The ability of any Member to bring forward a legislative proposition, and to have it debated, is the clearest indication that so far as legislation is concerned the House is not a mere machine, churning out endless bills introduced, timetabled, amended and whipped through by the Executive. However, the weight of evidence demonstrates a clear desire across the House for change to private Member's bill procedures. The fundamental problem with the private Member's bill procedures as they currently operate is that it is too easy for a small number of Members to prevent a bill from progressing without giving the House as a whole the chance to come to a decision on it. The difficulty of achieving legislative change - or rather, the ease with which legislative change can be resisted - undermines the effectiveness of both kite-flying and campaigns for legislative change, and tilts the balance away from backbenchers and towards the Government in the choice of bills brought forward. This report considers the various purposes for which private Members' bills may be used; and looks in detail at the reasons for the problems which are inherent in private Member's bill procedures as they currently operate; and puts forward options for reform. It's basis is that reform should have two objects: to increase the transparency of the process; and to ensure that the process is a genuine opportunity for debate, scrutiny and, if it is the will of the House, passage of a backbench legislative proposition
This report follows the Committee's report of September 2013 on private Members' bills. Since then they have received a Government response, which is published as an appendix to this report, and discussed recommendations further with the Leader of the House. This report sets out a revised package of recommendations for reform of the private Member's bill process. The revised proposals include that: the House should agree to a convention that the question on second reading of a private Member's bill should be put to the House at the end of a full day's debate, in the same way that the House expects the question to be put on second reading of a Government bill; Bills which have not been published should be clearly identified in the Future Business section of the Order Paper; Pages should be provided on the Parliamentary website where draft private Members' bills can be made available online for scrutiny and comment which should be done on a pilot basis in the 2014-15 session; a bill need not be brought in immediately after leave is granted under the ten minute rule; the risk of a single Member monopolising the limited opportunities for debate of private Members' bills should be reduced by providing that a private Member may present no more than one bill on any one day; the deadline for publishing a private Member's bill should be brought forward to the Wednesday of the week prior to the day of second reading; Private Members' bills should be called "backbench bills
Programme motions are used in the House of Commons to determine the amount of time spent considering legislation. The effective use of programming meets the Government's need to manage the legislative timetable whilst ensuring sufficient opportunity is available for Parliament to scrutinise legislation. However, the inquiry found that the way programming is currently managed means that there is often insufficient time to consider all of the amendments tabled at Report stage. Consequently many measures pass into law without any scrutiny at all. The Report makes a series of recommendations: Government should make greater use of "recommittal" procedures-sending all or part of a bill back to Committee- when large numbers of Government amendments have been tabled, to ensure they receive sufficient scrutiny; a revised procedure for the tabling of supplementary programme motions which would adjust the way scheduling of debate is carried out in advance; ensure that the House has the opportunity, where appropriate, to vote on alternative, non-Government, propositions for the timetabling of legislation and on consideration of Lords Amendments
The Sewel Convention seeks to ensure that the UK Parliament legislates on devolved matters only with the express agreement of the Scottish Parliament, and consent is also required for legislation on reserved matters if it alters the powers of the Scottish Parliament or Scottish Ministers. Following on from a report by the Scottish Parliament Procedures Committee on the operation of the Convention (SP paper 428, 7th report, session 2 (2005) (ISBN 1406113220) published in October 2005), the Committee's report focuses on ways of improving the communications procedure between the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments, and how MPs could be better alerted that a particular Bill before Parliament had been subject to a Sewel motion in the Scottish Parliament. Recommendations made include: the introduction of a formal process whereby the Scottish Parliament notifies Westminster when a Sewel motion has been passed and the 'tagging' of all relevant public Bills; and the need for an explicit statement on explanatory notes to Bills as to which parts of the UK the provisions will affect. The report also recommends the further consideration of the need to establish a 'Super' Scottish Grand Committee, composed of Scottish MPs, MSPs and Scottish MEPs, to discuss matters of mutual interest.
Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill; Video Recordings Bill, fourth report of session 2009-10, report, together with formal minutes and written evidence
Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill; Video Recordings Bill, fourth report of session 2009-10, report, together with formal minutes and written evidence
The Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill was re-introduced in the House of Commons on 19 November 2009 and the Committee welcomes a number of aspects of the Bill which is implementing some of the commitments made by the Prime Minister in his Governance of Britain statement in July 2007. But the Committee considers there are a number of significant omissions from the Bill including in relation to judicial appointments, parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence matters, and the restrictive judicial interpretation of the meaning of public function in the Human Rights Act. They recommend amendments relating to the latter two points. They also look at Protest around Parliament, Ratification of Treaties and Right to a fair hearing and access to a court in the determination of civil rights.The Video Recordings Bill was introduced into the House of Commons on 15 December 2009 and is a fast track piece of legislation which repeals and revives the provisions of the Video Recordings Act 1984 in order to enable them to be notified to the European Commission under the Technical Standards Directive and so secure its enforceability. The Committee considers the human rights issues raised by this Bill should be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. However as the 1984 Act, serves as an important child protection purpose, that are currently unenforceable, the Committee accepts the need for fast tracking this legislation and does not propose to further scrutinise this Bill.
Parliamentary privilege ensures that Members of Parliament are able to speak freely in debates, and protects Parliament's internal affairs from interference from the courts. Following (failed) attempts by some MPs to use parliamentary privilege to avoid prosecution for expenses fraud, the Government felt the time was right for a comprehensive review of the privileges of Parliament. Freedom of speech is arguably the most important privilege: a member must be able to speak or raise a matter without fear of a criminal or civil liability. The Government does not feel it necessary to change the protection of privilege in civil cases, nor in relation to injunctions or super-injunctions. But it is open to question whether parliamentary privilege should ever prevent members being successfully prosecuted for criminal offences. The paper consults on whether privilege should be disapplied in cases of alleged criminality, though not in respect of speeches in Parliament. The second major privilege is that of exclusive cognisance: the right of each House to regulate its own proceedings and internal affairs without interference from any outside body including the courts. This includes the conduct of its Members, and of other participants such as witnesses before select committees. Recent court judgments make clear that statute law on employment, health and safety etc do apply to Parliament providing the law would not interfere with Parliament's core functions. The green paper also consults on extending and strengthening select committee powers. A final section covers other miscellaneous privileges.
This report considers the case for Parliament to be able to initiate and conduct inquiries into serious and significant matters of public concern. It takes up the recommendationmade by this committiee's predecessor Committee (in the Government by Inquiry Report) that there should be a parliamentary mechanism for initiating inquiries. These would take the form of Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry, composed of parliamentarians and others. In the Report, the committee examines the justification for creating Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry in particular, that they would enable Parliament to hold the Executive to account more effectively. Then it covers some of the practical issues involved in setting up inquiries of this nature: how Parliament could instigate an inquiry, its composition, and its operation and powers. The committee concludes that it is crucial, in constitutional sense, that Parliament has the necessary powers and abilities to scrutinise the Executive and hold it to account. Proper parliamentary scrutiny should include the ability to establish and undertake inquiries into significant matters of public concern. Parliament has, in the past, conducted investigationsof this kind and as the great forum of the nation, should be expected to do so. The committee's recommendation for Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry would promoteeffective parliamentary accountability by creating a process for Parliament to initiate inquirieswhere it rather than the Executive sees fit.
Each year the Government deposits 1200 European policy documents for scrutiny, some of which are cleared straight away, whilst others are reserved for further scrutiny. These are normally considered by one of seven policy-based sub-committees and this report summarises the work undertaken by the Committee through its sub-committees. It also looks ahead to work it plans for next year including: the Subsiduarity Early Warning Mechanism and a scrutiny of the work of the European Commission.
This report says Parliament should not introduce any new privacy statute. It concludes that in weighing the competing rights to privacy and freedom of expression, each case must be judged on its own merits. The bar for limiting freedom of expression must be set high, but the courts are now striking a better balance in dealing with applications for privacy injunctions. Criticism that privacy law has been "judge-made", noting that it evolved from the Human Rights Act is rejected. The Committee says the most important step towards improving protection of privacy is to provide for enhanced regulation of the media. The Press Complaints Commission lacked the power, sanctions or independence to be truly effective. Substantial changes to press regulation are needed to ensure that it encompasses all major news publishers including, in time, major bloggers. The Committee makes several recommendations including that the reformed regulator should: have access to a wider range of sanctions, including the power to fine; be cost-free to complainants; be able to determine the size and location of a published apology, and the date of publication; play a greater role in arbitrating and mediating privacy disputes. One possible mechanism the Committee suggests is for advertisers to agree to advertise only in publications that are members of the press regulator and subscribe to its rules. It also concludes that parliamentarians should ensure that material subject to an injunction is only revealed in Parliament when there is good reason to do so
The report of the Leader's Group examining the working practices of the House of Lords and the operation of self-regulation was published today (Tuesday 26 April). Recommendations in the report include changes to enable the Lords better to fulfil its core functions of scrutinising government, testing out and reviewing legislation, and debating important issues. The report also suggests ways in which the House of Lords could make the most of its unique strengths and resources, including its Members' skills and experience.
Following on from a Green Paper (Cm. 7170, ISBN 9780101717021) published in July 2007, this consultation document discusses ways of making the executive branch of government more accountable, focusing on two areas: the power to enter into international obligations (treaties) and the power to engage the country in war. Although these are two of the most important powers a government can wield, there is no legal requirement for the House of Commons to have any particular role in these decisions, with the executive traditionally deriving its powers from the ancient prerogatives of the Crown. This consultation paper considers how the role of Parliament can be strengthened in the conduct of diplomacy and armed conflict, whilst balancing this against the need for government to take swift action to protect national security and other national interests, and avoiding undermining operational security and effectiveness. The consultation period ends on 17/01/2008.
These notes relate to the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (ISBN 0105416053) which is in six parts with 17 schedules and contains provisions to establish the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), including its functions and general powers, financial provisions and operational matters, complaints procedure, matters relating to prosecutions, use and disclosure of information. Other measures relate to investigatory powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions; offenders assisting investigations and prosecutions; financial reporting orders; protection of witnesses; proceeds of crime; police powers; public order and conduct in public places, including harassment, trespass and anti-social behaviour.
The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill contains provisions to increase the scope of regulatory reform powers (following a review undertaken by the Better Regulation Task Force) in order to tackle red tape and unnecessary regulatory burdens, building on the powers of the Regulatory Reform Act 2001. The Committee examines the provisions of the Bill as brought to the Lords in May 2006 (HLB 109, session 2005-06; ISBN 0108422399) which it finds to have been changed significantly since the Bill was first introduced into the Commons in January 2006. Although the Committee finds that the Bill proposes the greatest delegation of power to Ministers that it has seen, it does not find the regulatory reform provisions inappropriate, although it questions whether the 2001 Act could not itself have been amended. The provisions relating to consolidation, simplification and implementation of Law Commission recommendations are found to be unsuitable for delivery by delegated legislation and it is suggested that primary legislation subject to special procedure would be a better option to legislate for such purposes.
ministerial and other appointments from outside Parliament, eighth report of session 2009-10, report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
ministerial and other appointments from outside Parliament, eighth report of session 2009-10, report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
This report from the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) concludes that the practice of appointing ministers from outside Parliament via the House of Lords should be exceptional and subject to more checks and balances. Introducing a wider range of experience into ministerial teams can sometimes make government more effective, but government could also achieve this by making greater use of the range of talent on their own backbenches. The Committee argues for more scrutiny of outside appointments when they are made. The Prime Minister would be required to explain to the House of Commons why an appointment had been made, under what terms and what was expected of the minister during their time in government. The prospective appointee could be required to attend a pre-appointment select committee hearing. PASC identifies a strong argument of principle that ministers in an unelected House of Lords should be accountable to all Members of the House of Commons. People who have been appointed to the Lords to be ministers should not automatically receive a title and place in the legislature for life. It may be preferable to have a limited number of ministers who are members of neither House but accountable to both. The Committee also examined the role of so-called 'tsars'. There should be much more transparency about such appointments, with greater clarity about their roles and responsibilities and a public statement of what they have achieved in their posts.
The draft Bill and White Paper were included in Cm. 7342-I,II,III (ISBN 9780101734226) which follows the Green paper issued in July 2007, Cm. 7170 (ISBN 9780101717021) and various other Governance of Britain papers
This report contains the evidence given by Caroline Flint, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, on the proposed EU Council Directive on granting and withdrawing refugee status. Some of the topics covered were: appeals procedure; border procedures; Dublin II; first country of asylum; implementing legislation; safe country of origin; withdrawal of application.
The depth and pace of EU integration has demonstrated the need for effective democratic parliamentary scrutiny and accountability of Government at Westminster. This is the first major inquiry into the European scrutiny system in the House of Commons for eight years. There is more that the Committee could do to look at the impact of new proposals. There should be a new requirement to appoint 'Reporters' to take the lead within Committees on EU issues, as well as a more coordinated approach to the Commission Work Programme. Whilst the system need not be scrapped as some have said, it must be enhanced. Many problems arise from the fact that new Members are appointed for each document. The Committee argues forcefully for a return to the permanent membership system, new powers and a change of name to reflect the Committees' core purpose: EU Document Debate Committees. The Committee also examined how EU business is taken on the floor of the House, and the procedures which apply to it. They set out a series of recommendations about the way debates are scheduled and conducted and put the case for a new session of 'EU Questions'. They also review working practices and the visibility of the House's scrutiny of the EU in the media. It concluded that now is the time to propose the introduction of a form of national veto over EU legislative proposals, and then to explore the mechanics of disapplication of parts of existing EU obligations, notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972
The public will be given the right to recall their local MP if they are found to have engaged in serious wrongdoing under proposals announced in "Recall of MPs Draft Bill " ( ISBN 9780101824125, Cm.8241) published today. The proposals fulfil a commitment made in the Programme for Government as part of the political reform agenda. In the draft Bill, the Government is proposing to introduce a power of recall, allowing voters to force a by-election having had a petition signed by 10% of his or her constituents. At the last general election the manifestos of all three of the main parties included a commitment to establish a recall mechanism. The draft Bill is being published for pre-legislative scrutiny and sets out two triggers for a recall petition: firstly where an MP is convicted in the UK of an offence and receives a custodial sentence of 12 months or less, and secondly where the House of Commons resolves, through a vote by MPs, that a recall petition should be opened. The first trigger will close a gap in the existing legislation whereby MPs are only disqualified if they receive a custodial sentence of more than 12 months. The second trigger is an additional disciplinary power for the House of Commons, which for the first time allows constituents to have their say in deciding whether their MP should stay in office. The petition will be administered by the local returning officer and will be open for a period of 8 weeks. If 10% of eligible constituents sign the petition, the MP's seat will be vacated and a by-election will be held.
This report identifies the inherent tension within the role of the Attorney General where political, ministerial functions have to balanced with the provision of independent legal advice and the supervision of the prosecution service. Although there is a need for accountability to Parliament and the public for the duties carried out, there is also a need for reform to ensure clear lines of responsibility and remove the suspicion of political pressure. The Committee therefore recommend that the duties of the Attorney General be split. The purely legal functions should be carried out by an official who is outside party political life, whilst a minister in the Ministry of Justice should carry out the ministerial duties.
In autumn 2008, Britain's banking system came perilously close to collapse. To avert catastrophe, the Government was forced to step in with multi-billion pound bailouts. Many factors led to this crisis including failings in financial supervision and fuzzy allocation of responsibilities for preventing and managing systemic crises. The draft Financial Services Bill (printed as chapter 5 of 'A new approach to financial regulation: the blueprint for reform' (Cm. 8083, June 2011, 9780101808323) is aimed at preventing such a potentially calamitous systemic failure of the financial sector occurring again. It proposes far reaching changes to the regulatory structure, replacing the tripartite system of financial regulation with a twin peaks model. The Joint Committee's recommendations are intended to ensure that the new regulatory authorities have the right objectives, powers and responsibilities and systems of accountability which will be essential to make them effective.
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