This report finds the three bankers guilty of "catastrophic failures of management" in the run-up to the collapse of HBOS which resulted in its emergency takeover by Lloyds bank. "Toxic" misjudgments by the three led to the bank's downfall. Lloyds later needed a £20.5bn taxpayer bail-out at the height of the financial crisis as a direct result of its acquisition of HBOS. So far only one former HBOS director, Peter Cummings, has been penalised, after being fined £500,000 and banned for life from working in the City last September. The Commission said it was wrong that he should shoulder the blame alone. They claim "The primary responsibility for the downfall of HBOS should rest with Sir James Crosby, architect of the strategy that set the course for disaster, with Andy Hornby, who proved unable or unwilling to change course, and Lord Stevenson, who presided over the bank's board from its birth to its death.", and calls on the new City regulator to consider barring them from taking up any role in the financial sector. Senior executives of HBOS tried to blame the losses on the temporary closure of wholesale markets. During the financial crisis, banks stopped lending to each other, resulting in their short-term supplies of funding drying up. But members of the Commission said they were disappointed by such explanations, as it was the lending approach that was to blame. The FSA's failure to act exposes what a flawed regulatory framework was in place and politicians of all parties backed the propping up of the banks with frighteningly expensive bailouts
The report Banking Reform: Towards The Right Structure (HL 126 & HC 1012) welcomes the Government's acceptance of the principle that its proposed framework for ring-fencing requires reinforcement. The Commission sees no merit in the proposition that the first reserve power will create uncertainty for banks or put at risk their attempts to raise funds for lending. That power will be a source of uncertainty only for those minded to take actions that conflict with the objectives of the ring-fence. It is important that the regulator's powers to break-up a bank should be used only afterwards, by an independent reviewer. The Government should make explicit provision in the Bill to enable the regulator to require a bank to divest itself of a specified division or set of activities, which would fall short of the requirements of the first reserve power. It is essential that the timetable for the progress of the current Bill allows adequate time not only f
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was established in July 2012, in the wake of the LIBOR scandal, to conduct an inquiry into professional standards and culture in the UK banking sector and to make recommendations for legislative and other action. This final report from the Commission contains a package of recommendations to raise standards, including: making senior bankers personally responsible, reforming bank governance, creating better functioning and more diverse markets, reinforcing the powers of regulators and making sure they do their job. Key recommendations include: A new Senior Persons Regime, replacing the Approved Persons Regime, to ensure that the most important responsibilities within banks are assigned to specific, senior individuals so they can be held fully accountable for their decisions and the standards of their banks in these areas; a new licensing regime underpinned by Banking Standards Rules to ensure those who can do serious harm are subject to the full range of enforcement powers; a new criminal offence for Senior Persons of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank, carrying a custodial sentence; a new remuneration code better to align risks taken and rewards received in remuneration, with much more remuneration to be deferred and for much longer; a new power for the regulator to cancel all outstanding deferred remuneration, along with unvested pension rights and loss of office or change of control payments, for senior bank employees in the event of their banks needing taxpayer support, creating a major new incentive on bankers to avoid such risks.
There is no commonly-accepted definition of proprietary trading. Most activity undertaken by banks results in some form of proprietary position. In principle, the type of trading which causes the greatest concern is where the bank is using its own funds, raised from shareholders, depositors and creditors, to speculate on markets, without any connection to customer activity. This has been the main focus of the Committee's consideration in this report. Some banks, particularly US investment banks, historically had units dedicated to such activity. However, an examination of proprietary trading which only considered such units would be inadequate, because speculative activity can also take place alongside customer-related trading. The difficulty of moving beyond this theoretical definition to being able to differentiate in practice between what has been termed "pure" proprietary trading and the other kinds of trading activity is considered in more detail later in this Report. There is a wide range of activities which may from the outside look like proprietary trading, but which banks could attempt to justify as being related to customer business or hedging. Equally, proprietary trading for the benefit of the bank can be, and frequently has been, contrary to the interests of its customers. The Committee sets out a number of recommendations to assess and monitor this particular activity.
Banking reform is the second key pillar of the Government's programme for reform of the financial sector to address the weaknesses exposed by the financial crisis of 2007-09. The first pillar of this programme, reform of financial services regulation, has been legislated in the Financial Services Act that received Royal Assent in December 2012 (2012 Ch. 21, 9780105421122). The Government is now legislating to reform the structure of the UK banking system, through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill (HCB 130, session 2012-13, ISBN 9780215053794) which implements key recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking, including ring-fencing retail deposits from wholesale banking activities and depositor preference. This document accompanies introduction of the Bill and includes the Government response to the first report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS), which conducted pre-legislative scrutiny on the draft Bill. The response explains where the Government has amended the Bill and includes and impact assessment for the Bill, along with the opinion of the independent Regulatory Policy Committee
On cover and title page: House, committees of the whole House, general committees and select committees. On title page: Returns to orders of the House of Commons dated 14 May 2013 (the Chairman of Ways and Means)
In 2012 the House of Commons introduced a new 'core task' for all select committees that focused on public engagement as a distinctive and explicit factor of their work. This report focuses on how the select committees have responded to the new core task. Three core conclusions emerged: a) there has been a significant shift within the select committee system to taking public engagement seriously and this is reflected in many examples of innovation; b) this shift, however, has not been systematic and levels of public engagement vary significantly from committee to committee; and c) a more vibrant and systematic approach to public engagement is urgently needed but this will require increased resources, a deeper appreciation of the distinctive contribution that select committees can make and a deeper cultural change at Westminster. This report therefore details innovations in relation to the use of social media, the structure of inquiries and innovative outreach. Public engagement has not yet been fully embedded into the culture of parliament but there is evidence of significant 'cracks and wedges' that can now be built-upon and extended during the 2015-20 Parliament. Clearly the focus of the committee and the topic of the inquiry will have some bearing on the approach to engagement adopted but a more expansive and ambitious approach across the board is to be encouraged. This report leads to a ten-point set of inter-related recommendations but they can all be connected in the sense that the existing social research demonstrates a clear desire on the part of the public to 'do politics differently'.
On the evening of 27 March 2014, the Daily Telegraph published an article on its website describing a forthcoming thematic review by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) into the life insurance market. The same story appeared in the print edition of the Telegraph the following day. The story, based on an advance briefing given by the FCA to the Telegraph earlier that week, gave a misleading impression of the scope of the life insurance review, and was published before the FCA had made any official announcement of its own. When the markets opened on 28 March, the share prices of several leading life insurers began to fall heavily. Only when the FCA published a clarifying statement about the scope of the review - several hours later that day - did share prices begin to recover. On the day following the publication of the Telegraph article, the Chairman of this Committee called for a "full and transparent explanation about how such an apparently serious mistake came to be made by our financial services watchdog--the body appointed by Parliament to enforce high standards of conduct". Simon Davis, Partner at Clifford Chance LLP, was subsequently appointed to conduct an investigation, and reported his findings in December 2014. The Committee records its thanks to Mr Davis for undertaking this work and for the evidence he gave to it.
One of the most significant consequences of Co-op Bank's near-collapse, from a public policy perspective, was the collapse of Lloyds Banking Group's planned divestment under Project Verde. Co-op Bank's withdrawal forced Lloyds to resort to its fallback option of an Initial Public Offering. The result is a new bank, TSB, which, not having an existing banking presence of its own, consists solely of the business divested by Lloyds. Accordingly, it has a personal current account market share not of 7 per cent, but of 4.2 per cent. There is a risk that a bank of this size might struggle to grow significantly and to act as a true challenger in the market. Had Co-op Bank's resulting capital shortfall been uncovered earlier, it is likely that the bank would not have progressed so far with Verde. As it was, the rapid and late emergence of the capital problem led to Co-op's withdrawal from the Verde process at a relatively late stage. The Committee recommends that the FRC investigation and the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank consider the role of KPMG and the FSA in relation to the late emergence of loan impairment and IT losses. On the basis of these findings, the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank should also form a view on whether Co-op's Verde bid could or should have been halted sooner. While it may not have been fully transparent from the start that Co-op Bank's bid was doomed to failure, it was beset by problems from an early stage. But it was not these problems that killed the deal-it was the capital shortfall that emerged only late in the day. It is important, from every angle to determine why the capital shortfall was not uncovered earlier.
The Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) has concluded a year-long inquiry into the future of the Civil Service with only one recommendation: that Parliament should establish a Joint Committee of both Houses to sit as a Commission on the future of the Civil Service. It should be constituted within the next few months and report before the end of the Parliament with a comprehensive change programme for Whitehall with a timetable to be implemented over the lifetime of the next Parliament. The Report considers the increased tensions between ministers and officials which have become widely reported, and places the problems in Whitehall in a wider context of a Civil Service built on the Northcote-Trevelyan settlement established in 1853 and the Haldane principles of ministerial accountability set out in 1919. The government's Civil Service Reform Plan lacks strategic coherence and clear leadership from a united team of ministers and officials. The Northcote-Trevelyan Civil Service remains the most effective way of supporting the democratically elected Government and future administrations in the UK. Divided leadership and confused accountabilities in Whitehall have led to problems: a low level of engagement amongst civil servants in some departments and agencies, and a general lack of trust and openness; the Civil Service exhibits the key characteristics of a failing organisation with the leadership are in denial about the scale of the challenge they face. There is a persistent lack of key skills and capabilities across Whitehall and an unacceptably high level of churn of lead officials, which is incompatible with good government.
Despite the improvement in the public finances, this year's Autumn statement is fiscally neutral and locks in lower spending by reducing departmental budgets for 2014-15 and 2015-16 by 1.1% but excluding local government, Security & Intelligence Agencies and HMRC. The Government will: cap the Retail Prices Index in business rates to 2% in 2014-15 and extend the doubling of Small Business Rate Relief to April 2014; will provide a business rate discount of £1,000 in 2014-15 and 2014-16 for retail properties with a rateable value of up to £50,000 and a 50% discount from business rates for new occupants of previously empty retail premises for 18 months; abolish National Insurance Contributions for under 21 year olds on earnings up £813 per week; remove cap on higher education student numbers; announce further reforms to make the most of the UK's science base; introduce a new tax relief for shale gas, and increase support for employee ownership and the creative industries; improve the UK's infrastructure with the National Infrastructure Plan 2013; and take further action to increase housing supply and support home ownership. Fuel prices will be frozen and the impact of policies on energy bills will be reduced. The average increase in rail fares will capped. Married couples & civil partners will be allowed to transfer £1,000 of their income tax personal allowance to their spouse where neither is a higher rate taxpayer.
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) form a large part of the UK economy. According to official statistics, there were 5.243 million private sector businesses at the start of 2014. 5.236 million had 0-250 employees and are classed as SMEs, of which 5.204 million had fewer than 50 employees and are classed as small businesses. SMEs account for 60 per cent of all private sector employment, and registered an annual turnover of £1.6 trillion at the start of 2014-47 per cent of the private sector total. A large majority of SMEs are sole traders-76% of all businesses are non-employers. The Government believes that access to finance for SMEs is 'key to the recovery and long term growth of the economy'. Research by National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) in 2009 found that the '6 per cent of UK businesses generated half of the new jobs created by existing businesses between 2002 and 2008. This report offers a number conclusions and recommendations covering: the state of the SME lending market; RBS Global Restructuring Group (GRG); mis-sale of Hedging Products; and alternative finance
The Treasury Committee has today published a report following the pre-commencement hearing it held with the next Governor of the Bank of England, Dr Mark Carney, on 7 February 2013. During the hearing, Dr Carney offered his views on the UK's future monetary policy framework. The Treasury Committee will report its conclusions, based in part on Dr Carney's evidence, in its forthcoming Report on the Budget. The Bank of England has taken on a wide range of new powers. Significant structural and cultural change is underway. Dr Carney will be responsible for overseeing it. In evidence to the Committee, Dr Carney set out his preference for a consensus-based approach to leadership; this will be significant if it leads to a meaningful change of culture within the Bank. The Committee wishes Dr Carney every success for his term as Governor. He will bring a wide range of skills and a great deal of experience to the role. Dr Carney's appearance before the Treasury Select Committee has set an important precedent. No previous Governor of the Bank of England has been subject to such a rigorous pre-commencement hearing. In future, they will be.
A European banking union is urgently required in order to restore credibility and stability to the euro area banking system, and to break the vicious cycle between banks and sovereign states. The UK has made clear that it will not participate in a banking union creating a significant risk that the UK will be marginalised as banking union participants move towards closer integration. The Government must do all in their power to ensure that London's pre-eminence as a financial market is not imperilled and that the integrity of the single market is retained. The original banking union proposals set out a three-pronged approach: a Single Supervisory Mechanism, a common resolution mechanism and a common deposit insurance scheme. The Committee regrets that this coherent model has already been undermined by political pressure, led by Germany. Banking union requires all three of these elements if it is to be effective. However the publication of the Single Supervisory Mechanism proposals is welcomed as a significant first step towards banking union. It is agreed that the European Central Bank be given ultimate supervisory responsibility for every euro area bank but the concentration of so much power in one institution means that powerful safeguards must be put in place. The Commission's original proposals do not go nearly far enough to meet these concerns. It is highly uncertain whether these safeguards can be put in place within existing treaty constraints. European legislators need to decide whether treaty change is a price they are willing to pay in order to create a viable banking union
In this report the Treasury Committee makes recommendations on pensions, savings, HMRC debt recovery powers and housing. The greater flexibility and choice provided by the proposed pension reforms is welcomed. The 'guidance guarantee' is an important part of making sure that consumers benefit from increased choice. It should be measured against a set of recommended principles to ensure its effectiveness. The pensions reforms are also likely to lead to financial innovation. Following the financial crisis, and the mis-selling scandals, the reputation of the industry is under scrutiny. With regard to savings - double taxation has long been a deterrent to some forms of saving. With the enhanced flexibility for those saving there may now be scope in the long term for bringing the tax treatment of savings and pensions together to create a 'single savings' vehicle. The proposal to grant the power to HMRC to take money directly from people's bank accounts is extremely concerning. Exceptional powers such as this require prior independent oversight. With regard to housing, the Help to Buy scheme, at least in the short-to-medium term, could raise house prices. There is also the risk that withdrawal of Help to Buy may have a distorting effect on the housing market. The need to address these difficulties places a particular responsibility on the FPC, as well as the Government, for detecting and addressing the financial stability risks arising from the housing market. There are also reservations about any extension of retrospection in the tax system. Retrospection should be considered only in wholly exceptional circumstances
The OBR's forecast for GDP growth in 2012 is -0.1 percent and is projected to pick up in every year of the forecast. Public Sector Net Borrowing is forecast to fall by 1.0 percent of GDP in 2012-13 and in subsequent years of the forecast. Public Sector Net Debt is expected to be 79.9 per cent of GDP in 2015-16 before falling to 77.3 per cent by 2017-18. This Statement sets out a further £6.6 billion package of savings in the spending review period, made up from welfare, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and departmental current spending. A £5.5 billion of additional infrastructure will be funded, including in new roads, science and free schools and academies. There will be a further 1 per cent cut in the main rate of corporation tax from April 2014, to 21 per cent and a significant temporary increase in the Annual Investment Allowance from £25,000 to £250, 000 for two years. A greater proportion of growth-related spending will be devolved to local areas and a Business Bank will be created to deploy £1 billion of additional capital and enable UK Export Finance to provide up to £1.5 billion in loans with a package of reforms to promote export. The Government will: increase the basic State Pension by 2.5 percent; create an HM Revenue & Customs unit dedicated to tackling offshore tax evasion; introduce of the UK's first General Anti-abuse Rule; develop significant new information disclosure and penalty powers; and close off tax loopholes. Lifetime allowances for pension contributions will be reduced.
The final report of the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), chaired by Sir John Vickers (2011, ISBN 9780108510984) recommended a dual approach to reform of the banking sector: ring-fencing vital banking services and increasing banks' loss-absorbency. The Government issued a consultation paper (Cm. 8356, ISBN 9780101835626) setting out how it intended to implement the Commission's recommendations. "Sound banking: delivering reform" provides an overview of responses to the consultation as well as a draft Bill and explanatory notes, ahead of pre-legislative scrutiny by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. While the draft Bill focuses on banking reform, other changes will also be brought forward. These include reform of the Payments Council and changes to the governance structure of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which will be included in the Bill when it is introduced to Parliament in 2013. This paper is divided into three parts: an overview of the key policy areas covered in the draft Bill; the draft Bill and explanatory notes; and annexes include the summary of responses to the consultation and the impact assessment.
On 17 October 2014, the European Commission informed HM Treasury that the UK would have to make an additional contribution to the EU budget of approximately 2.1 billion euro. This additional contribution had been prompted by revisions to EU Member States' historic Gross National Income (GNI) data, dating back to 1995. Member States make several annual contributions to the EU budget, by far the most significant being a levy on GNI. This levy is charged as a percentage rate on Member States' annual GNI, with the rate set at a level designed to cover exactly the portion of the EU Budget which remains unfunded once the other sources of income - namely Traditional Own Resources' and VAT-based resources - have been taken into account. The result is that an individual Member State contributes to this portion of the budget in proportion to its share of total GNI across all Member States. In 2013, GNI-based contributions amounted to 74 per cent of the EU's total budget. Emerging from the ECOFIN summit of 7 November 2014, the Chancellor claimed to have "halved the bill" of £1.7 billion demanded by the EU. He later described this as the result of "hard-fought negotiation" with the Commission to ensure that the consequential change to the UK's rebate would apply. The calculation of the rebate, and the circumstances in which it applies, are embedded in EU law. This is set out in detail in Council Decision 2007/436/EC and the supporting Council document on the UK correction. These documents establish the precise method for calculating the rebate. On the basis of the evidence the Committee has seen, it should have been unambiguously clear to the Treasury, well in advance of ECOFIN on 7 November 2014, that the UK was entitled to a rebate on any additional budget contributions that could arise from the GNI revisions.
This report identifies issues arising from the FSA's report into the failure of RBS that may merit further legislative or regulatory change. The report also considers the value of the reporting process for understanding the causes of RBS's failure and for ensuring that appropriate lessons have been learnt. The Government should include an explicit requirement for the Prudential Regulation Authority to approve major bank acquisitions and mergers in forthcoming legislation and the Treasury should report on the legislative or other changes it proposes to make to the current regime regulating acquisitions in the banking sector. The Bank of England has still to produce a comprehensive review of the Bank's role in, and response to, the crisis. Any lessons learned will only be available at a very late stage in Parliament's consideration of the Financial Services Bill, when incorporation of them into legislation may be more difficult. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards should examine the PRA's approach to banking supervision. The Government should consult on whether additional legislation is required to ensure that directors or other senior executives of failed banks cannot work in other regulated industries in future, or to make the system more certain. The Committee supports attempts to remedy the misalignment of incentives embedded within the financial services framework. The introduction of strict liability would be a major change to the existing legal framework and would require full public debate. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards should examine this and other options.
One of the most significant consequences of Co-op Bank's near-collapse, from a public policy perspective, was the collapse of Lloyds Banking Group's planned divestment under Project Verde. Co-op Bank's withdrawal forced Lloyds to resort to its fallback option of an Initial Public Offering. The result is a new bank, TSB, which, not having an existing banking presence of its own, consists solely of the business divested by Lloyds. Accordingly, it has a personal current account market share not of 7 per cent, but of 4.2 per cent. There is a risk that a bank of this size might struggle to grow significantly and to act as a true challenger in the market. Had Co-op Bank's resulting capital shortfall been uncovered earlier, it is likely that the bank would not have progressed so far with Verde. As it was, the rapid and late emergence of the capital problem led to Co-op's withdrawal from the Verde process at a relatively late stage. The Committee recommends that the FRC investigation and the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank consider the role of KPMG and the FSA in relation to the late emergence of loan impairment and IT losses. On the basis of these findings, the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank should also form a view on whether Co-op's Verde bid could or should have been halted sooner. While it may not have been fully transparent from the start that Co-op Bank's bid was doomed to failure, it was beset by problems from an early stage. But it was not these problems that killed the deal-it was the capital shortfall that emerged only late in the day. It is important, from every angle to determine why the capital shortfall was not uncovered earlier.
The Treasury Committee's report on Budget 2013 focuses on: macroeconomy; the public finances; monetary policy; taxation; departmental spending; housing; energy policy; premature disclosure of budget information; Parliamentary timing. The report contains 46 conclusions and recommendations. Particular attention is paid to the Help to Buy housing policy, which is considered a work in progress which may have unintended consequences and may not help first-time buyers. The Committee poses a number of questions for the Chancellor on the policy. Overall, if the Government's priority was housing supply, its housing measures should have concentrated there. On energy it is unclear which Government Department is in the lead for energy policy and this lack of clarity must be addressed. The changes to the monetary policy remit announced by the Chancellor at the time of Budget 2013 create uncertainty. Tax complexity and instability remain of considerable concern. The Committee will monitor whether the Government anti-avoidance measures succeed in generating the revenue predicted of them. In addition, the Committee invited comments from three accounting bodies on how Budget 2013 meets the Committee's tax policy principles: basic fairness; supporting growth and encouraging competition; certainty, including simplicity; stability; practicality; and coherence.
The Treasury has again been unable to provide all the information needed by deadlines agreed with the OBR. The Government may, as the Chairman of the Office for Budget Responsibility suggested, have decided that for political reasons this was a "price worth paying." This would set an undesirable precedent. The work of the Office for Budget Responsibility depends on the Treasury meeting the agreed deadlines. The Committee welcomes the OBR's innovation of providing uncertainty ratings for policy costings. The Committee recommends in future that the OBR publish a breakdown of the uncertainty rating assessment against the three criteria for all announced measures at Autumn Statements and Budgets. The Committee also welcomes the Government's continued publication of the distributional analysis of the Government's policy changes and recommends that the next Government continue with this important aid to transparency. The current inflation target set by the Government is symmetrical, and is 2 per cent at all times. Several witnesses alluded to the risks of very low inflation and subsequent deflation, including the Chancellor. The Chancellor has publicly welcomed the current level of inflation. This is not likely to help anchor inflationary expectations. The Governor of the Bank of England is required to write to explain to the Chancellor why inflation has fallen below 1 per cent. It is important to avoid mixed messages on inflation targeting. The Bank of England should undertake research on the effect of net migration, and the potential for future net migration, on the supply of labour and wage growth as part of the work on meeting the MPC's remit. The Treasury should ensure that discussions within Government on immigration policy fully consider the requirements of the economy.
In this Report, the Committee has considered the suitability of Ms Angela Knight for her role as Chair of the OTS against two criteria - personal independence and professional competence - as the previous Treasury Committee did for her predecessor and for appointees to the Bank of England's Policy Committees and the Office for Budget Responsibility. In this appointment hearing, the Committee also wanted to ensure that the candidate's personal and professional background does not give rise to any conflicts of interest with the aims of the OTS. Notwithstanding reservations based on the evidence it heard, the Committee is content to endorse Ms Knight's appointment
The Committee's report examines the future role of the International Monetary Fund, including issues of governance and finance, its surveillance and analysis functions, and the UK Government's report on its dealings with the IMF. Findings include: support for the idea of a focused Fund, with a greater role in crisis prevention than crisis resolution; the need for governance reforms to ensure that the IMF is more representative of its stakeholders and accountable to them, including a more open selection process for the next Managing Director and greater representation for low-income countries and emerging market economies via a reform of the quota allocations; and the need for a more transparent decision-making process, especially around the workings of the Executive Board, to ensure the Fund remains accountable to its stakeholders. The Committee supports the Exogenous Shocks Facility to provide assistance to countries suffering from crisis events such as natural disasters. In promoting IMF financial reforms, the UK Government should seek to ensure that the IMF maintains both its independence in surveillance and its ability to support low-income countries.
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