The Committee wrote to Government Departments in May 2001, asking them to explain why they refused to provide information in response to some Parliamentary questions. Only seven responses were received by November 2001 and the last one was received in March 2002 and this long delay is unacceptable. The Committee recommends that where Departments withhold information under an exemption of the Code of Practice, they should cite the relevant exemption in their written answers. Wherever possible, the full answer to a written question should be placed on the official record. One of the reasons given for withholding information is "commercial confidentiality", for instance, in connection with PFI and PPP matters, but openness should be given a higher priority. It is recommended that a Member should be able to ask the Committee to refer unsatisfactory answers to questions back to the Department concerned. At the request of the Leader of the House, a quarterly report is now prepared about the number of questions which remain unanswered at the end of a Session, and another quarterly report is prepared regarding "I will write" answers. These reports should be published in the interests of transparency. The Committee agrees with the Procedure Committee, that there should be a daily quota per member of five named day questions. This should improve the speed and quality of answers. It is hoped that this report, and those in successive sessions, on parliamentary questions, should be debated in the House.
This report (HC 814, session 2007-08, ISBN 9780215525468) looks at the work of the British Council and what impact the Council has working with whole societies, how it makes best use of resources and their efforts to increase consistency across the British Council network. It follows an NAO report (HCP 625, session 2007-08, ISBN 9780102954173), on the same topic. The British Council is a Registered Charity and an executive Non-Departmental Public Body as well as a Public Corporation. It aims to build relationships between people in the UK and other countries, through teaching English and running cultural projects. It operates in over 110 countries and engages with over 15 million people a year worldwide. The Committee has set out a number of conclusions and recommendations, including: that the British Council should be congratulated for its achievements in promoting the English language and culture overseas; the Committee believes though that the current teaching model, based on premium prices and concentrated mainly in capital cities, severely restricts its reach; that the Council's recent programme of change has had a negative effect on staff and their view of the Council's leadership; the Council is without a single customer relationship management system, which it is now going to address; that sponsorship and partner income has fallen year on year since 2000-01, and the Council should do more to reverse this trend; the Committee has identified a lack of consistency across the network.
The Committee in this report which, on the basis of evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department), examined making important decisions, managing dependence on the United States and managing the programme effectively. The United Kingdom first deployed a submarine-launched nuclear deterrent in 1968. Since then, successive governments have been committed to a policy of continuous at sea deterrence, meaning that at least one nuclear-armed submarine is on patrol at any one time. In its 2006 White Paper, the Government announced its intention to maintain the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent capability and its plans to build a new class of submarines to replace the current Vanguard fleet and to participate in the United States' Trident D5 ballistic missile life extension programme. The Ministry of Defence's ability to sustain its nuclear deterrent capability in the future is dependent on collaboration with the United States. The new class of submarine is likely to remain in service beyond the extended life of the existing Trident D5 missile, which will be renewed in 2042, and must therefore be compatible with any successor missile developed by the United States. The Department has received a series of assurances from the United States that any new missile will be compatible with the United Kingdom's new submarine class. Nevertheless, the concern remains that the Department has no direct control over the development of the new missile. The future deterrent programme is still at the concept phase. The Department has yet to make many decisions about the principal parameters of the submarine design, the type of nuclear reactor, and the design and size of the missile compartment. The Department expects to make these decisions by September 2009.
This report examines how well the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is managing its resources, the adequacy of the IPCC's quality assurance arrangements and how far the IPCC has sought to assess the impact of its work. Complaints against the police of a serious nature requiring IPCC involvement led to it opening 100 independent investigations in 2007-08, compared to 31 in 2004-05. The IPCC also received 4,141 appeals about local police investigations which was a four-fold increase on the number in 2004-05. As a result of its increasing workload, the IPCC has found itself working at above full capacity. The IPCC has no formal quality control framework in place. The IPCC's Commissioners have not been formally approving all investigation reports, one of their key responsibilities. Public confidence in the police complaints system is essential. While the IPCC has commissioned research to look at levels of public confidence in the complaints system, it has not sought the views of complainants, police officers and appellants about their experiences of the IPCC's processes. The absence of feedback from those who have had direct experience of dealing with the IPCC is a significant oversight which the IPCC is now rectifying. There is a lack of clarity about who has responsibility for monitoring the implementation of IPCC recommendations. The IPCC accepts responsibility for recording each police force's acceptance or rejection of the recommendations following an investigation, but not for monitoring the implementation of the recommendations. The IPCC has, therefore, only limited evidence on the impact of its work.
This report examines recording and acting on complaints, and on the adequacy and costs of the complaints process, in the Department for Work and Pensions (the Department) and Jobcentre Plus and the Pensions, Disability and Carers Service (the Agencies). The Agencies provided services to over 22 million customers in 2007-08 and around 70,000 complaints were recorded (down from 103,000 in 2003-04). A three-tiered process has been introduced, and Agencies aim to resolve most complaints at frontline staff or manager level, so as to minimise the number reaching Chief Executive level. Additionally, dissatisfied customers have two independent resolution routes if internal processes fail: the Independent Case Examiner and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. Whilst only about 200 cases reach the Ombudsman, the proportion upheld at that stage is around two thirds, suggesting that there is scope for improvement in handling the most difficult cases. Staff attitude is the most common cause of complaints. Another common complaint is the cost of calling the Agencies, particularly from mobile phones. The Department has no consistent system across its operations for recording complaints, although it is currently piloting a simplified system with the intention of moving to a common system. There is also limited central monitoring of the quality of replies to customers. The cost of handling complaints is estimated by the National Audit Office to be between £4.7 million and £6.2 million, although the Department does not monitor such information. Resolving at the front line a third of the cases which currently reach 'tier three' (Agency Chief Executive level) could save the Department around £700,000.
The Ministry of Defence is currently replacing hundreds of existing computer systems with a single new system, called the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII). The programme to design, install and run this is being led by the ATLAS consortium. The programme began in March 2005 and will cost an estimated £7.1 billion by 2015, if fully implemented. The implementation has suffered major delays. The main causes of the delay of terminal installation being over-optimistic assumptions about the condition of the buildings into which DII would be fitted. The DII Programme also provides a range of core software such as word process, email, internet access and security. This should all have been available in June 2006, but less than half of the requirement had been delivered two years later. As a result of these problems, the Department's existing computer systems have had to be used for longer than intended with the increased risk that one or more of them will fail. On the bases of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Committee examined the Ministry of Defence on the difficulties experienced on the DII Programme in the past and the measures put in place to deliver improvement in future.
Although the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, and its predecessor, the Department for Education and Skills, spent around £5 billion on basic skills courses between 2001 and 2007 (£9 billion by 2011), large numbers of the adult working population of England remain functionally illiterate and innumerate. In 2003, an estimated 75 per cent of the adult population of working age had numeracy skills below the level of a good pass at GCSE and 56 per cent had literacy skills below this level. In July 2007, the Government announced a new objective to help 95 per cent of the adult population of working age achieve functional literacy and numeracy (the level of skill generally needed to get by in life) by 2020. Achieving this ambition would, however, only raise England to the standards currently achieved by the top 25 per cent of OECD member countries. There are now separate targets for literacy and numeracy which focus on achieving the functional level of skill. The new targets, especially for numeracy, will be challenging to meet and, to date, far less progress has been made tackling poor numeracy skills compared with literacy skills. This is not helped by the low number of numeracy teachers available. Many hard-to-reach people with poor literacy and numeracy skills come into contact with other government services, such as Jobcentre Plus, the Prison Service and the Probation Service. More of these people are being encouraged to take up courses to improve their literacy and numeracy skills, but the percentage who participate is still relatively small. The Department's biggest challenges are reaching people in the workplace who lack skills and getting employers to recognise the benefits of raising the skills of their workforce.`
The Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) has concluded a year-long inquiry into the future of the Civil Service with only one recommendation: that Parliament should establish a Joint Committee of both Houses to sit as a Commission on the future of the Civil Service. It should be constituted within the next few months and report before the end of the Parliament with a comprehensive change programme for Whitehall with a timetable to be implemented over the lifetime of the next Parliament. The Report considers the increased tensions between ministers and officials which have become widely reported, and places the problems in Whitehall in a wider context of a Civil Service built on the Northcote-Trevelyan settlement established in 1853 and the Haldane principles of ministerial accountability set out in 1919. The government's Civil Service Reform Plan lacks strategic coherence and clear leadership from a united team of ministers and officials. The Northcote-Trevelyan Civil Service remains the most effective way of supporting the democratically elected Government and future administrations in the UK. Divided leadership and confused accountabilities in Whitehall have led to problems: a low level of engagement amongst civil servants in some departments and agencies, and a general lack of trust and openness; the Civil Service exhibits the key characteristics of a failing organisation with the leadership are in denial about the scale of the challenge they face. There is a persistent lack of key skills and capabilities across Whitehall and an unacceptably high level of churn of lead officials, which is incompatible with good government.
The Border Force's 7,600 staff operate immigration and customs controls at 138 air, sea and rail ports across the UK. It has a budget of £604 million for 2013-14, but is facing cuts. It has had to prioritise passenger checks at the expense of its other duties thereby weakening security at the border by neglecting other duties, such as the examination of freight for illicit goods, and checks in Calais on lorries to detect concealed illegal entrants. It was not able to meet and check up to 90,000 private planes or private boats arriving in the UK each year, leaving the UK border vulnerable and raising issues about resourcing and how priorities are set. The Border Force acknowledged that it had missed 8 of its 19 seizure and detection targets. Recommendations: set out how it will ensure that it delivers its full range of duties across all ports to provide the required level of national security; demonstrate that it can deliver its workload within the resources available; must address the gaps in the data it receives on people arriving in the UK, and the existing data needs to be cleansed to increase the quality, reliability and usefulness of the intelligence generated; set out how, and by when, it will have in place the functional IT systems it needs to underpin the security of the UK border; senior management must provide the organisation with a clear sense of purpose and tackle those barriers which inhibit the flexible and effective deployment of its staff.
The Department of Health (the 'Department') and the NHS achieved a surplus of £515 million in 2006-07, representing 0.6 per cent of total available resources. This followed two years of rising deficits, and the Department, working with the NHS, has done well in restoring overall financial balance. While the national picture is one of financial surplus there remain variations in financial performance. The surplus is concentrated in Strategic Health Authorities, whilst overall Primary Care Trusts and NHS Trusts remain in deficit Of the 372 NHS organisations, 82 recorded a deficit of £917 million, with 80 per cent of this being reported by just 10 per cent of NHS organisations. There are also regional variations, with the East of England Strategic Health Authority area having a deficit of £153 million and the North West achieving a £189 million surplus. Financial recovery is therefore inconsistent and more needs to be done so that all parts of the NHS achieve financial balance. The Committee concludes that the return to financial balance is the result of the Department's tighter performance management of NHS finances in the way funding flowed through the NHS together with a programme of support for local organisations with particular financial difficulties. In the short term, this largely centralist approach was appropriate. For the future if the NHS is to remain in financial balance more health organisations locally need to improve their financial management. Failure to keep a tight grip on financial performance will undermine health care for patients.
In this report the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) calls for a 'People's Ombudsman' and says the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO), which investigates complaints against the NHS and other government departments and agencies, is outdated. Citizens should have direct and more user-friendly access to the Ombudsman. None of the Ombudsmen created since the PHSO's operations were established in legislation 47 years ago have adopted the same restricted model as the Parliamentary Ombudsman. As a priority, the restriction on citizens' direct and open access to PHSO, known as the MP filter, must be abolished (as is already the case in respect of NHS complaints). PHSO must be able to receive complaints other than in writing: such as in person, by telephone or online, just as is expected of any normal complaints system. PHSO should have powers to investigate areas of concern without having first to receive a complaint from a service user. Parliament should strengthen the accountability of PHSO. PASC, along with other Departmental Select Committees, should make greater use of the intelligence gathered by the PHSO to hold Government to account. A consultation should be held on the creation of a single public services ombudsman for England. At the same time, there must be a distinctive ombudsman service for UK non-devolved matters.
The House of Lords Constitution Committee has today published a report which says that the Government should do more to inform Parliament when ministers propose to take action before Parliament has passed the legislation that would make that action legal. The Committee says that when ministers want to act in anticipation of legislation, known as "pre-empting Parliament", they should set out what they want to do, why and under what powers in a statement made to Parliament. The Committee also says the Government should publish a full list of instances where they pre-empted Parliament at the end of each parliamentary session. The Committee calls on the Government to consolidate the principles and practices governing pre-emption and restate them clearly in the Cabinet Manual. It stresses that pre-emption should not take place when it might threaten the principle of effective parliamentary scrutiny.
This report expresses concern that proposals in the Governments Civil Service Reform Plan, such as allowing ministers to select departmental permanent secretaries from a shortlist and directly to appoint civil servants on fixed-term contracts, could risk undermining the impartiality of the civil service, threaten the principle that appointments are based on merit and make it harder for officials to give honest advice to ministers. Ministers remain constitutionally responsible for everything their departments and their civil servants do. Ministers should not seek to distance themselves from the actions of civil servants, or of special advisers. The Committee also addresses the relationship between parliamentary select committees and the civil service. The report concludes that select committees should have greater access to advice given to ministers by civil servants and that select committees should be able to call former civil servants to give evidence on projects which they used to work on. Other recommendations in the report include that: Parliament should in future be given the chance to scrutinise revised editions of the Osmotherly rules, which provide guidance to civil servants on dealing with select committees; the Osmotherly rules, however, should not be regarded as anything more than guidance for civil servants; when select committees call for specific civil servants to give evidence the Government should normally agree to the request; it should be normal practice for a single senior civil servant to oversee major Government projects from start to finish, in order to ensure better accountability of such projects
In this report the Liaison Committee conducts a brief review of House of Lords policy committees, in advance of the appointment of those committees in the new Parliament
This report presents John Tiner's "Review of the National Audit Office's corporate governance". The head of the National Audit Office, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), is an Officer of the House of Commons appointed by the Queen, and is completely independent of Government and enjoys complete discretion over the discharge of his functions. The current C&AG has put in place a number of governance processes, but in their effectiveness these fall short of what is currently best practice. The NAO must remain independent, but work within systems of governance that are consistent with best practice, and follow relevant auditing and professional standards. The main proposals are: (1) the NAO should be formed as a body corporate with a governing board comprising a majority of independent non executive directors. Its main functions should be to set the strategy of the Office, support and oversee the work of the C&AG, ensure the Office conducts its business in an economic, efficient and effective way and satisfy itself that the systems of governance and internal controls operate effectively and to the highest standards. (2) The Chief Executive (the C&AG) should have complete personal discretion as to the audit judgements he reaches and the presentation of those judgements to the Public Accounts Committee and other committees of Parliament as may be necessary. (3) Both the Chairman and Chief Executive of the NAO Board would be appointed by the Queen on a motion from the House of Commons. The Chairman and the other non-executives should be appointed for a term of 3 years renewable once. The Chief Executive should be appointed for a fixed term of 8 years which cannot be renewed.
This report discusses the pre-appointment hearing of the preferred candidate, Tom Winsor, to the post of Chief Inspector of Constabulary. Pre-appointment hearings are to assess the suitability of the preferred candidate, but that cannot be done effectively in a vacuum and the Committee were disappointed that the Home Secretary initially refused to provide information on the selection process or the shortlist. The Committee recommends that the Government in future provide such information in keeping with the recommendation from the Liaison Committee. The Home Affairs Committee is content for the Home Secretary to proceed with Mr Winsor's appointment. This is considered against the background that his nomination was controversial. If appointed he will be the first Chief Inspector who has never served as a police officer. They urge Mr Winsor to reach out to forces, police officers of all ranks and their representative bodies to build bridges. He must create a strong relationship with forces and with police and crime commissioners. The Home Affairs Committee will take a continued interest in the work of the Chief Inspector and look forward to hearing evidence from him on a regular basis
Many of the Prime Minister's powers are obscure "prerogative" powers, which are not well understood or defined. More of these prerogative powers should be codified in statute to make them more transparent and increase accountability to Parliament. Government should also consider consolidating the existing Prime Ministerial powers in one place - the way the role has evolved means there is no single and authoritative source of information on the powers. There is widespread agreement that the Prime Minister's role has increased in recent decades-including in policy making. Coalition government has to some extent constrained the powers of the Prime Minister but this might not persist under single-party government. The need for support by a majority of Members of Parliament and the Cabinet acts as a check and balance on the Prime Minister. However, these political mechanisms are not effective on a "day-to-day" basis. The Liaison Committee has the potential to be a very effective mechanism for Parliament to hold the Prime Minster to account, and should continue to improve the way it works. The Government should consider a role for Parliament in the investiture of the Prime Minister, or the Government, after a general election. Some consider that accountability of the Prime Minister would be strengthened by direct election by the public, US style. The Government could also consider the creation of a combined Department for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, with a departmental Select Committee specifically to scrutinise that Department
This report examines the operational and constitutional relationship between government ministers and civil servants, including the issues of ministerial and civil service accountability, the role of ministers in making appointments and the position of special advisers, and whether it is time to give the civil service a proper constitutional footing. It considers what is meant by politicisation, whether politicisation is an entirely negative phenomenon, and, if it is not, what kinds of politicisation would be appropriate in the UK. The Committee notes that the UK civil service in held in high regard, both at home and abroad, and that it is essential that the governing relationship is kept in good repair for effective government and proper accountability. Recent difficulties have highlighted long-standing concerns about the way in which responsibility and accountability are divided in the UK political system, and the report proposes a number of steps aimed at contributing to its good working in combining an independent civil service with political accountability for its operation. Amongst the 27 conclusions and recommendations made, the report calls for a new "public service bargain" underpinned by a governance code which seeks to clarify the respective responsibilities and expectations of ministers and civil servants, including the need for a Civil Service Act to clarify the constitutional position of the civil service.
The Committee calls for better and more accessible procedures for civil servants to raise concerns about the conduct of government. A route should to be established whereby evidence that a minister had misled Parliament or the public could be reported to Parliament following a complaint by a civil servant. Leaks damage trust within government and trust in government. The Committee concludes that leak investigations are often hamstrung by the fact that many leaks are politically motivated, including leaks from ministers and special advisers. The most effective way to prevent leaks by civil servants is to have accessible, effective and visible ways for individuals to raise concerns about the conduct of government, either internally or through an external oversight body, the Civil Service Commissioners. The report makes the following key recommendations: the Civil Service Commissioners should have the power to report to Parliament evidence indicating that the government was misleading Parliament or the public or the fact that the Civil Service has refused to act on a justified complaint; the Commissioners should also conduct independent investigation of breaches of confidentiality by special advisers; the leaking of information should only be a criminal matter where there is a breach of the Official Secrets Act or there is evidence of serious criminal misconduct; the Cabinet Office, Heads of Departments and the Civil Service Commissioners should do more to ensure that potential whistleblowers know how to raise concerns and have the confidence to come forward with them.
This is the seventh report on Ministerial Accountability and Parliamentary Questions and the last that covers the workings of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information, as in January 2005 this Code was superseded by the Freedom of Information Act. Amongst its conclusions are a concerned that departments have failed to honour fully their undertaking to provide specific Code exemption when they failed to give answers on public interest grounds. The Committee will monitor the effect of the Freedom of Information Act but believes that Cabinet Office guidance is inconsistent with earlier practice and should be reconsidered. The Committee also recommend that there should be an annual report of departmental performance on named-day questions and they strongly deplore and attempt to use the new arrangements of dealing with Questions before Prorogation as a means of avoiding answering a Question.
There has been concern in the last few years that former Ministers and Crown Servants have inappropriately used knowledge they gained in Government to seek new employment in other sectors. Over two years ago the Committee launched an inquiry to examine the effectiveness of the Business Appointment Rules in ensuring propriety in the future employment of former Ministers and senior Crown servants; and to consider the potential of the Big Society agenda to increase traffic through the "revolving door" between the public sector and business and the voluntary sector. The report "The Business Appointment Rules" was published on 17 July 2012. Some twenty months later, the Government has not responded to the Report. The Committee has raised this matter both through correspondence with the Rt Hon Francis Maude, Minister for the Cabinet Office, and by way of Parliamentary Questions. The Committee views the Government failure to respond to a Select Committee Report as unacceptable behaviour and in this instance as obstructive and secretive, both showing a cavalier attitude in its responsibilities towards Parliament and thereby deliberately impeding a cross-party scrutiny of Government policy in this area.
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