A robust yet accessible history of US involvement in the world's most dangerous waterway, and a guide for what to do about it. Lamentations that the United States is "losing" the South China Sea to China are now common. China has rapidly militarized islands and reefs, projects power across the disputed waterway, and freely harasses US allies and partners. The US has been unable to halt these processes or convince Beijing to respect the rights of smaller neighbors. But what exactly would "losing" mean? In On Dangerous Ground, Gregory B. Poling evaluates US interests in the world's most complex and dangerous maritime disputes by examining more than a century of American involvement in the South China Sea. He focuses on how the disputes there intersected and eventually intertwined with the longstanding US commitment to freedom of the seas and its evolving alliance network in Asia. He shows that these abiding national interests--defense of maritime rights and commitment to allies, particularly the Philippines--have repeatedly pulled US attention to the South China Sea. Understanding how and why is critical if the US and its allies hope to chart a course through the increasingly fraught disputes, while facing a more assertive, more capable, and far less compromising China. With an emphasis on decisions made not just in Washington and Beijing, but also in Manila and other Southeast Asian capitals, On Dangerous Ground seeks to correct the record and balance the China-centric narrative that has come to dominate the issue. It not only provides the most comprehensive account yet of America's history in the South China Sea, but it also demonstrates how that history should inform US national security policy in one of the most important waterways in the world.
Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis tools offer an unprecedented opportunity to harness new technologies in order to help resolve boundary disputes. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute uses these tools to provide a first and necessary step toward tackling the overlapping maritime disputes in the South China Sea: determining which waters are and are not in dispute under international law. The report opens with a set of geographic information system (GIS)–based maps that provide an easily understandable benchmark against which policymakers and academics can judge the claims and actions of the South China Sea claimants. More detailed color maps and methodological information follow for those who want to dig deeper into the claims and the report’s conclusions.
A U.S.-Indonesia Partnership for 2020 explores avenues to boost cooperation in all three of these pillars. Political and security relations between the United States and Indonesia have grown more robust in recent years. Trade and economic relations, while growing, remain contentious. This study assesses progress on these two pillars, along with the under-resourced field of people-to-people collaboration, and offers recommendations to take the partnership to the next level in each area.
A New Era of U.S.-Vietnam Relations examines the history of the relationship and offers concrete recommendations for policymakers in both countries to deepen cooperation across each major area of the relationship: political and security ties, trade and economic linkages, and people-to-people connections.
With elections in both the Philippines and the United States in 2016, the future of the alliance must be institutionalized to ensure that it is not diminished by a change of leadership in either country. A new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and cooperation in the South China Sea are important components of the new era of relations, but they are not and should not be the only defining features of the alliance. Given the long history of U.S.-Philippine relations, the alliance must be based on more robust cooperation across the spectrum of political, security, economic, and sociocultural relations. Security concerns provide an acute impetus for leaders to put more energy into the relationship, but its sustainability will require a more comprehensive focus.
Building on a careful analysis of Southeast Asia’s recent history, politics, economics, and place within the Asia Pacific, this report looks forward two decades to anticipate the development of trends in the region and how they will impact the U.S.-Japan alliance. How will Southeast Asian states come to grips with the political and economic rise of China? How will they modernize their military forces and security relationships, and what role can the United States and Japan play? How will they manage their disputes in the South China Sea, and how will they pursue greater regional integration? These questions will prove critical in understanding Southeast Asia’s role in the Asia Pacific, and in the U.S.-Japan alliance, in the decades ahead.
The first documented moves to claim and administer some of these far-flung islands took place during the early nineteenth century. The Spanish, as the colonial power in the Philippines, undertook occasional surveys of Scarborough Shoal from 1800 onward. Spain never made a formal declaration of sovereignty over the feature but included it on some maps as part of the Philippine archipelago. Emperor Gia Long, who founded the Nguyen Dynasty in Vietnam, declared sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in 1816. Prior to that, Vietnamese authorities had been officially sanctioning salvage operations in the islands for several decades. Vietnam continued to make occasional use of the islands during the 1830s and 1840s, after which official interest lapsed. In 1843, Captain Richard Spratly aboard the British whaler Cyrus claimed to be the first to discover the island that bears his name. Eventually the entire island group would come to be known as the Spratlys. The British East India Company had been conducting surveys of the islands from the late eighteenth century and in 1868, the British Admiralty compiled the results of those efforts into a new nautical chart of the South China Sea. That map displayed nine distinct islands and reefs in the western portion of the grouping, including Spratly Island itself. In the east, it showed a largely empty expanse of water dotted with reefs whose existence could not be confirmed. The chart labeled this area "Dangerous Ground," a nickname it still bears. The map was revised in 1881 and reproduced by nearly every country with an interest in the South China Sea, including the United States. It would remain the standard chart of the area until the 1950s. No government showed much interest in the islands themselves until 1877 when the British colonial authorities in Labuan, North Borneo registered a claim to Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay on behalf of London. Those two features were listed as possessions by the British Colonial Office from 1891 to 1933, though the British never vigorously pursued the claim. Despite later revisionism, Qing Dynasty documents and actions show that Chinese officials considered Hainan Island to be the southernmost limit of their authority. There is no record of any Chinese objections to Gia Long's annexation of the Paracels or subsequent Vietnamese activity there. When German and Japanese ships carrying insured British copper wrecked on the islands in 1895 and 1896, Chinese authorities foreswore any responsibility for them. Chinese fishers had salvaged the wrecks, prompting the insurance company to demand compensation from those responsible. This was transmitted through the United Kingdom's embassy in Beijing and its consul in Hoihow (modern Haikou). In response, Chinese officials in Liangguang-supervising Guangxi and Guangdong provinces, including Hainan-insisted the islands were unclaimed as far as they were concerned"--
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.