Despite the best efforts of a number of historians, many aspects of the ferocious struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War remain obscure or shrouded in myth. One of the most persistent of these is the notion - largely created by many former members of its own officer corps in the immediate postwar period - that the German Army was a paragon of military professionalism and operational proficiency whose defeat on the Eastern Front was solely attributable to the amateurish meddling of a crazed former Corporal and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army. A key pillar upon which the argument of German numerical-weakness vis-à-vis the Red Army has been constructed is the assertion that Germany was simply incapable of providing its army with the necessary quantities of men and equipment needed to replace its losses. In consequence, as their losses outstripped the availability of replacements, German field formations became progressively weaker until they were incapable of securing their objectives or, eventually, of holding back the swelling might of the Red Army. This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943). Employing a host of primary documents and secondary literature, it traces the development and many challenges of the German Army from the prewar period until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It continues on to chart the first two years of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with a particular emphasis upon the scale of German personnel and equipment losses, and how well these were replaced. It also includes extensive examinations into the host of mitigating factors that both dictated the course of Germany's campaign in the East and its replacement and regeneration capabilities. In contrast to most accounts of the conflict, this study finds that numerical-weakness being the primary factor in the defeat of the Ostheer - specifically as it relates to the strength and condition of the German units involved - has been overemphasized and frequently exaggerated. In fact, Germany was actually able to regenerate its forces to a remarkable degree with a steady flow of fresh men and equipment, and German field divisions on the Eastern Front were usually far stronger than the accepted narratives of the war would have one believe.
Despite the best efforts of a number of historians, many aspects of the ferocious struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War remain obscure or shrouded in myth. One of the most persistent of these is the notion - largely created by many former members of its own officer corps in the immediate postwar period - that the German Army was a paragon of military professionalism and operational proficiency whose defeat on the Eastern Front was solely attributable to the amateurish meddling of a crazed former Corporal and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army. A key pillar upon which the argument of German numerical-weakness vis-à-vis the Red Army has been constructed is the assertion that Germany was simply incapable of providing its army with the necessary quantities of men and equipment needed to replace its losses. In consequence, as their losses outstripped the availability of replacements, German field formations became progressively weaker until they were incapable of securing their objectives or, eventually, of holding back the swelling might of the Red Army. This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943). Employing a host of primary documents and secondary literature, it traces the development and many challenges of the German Army from the prewar period until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It continues on to chart the first two years of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with a particular emphasis upon the scale of German personnel and equipment losses, and how well these were replaced. It also includes extensive examinations into the host of mitigating factors that both dictated the course of Germany's campaign in the East and its replacement and regeneration capabilities. In contrast to most accounts of the conflict, this study finds that numerical-weakness being the primary factor in the defeat of the Ostheer - specifically as it relates to the strength and condition of the German units involved - has been overemphasized and frequently exaggerated. In fact, Germany was actually able to regenerate its forces to a remarkable degree with a steady flow of fresh men and equipment, and German field divisions on the Eastern Front were usually far stronger than the accepted narratives of the war would have one believe.
In this highly original study, Gregory Downs argues that the most American of wars, the Civil War, created a seemingly un-American popular politics, rooted not in independence but in voluntary claims of dependence. Through an examination of the pleas and
Communist regimes are defined by dictatorial power, state planning, and active propaganda machines. In The Campaign State, Gregory Witkowski explores the intersection of these three elements in East Germany by focusing on mass mobilizations. He dissects the anatomy of campaigns and argues that while mass mobilizations are often perceived as symbols of strength, they also indicate underlying systemic weaknesses. By focusing on the ability of regimes to mobilize individuals to transform society, he explains both the durability and the ultimate demise of the German Democratic Republic. This study seamlessly blends an analysis of top-down campaign initiatives with the influence of such mobilizations on the grassroots level. For more than thirty years, East German leaders doggedly extended such mobilization efforts, yet complete success remained elusive. Witkowski reveals how local leaders, campaign participants, and peasants acted in ways both compliant and noncompliant with party goals to create societal change. Campaigns became a ubiquitous part of life under communist rule. Witkowski shows that such mobilizations were initially an integral part of state-planning efforts and only later became ritualized, as party portrayals of goals and accomplishments diverged from East Germans' lived experience. He argues that incessant campaigns exposed a substantial gap between rhetoric and reality in the German Democratic Republic that undermined the regime's legitimacy. This valuable and original study will appeal to scholars and students of German history, Communism, and state planning.
The Cloud It sounds fluffy and soft. Amorphous, remote, floating above the world. Run it in the Cloud, we say. A modern metaphor, but we once had another name, a more descriptive name for using someone else's computer. We called it timesharing. Today we mix the idea of using distant computers and the idea of communicating via a network and call the combination The Cloud, imagining we have invented something new. But it isn't so new after all. Beginning in the 1960s, a company created a successful business making remote computer services available inexpensively to anyone via a network built for that purpose. In doing so, they created the first cloud. Companies offered online resources from banking to research, email to instant messaging, and the ability to run applications on powerful, remote computers and access them from anywhere. They called it Tymnet, and the company was Tymshare.
Risk and reliability analysis is an area of growing importance in geotechnical engineering, where many variables have to be considered. Statistics, reliability modeling and engineering judgement are employed together to develop risk and decision analyses for civil engineering systems. The resulting engineering models are used to make probabilistic predictions, which are applied to geotechnical problems. Reliability & Statistics in Geotechnical Engineering comprehensively covers the subject of risk and reliability in both practical and research terms * Includes extensive use of case studies * Presents topics not covered elsewhere--spatial variability and stochastic properties of geological materials * No comparable texts available Practicing engineers will find this an essential resource as will graduates in geotechnical engineering programmes.
Massachusetts General Hospital Handbook of General Hospital Psychiatry, by Theodore A. Stern, Gregory L. Fricchione, Ned H. Cassem, Michael Jellinek, and Jerrold F. Rosenbaum, is your ideal source of guidance on consultation-liaison psychiatry! Experts from the Massachusetts General Hospital—widely respected as one of the world's premier psychiatric institutions—provide practical advice on the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric issues experienced by in-hospital, medically ill adults and children. This compact resource reads like a handbook, but delivers all the details you’d expect from a textbook. Understand and manage the psychological impact of chronic medical problems, life-threatening diseases, disfigurement, and more. Effectively manage difficult patients, including those with hypochondriacal and conversion disorders. Find information quickly thanks to an improved chapter organization, and get just the answers you need with concise yet complete coverage appropriate for psychiatrists and generalists alike. Implement the most current, effective pharmaceutical therapies as well as cognitive-behavioral approaches.
Has your life ever felt out of balance? Has it ever seemed to you that society is imbalanced, with racial and economic disparities unfairly affecting people's lives-and maybe even your own? More importantly, in the face of these inequalities, where can you turn for answers and solutions? In 50/50: Finding Life's Balance for All Human Beings, author Gregory L. Doctor explores the history of social inequality and oppression, sharing his own story and showing you how to discover that there is something more to your life. God has a message for you, and by listening to this valuable lesson, you can learn how to be your brother's keeper and live powerfully and in balance. The key is to embrace the fifty-fifty rule: be a well-informed learner for one part of your life, but become a knowledgeable teacher for the other half. By blending the two together, you can live a completely balanced life and be in a position to help someone younger live a complete and balanced life too.
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