that, conversely, an inquiry into the history of ideas can lead to further refinement of our conceptual tools in the analysis of collective intentionality (part 3).
“Successful training is possible only in the presence of perfect understanding between trainer and his dog.” This vintage guide provides 12 Lessons in how to train your dog including sitting, walking on a leash, and responding to signals. It contains all you need to know to raise and obedient dog for all the family to enjoy. Contents include: Psychology of Dog Training, What Equipment Do We Need, Praise and Punishment, Puppy Education, Obedience, Heeling on Leash, Right, Left, and About Turn, Sit, Lying Down, Staying Sit and Down Position, Finish, Come When Called, Heeling Free, Stopping in His Tracks When Signalled, Jumping, Long or Broad Jump, Retrieving, Preparation for Obedience Tests, A Preface to Trailing, Trailing or Tracking, Correction of Habits, Attack and Protection, Courier and Message Carrier Dogs, Red Cross or Casualty Dogs, Standard for Obedience Trials. Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing many of these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.
This monograph studies multi-member households or, more generally, socio-economic groups from a purely theoretical perspective and within a general equilibrium framework, in contrast to a sizeable empirical literature. The approach is based on the belief that households, their composition, decisions and behavior within a competitive market economy deserve thorough examination. The authors set out to link the formation, composition, decision-making, and stability of households. They develop general equilibrium models of pure exchange economies in which households can have several, typically heterogeneous members and act as collective decision-making units on the one hand and as competitive market participants on the other hand. Moreover, the more advanced models combine traditional exchange (markets for commodities) and matching (markets for people or partners) and develop implications for welfare, social structures, and economic policy. In the field of family economics, Hans Haller and Hans Gersbach have pioneered a ‘market’ approach that applies the tools of general equilibrium theory to the analysis of household behavior. This very interesting book presents an overview of their methods and results. This is an inspiring work. Pierre-André Chiappori, Columbia University, USA The sophisticated, insightful and challenging analysis presented in this book extends the theory of the multi-person household along an important but relatively neglected dimension, that of general equilibrium theory. It also challenges GE theorists themselves to follow Paul Samuelson in taking seriously the real attributes of that fundamental building block, the household, as a social group whose decisions may not satisfy the standard axioms of individual choice. This synthesis and extension of their earlier work by Gersbach and Haller will prove to be a seminal contribution in its field. Ray Rees, LMU Munich, Germany
While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.
While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.
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