In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema’s central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other’s wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing—especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact—is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing.
Moral expectation is a concept with which all of us are well acquainted. Already as children we learn that certain courses of action are expected of us. We are expected to perform certain actions, and we are expected to refrain from other actions. Furthermore, we learn that something is morally wrong with the failure to do what we are morally expected to do. A central theme of this book is that moral expectation should not be confused with moral obligation. While we are morally expected to do everything we are obligated to do, a person can be morally expected to do some things that he or she is not morally obligated to do. Although moral expectation is a familiar notion, it has not been the object of investigation in its own right. In the early chapters Mellema attempts to provide a philosophical account of this familiar notion, distinguish it from other types of expectations, and show how it is possible to form false moral expectations. Subsequent chapters explore the role of moral expectation in agreements between people, analyze ways that people avoid moral expectation, illustrate how groups can have moral expectations, and view moral expectation in the context of our relationship with divine beings. The final chapter provides insight into how moral expectation operates in people's professional lives.
A surprisingly large number of people have denied that it is possible for human moral agents to act in such a way as to go beyond or transcend what moral duty or obligation requires of them. Some of this opposition to the possibility of supererogation, as it is called, has been motivated by theological concerns. This book surveys the concerns of Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, as they react to certain teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the concerns of several contemporary theologians. It also examines some contemporary philosophers whose concerns have grown out of a commitment to a Kantian, utilitarian, or prescriptive type of ethics and urges that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these theologians and philosophers. At the same time it is argued that some of their concerns are the result of a mistaken idea of what it means to perform an act of supererogation. In addition, it is argued that some of their concerns can be addressed in ways that do not require a denial of the possibility of going beyond the call of duty in human life. This stage of the argument involves a discussion of virtue ethics and an examination of the concept of vocation, particularly as it has developed in Protestant thought, and illustrates the relevance of virtue and vocation to the problem of supererogation.
Groups of people are commonly said to be collectively responsible for what has happened. Sometimes the groups claimed to be responsible are vast in size, as when collective responsibility is ascribed to the class of all Americans or the class of all white males. In this book the concept of collective responsibility is analyzed. It is examined not only in the light of what philosophical proponents (such as Cooper, Held, Bates, French, Swinburne, and May) have said about it, but a genuine attempt is made to make sense of what ordinary people say about responsibility when it is ascribed to groups of people. Accordingly, it is distinguished from related concepts such as shared responsibility and moral taint. Parallels are examined between the actions of an individual and the actions of a group or collective, parallels which seem to make ascriptions of collective responsibility more plausible. Some philosophers oppose collective responsibility and argue for an individualist type of position; in this regard the positions of Lewis and Sverdlik are critically examined. The final chapter contains the author's own position, a position which affirms that collective responsibility is possible but which also preserves some of the central intuitions of the individualist.
A surprisingly large number of people have denied that it is possible for human moral agents to act in such a way as to go beyond or transcend what moral duty or obligation requires of them. Some of this opposition to the possibility of supererogation, as it is called, has been motivated by theological concerns. This book surveys the concerns of Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, as they react to certain teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the concerns of several contemporary theologians. It also examines some contemporary philosophers whose concerns have grown out of a commitment to a Kantian, utilitarian, or prescriptive type of ethics and urges that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these theologians and philosophers. At the same time it is argued that some of their concerns are the result of a mistaken idea of what it means to perform an act of supererogation. In addition, it is argued that some of their concerns can be addressed in ways that do not require a denial of the possibility of going beyond the call of duty in human life. This stage of the argument involves a discussion of virtue ethics and an examination of the concept of vocation, particularly as it has developed in Protestant thought, and illustrates the relevance of virtue and vocation to the problem of supererogation.
In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema’s central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other’s wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing—especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact—is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing.
Moral expectation is a concept with which all of us are well acquainted. Already as children we learn that certain courses of action are expected of us. We are expected to perform certain actions, and we are expected to refrain from other actions. Furthermore, we learn that something is morally wrong with the failure to do what we are morally expected to do. A central theme of this book is that moral expectation should not be confused with moral obligation. While we are morally expected to do everything we are obligated to do, a person can be morally expected to do some things that he or she is not morally obligated to do. Although moral expectation is a familiar notion, it has not been the object of investigation in its own right. In the early chapters Mellema attempts to provide a philosophical account of this familiar notion, distinguish it from other types of expectations, and show how it is possible to form false moral expectations. Subsequent chapters explore the role of moral expectation in agreements between people, analyze ways that people avoid moral expectation, illustrate how groups can have moral expectations, and view moral expectation in the context of our relationship with divine beings. The final chapter provides insight into how moral expectation operates in people's professional lives.
This work is intended for future teachers and practicing teachers who are pursuing further education, as well as secondary audiences including students of philosophy, future church educators, and clergy. The first part of the book traces developments in Philosophy of Education from Rousseau through the twentieth century. The second part describes Christian approaches to educational philosophy, including a chapter on special education. The Christian perspective is broad enough to appeal to Catholics as well as Protestants. Jacques Maritain represents the catholic perspective regarding educational philosophy, and Nicholas Wolterstorff represents the protestant point of view.
This book brings clarification to our understanding of the nature of sin and will be of interest to nonphilosophers as well as philosophers. Most of the scholarly literature on sin has focused on theological issues, making book-length philosophical treatments of the topic hard to find. Sin, the newest contribution by Gregory Mellema, fills the gap by providing a short and lively summary of what contemporary philosophers are saying about the relationship between the traditional theological category of sin and contemporary philosophical ethics. Mellema brings together contributions by a number of philosophers, including Marilyn Adams, Robert Adams, Rebecca DeYoung, Alvin Plantinga, Michael Rea, Eleonore Stump, and Richard Swinburne, into a coherent discussion that clarifies our understanding of the nature of sin. The topics covered include the doctrine of original sin, accessory sins, mortal (or cardinal) sins, and venial sins. Mellema also examines Islamic codes of ethics, which include a category of acts that are “discouraged,” some of which qualify as sins, and the final chapter surveys the teachings of six major world religions concerning sin. The overarching link between the chapters is that sin is fundamentally connected to the subject matter of morality. Analyzing the points of connection is profitable not just to enhance our theoretical understanding of sin but to provide a greater depth of knowledge as to how the moral choices we make can more effectively help us avoid sin and contribute to lives that are satisfying and authentically worthwhile. This concise introduction to sin and moral wrongdoing will have a wide readership and is intended for use in introductory level philosophy, philosophy of religion, or theological ethics courses.
Groups of people are commonly said to be collectively responsible for what has happened. Sometimes the groups claimed to be responsible are vast in size, as when collective responsibility is ascribed to the class of all Americans or the class of all white males. In this book the concept of collective responsibility is analyzed. It is examined not only in the light of what philosophical proponents (such as Cooper, Held, Bates, French, Swinburne, and May) have said about it, but a genuine attempt is made to make sense of what ordinary people say about responsibility when it is ascribed to groups of people. Accordingly, it is distinguished from related concepts such as shared responsibility and moral taint. Parallels are examined between the actions of an individual and the actions of a group or collective, parallels which seem to make ascriptions of collective responsibility more plausible. Some philosophers oppose collective responsibility and argue for an individualist type of position; in this regard the positions of Lewis and Sverdlik are critically examined. The final chapter contains the author's own position, a position which affirms that collective responsibility is possible but which also preserves some of the central intuitions of the individualist.
Kwon and Thompson's eloquent reasoning will help Christians broaden their understanding of the contemporary conversation over reparations."--Publishers Weekly "A thoughtful approach to a vital topic."--Library Journal Christians are awakening to the legacy of racism in America like never before. While public conversations regarding the realities of racial division and inequalities have surged in recent years, so has the public outcry to work toward the long-awaited healing of these wounds. But American Christianity, with its tendency to view the ministry of reconciliation as its sole response to racial injustice, and its isolation from those who labor most diligently to address these things, is underequipped to offer solutions. Because of this, the church needs a new perspective on its responsibility for the deep racial brokenness at the heart of American culture and on what it can do to repair that brokenness. This book makes a compelling historical and theological case for the church's obligation to provide reparations for the oppression of African Americans. Duke Kwon and Gregory Thompson articulate the church's responsibility for its promotion and preservation of white supremacy throughout history, investigate the Bible's call to repair our racial brokenness, and offer a vision for the work of reparation at the local level. They lead readers toward a moral imagination that views reparations as a long-overdue and necessary step in our collective journey toward healing and wholeness.
Every moment is an opportunity to move forward. Every moment is a time to fulfill a purpose. Every moment is an occasion to shine and inspire. Life happens in a moment. The words in this journal describing a journey to find God’s path and purpose in an ever-changing world inside and outside one’s self is unfiltered and truthful. Having faith above fear. Finding the light God shines above all darkness. No matter what happens in life - believe in the God of all possible. Life’s roadways are full of left turns.
The classic struggle of an ethical person acting in an unethical manner, It Never Entered My Mind tells the tale of a valued member of society who chooses to live outside the saw. How one might reconcile this duality of life and its implications for self-acceptance is at the core of this tale. The story is the unfolding of a lifetime that is defined by what one chooses to do as well as what one is compelled to do"--Page 1.
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