This book provides a comprehensive yet short description of the basic concepts of Complex Network theory. In contrast to other books the authors present these concepts through real case studies. The application topics span from Foodwebs, to the Internet, the World Wide Web and the Social Networks, passing through the International Trade Web and Financial time series. The final part is devoted to definition and implementation of the most important network models. The text provides information on the structure of the data and on the quality of available datasets. Furthermore it provides a series of codes to allow immediate implementation of what is theoretically described in the book. Readers already used to the concepts introduced in this book can learn the art of coding in Python by using the online material. To this purpose the authors have set up a dedicated web site where readers can download and test the codes. The whole project is aimed as a learning tool for scientists and practitioners, enabling them to begin working instantly in the field of Complex Networks.
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
This book revisits the debate over the new international division of labour (NIDL) that dominated discussions in international political economy and development studies until the early 1990s. It submits that a revised NIDL thesis can shed light on the specificities of capitalist development in various parts of the world today. Taken together, the contributions amount to a novel value-theoretical approach to understanding the NIDL. This rests upon the distinction between the global economic content that determines the constitution and dynamics of the NIDL and the evolving national political forms that mediate its development. More specifically, the authors argue that uneven development is an expression of the underlying essential unity of the production of relative surplus-value on a world scale. They substantiate and illustrate this argument through several international case studies, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Ireland, South Korea, Spain and Venezuela.
While the internationalisation of society has stimulated the emergence of common legal frameworks to coordinate transnational social relations, private law itself is firmly rooted in national law. European integration processes have altered this state of affairs to a limited degree with a few, albeit groundbreaking, interventions that have tended to engender resistance from various actors within European nation-states. Against that background, this book takes as its point of departure the need to understand the process of legal denationalisation within broader political frameworks. In particular it seeks to make sense of opposition to Europeanisation at this point in the evolution of European law when, despite growing nationalist attitudes, great efforts have been made to produce comprehensive legal instruments to synthesise general contract law - an area that has traditionally been solely within the ambit of nation-states. Combining insights from the disciplines of law, history and political science, the book investigates the conceptual and cultural associations between law and the nation-state, examines the impact of nationalist ideas in modern legal thought and reveals the nationalist underpinnings of some of the arguments employed against and, somewhat paradoxically, even in support of legal Europeanisation. The author's research for this book has been supported by the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law.
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
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