Telephone services are a vital part of government support, accounting for 43% of all customer contacts. But departments are continuing to make extensive use of higher rate phone numbers for customer telephone lines despite the fact that many people are put off calling as a result. The most vulnerable callers, on the lowest incomes, face some of the highest charges. Costs to callers are even higher because the caller has to endure long waiting times and poor customer service. In the face of this evidence we welcome the Cabinet Office's acknowledgement that it was "inappropriate" for vulnerable citizens to pay a substantial charge to access public services and its commitment to establish best practice in this field and ensure it is followed across government
The 2012 Civil Service Reform Plan (the Plan), published in June 2012, outlines plans to transform the civil service so that it is sharper and quicker, more delivery-focused, and has sufficient commercial, digital, project and change management skills. The Cabinet Office is responsible for overseeing implementation of the Plan. The Committee hope that the reforms and enhanced capabilities will help prevent the failures in project and programme delivery it has seen so often, but is concerned, however, that government has not set itself objective measures for assessing the impact of its reforms. If the public is to have confidence in the system for holding permanent secretaries accountable, the Government must be clear about the detail of what each permanent secretary is expected to achieve and how their performance will be assessed. Commercial and contracting skills in the civil service remain weak and underdeveloped, despite the many attempts to address this skills deficiency in recent years. Efforts to fill skills gaps are hindered by real or perceived barriers to recruiting people with the necessary expertise and paying them enough. The process for overseeing major projects lacks real teeth and is seemingly unable to stop ill-conceived or poorly-managed projects. Yet the Government will only be successful in cutting public spending with minimum impact on frontline services if it finds new and innovative ways to deliver its programmes. This innovation can only be implemented if the Civil Service has the necessary skills and competencies.
Universal Credit is the DWP's single biggest programme and enjoys cross-party support, yet its implementation has been extraordinarily poor. The failure to develop a comprehensive plan has led to extensive delay and the waste of a yet to be determined amount of public money. £425 million has been spent so far on the programme. It is likely that much of this, including at least £140 million worth of IT assets, will now have to be written off. Lack of day-to-day control meant early warning signs were missed, with senior managers becoming aware of problems only through ad hoc reviews. Pressure to deliver a programme of this magnitude within such an ambitious timescale created a fortress culture where only good news was reported and problems were denied. There has been a shocking absence of control over suppliers, with the Department failing to implement the most basic procedures for monitoring and authorising expenditure. The pilot programme is not a proper pilot. Its scope is limited and does not deal with the key issues that Universal Credit must address: the volume of claims; their complexity; change in claimants' circumstances; and the need for claimants to meet conditions for continuing entitlement to benefit. The programme will not hit its current target of enrolling 184,000 claimants by April 2014. The Department will have to speed up the later stages of the programme if it is to meet the 2017 completion date but that will pose new risks. Meeting any specific timetable from now on is less important than delivering the programme successfully
In the three years to December 2012, the BBC gave 150 senior managers severance payments totalling £25 million. The BBC paid more salary in lieu of notice than it was obliged to in 22 of the 150 severance payments for senior managers in the three years to December 2012, at a cost of £1.4 million. It is unacceptable for the BBC, or any other public body, to give departing senior managers huge severance payments that far exceed their contractual entitlements. Some of the justifications put forward by the BBC were extraordinary. The Committee welcomes the changes that the BBC's Director General, Lord Hall, has made to cap severance pay. Recommendations include: the BBC should remind its staff that they are all individually responsible for protecting public money and challenging wasteful practices; to protect licence fee payers' interests and its own reputation, the BBC should establish internal procedures that provide clear central oversight and effective scrutiny of severance payments; the BBC Executive and the BBC Trust need to overhaul the way they conduct their business, and record and communicate decisions properly; the BBC Trust should be more willing to challenge practices and decisions where there is a risk that the interests of licence fee payers could be compromised; the BBC Trust and the BBC Executive need to ensure that decision-making is transparent and accountability taken seriously, based on a shared understanding of value for money, with tangible evidence of individuals taking public responsibility for their decisions.
The BBC did a good job in completing the move to Salford on time, within budget and without disruption services. However, the scale of some of the allowances paid to staff to relocate to Salford is difficult to justify. There were 11 cases where the cost of relocating staff exceeded £100,000 per person, with one costing £150,000. The BBC also failed to make a proper record of the exceptions it made to its allowance policy. The longer term success of the move to Salford depends on the BBC achieving the wider benefits it promised. These include reducing the gap between Northern and Southern audiences in the BBC's market share and stimulating economic and other regional benefits, including creating up to 15,000 jobs. The BBC should set clearly defined expectations for its relationships with its commercial partners and make clear that they must pay their fair share of tax. The BBC's decision to enter into a 10-year contract with the Peel Group for studio space at Salford seems to take little account the fast pace of change in the broadcasting industry. The BBC could end up having to pay for studio services it no longer needs and become overly dependent on them. There is also dismay at the abandonment of the BBC's Digital Media Initiative at a cost to the licence fee payer of £100 million. There have been conflicting reports from the BBC and the BBC Trust on what the project did or did not deliver
The Whole of Government Accounts for 2011-12 presents the combined financial activities of some 3,000 organisations. It provides vital data on which Government needs to act. Key issues have been identified, such as the £19.4 billion liability for clinical negligence claims. But it is frustrating to see other issues seemingly ignored in long-term policy making and spending decisions. In one year, the public sector was defrauded of over £20 billion and the tax gap rose to £35 billion. The financial liabilities for dealing with nuclear waste also keep growing. There is room for improvement in the document itself and how it is used. Users find it hard to understand, for example, why the Government debt and deficit highlighted in the WGA differ from those reported in the ONS's National Accounts. Also, by changing definitions in its commentary published alongside the WGA, the Treasury makes it difficult to track changes over time. The Treasury's introduction in the commentary of a new concept of so-called 'direct' expenditure leaves out key costs such as the interest paid on the National Debt. The publicly owned and controlled bodies - such as Network Rail and the taxpayer owned banks - are still being excluded, in defiance of normal accounting rules. The usefulness of the WGA is also being limited by the length of time it takes to produce the document and by poor quality data from some of the bodies. The accounts have again been qualified over the completeness, timeliness and accuracy of the information supplied for schools and academies
Although officially 'dismantled', the National Programme for IT in the NHS continues in the form of separate component programmes which are still racking up big costs. The original contracts with CSC totalled £3.1 billion for the setting up of the Lorenzo care records system in trusts in the North, Midlands and East. Despite the contractor's weak performance, the Department of Health is itself in a weak position in its attempts to renegotiate the contracts. It couldn't meet the contractual obligation to make enough trusts available to take the system. We still don't know what the full cost of the National Programme will be. The Department's latest estimate of £9.8 billion leaves out the future costs of Lorenzo or the potential large future costs arising from the Department's termination of Fujitsu's contract for care records systems in the South of England. Parliament needs to be kept informed not only of what additional costs are being incurred, but also of exactly what has been delivered so far. The Department estimates £3.7 billion of benefits to March 2012, just half of the costs incurred. There is still a long way to go before government departments can honestly say that they have learned and properly applied the lessons from previous contracting. Given the Department's track record with the National Programme, it is very hard to believe that the paperless NHS towards which the Department is working has much chance of being achieved by the target date of 2018
There is at present around £46 billion of outstanding student loans on the Government's books, and this figure is set to rise dramatically to £200 billion by 2042 (in 2013 prices). By 2042 there will be an estimated 6.5 million borrowers of student loans. At the same time estimates for the amount of loans that will not be repaid are also rising and the Government assumes that 35-40% of outstanding loans will never be repaid. That is some £16 billion to £18 billion on the current debt of £46 billion and £70 billion to £80 billion on the estimated value of student loans by 2042. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (the Department) is not doing enough to secure value for money from its collection arrangements. The Department is unable to accurately forecast student loan repayments, and does not have a sufficient understanding of the likely future cost of non-repayment to the taxpayer. The Student Loans Company is not doing enough to ensure that it identifies and collects all the repayments due, given the substantial size of the financial assets involved, and will need to demonstrate value for money from the proposed sale of the student loans book.
In pursuing unpaid tax, HMRC has not clearly demonstrated that it is on the side of the majority of taxpayers who pay their taxes in full. Last year the Department collected less tax in real terms than it managed to collect in 2011-12. This was despite the stated ambition to crack down on tax avoidance. The tax gap as defined by HMRC did not shrink, but in 2011-12 grew to £35 billion. Furthermore, this figure does not include all the tax revenue lost. HMRC pursues tax owed by the smaller businesses but seems to lose its nerve when it comes to mounting prosecutions against multinational corporations. It predicted that it would collect £3.12 billion unpaid tax from UK holders of Swiss bank accounts and this figure was built into budget estimates, but in 2013-14 it has so far secured just £440 million. HMRC aims to make the UK more attractive to business but the incentives to international corporations may also enable them to avoid tax. HMRC needs to strike the right balance between support and enforcement. The implementation of the Real Time Information system has been encouraging overall though some small businesses are continuing to struggle. It is of concern that HMRC is planning from April 2014 to fine companies even though some face continuing challenges. The successful implementation of Universal Credit depends on RTI continuing to work properly but the system does not have full disaster recovery arrangements. System failures could have serious consequences for payments to individuals
The Duchy of Cornwall (the Duchy) delivered a good financial performance in 2012-13, increasing its total income and also its net revenue after taking account of costs. However, the Treasury is not doing enough to scrutinise the Duchy's financial strategy or transactions-it does not independently verify information offered by the Duchy, and details of its approvals for the Duchy's land transactions over £500,000 are not published. The Duchy has a Crown Exemption from tax, but there is no clear understanding of any consequences for its competitors, which are subject to corporation and capital gains tax. The transparency of The Prince of Wales's tax payments is limited by reporting only a combined amount for income tax and VAT. The Duchy's charter rules that each future Duke of Cornwall will be the eldest son and heir of the Monarch, which is out of line with the Succession to the Crown Act 2013.
The rural broadband programme is designed to help get superfast broadband to areas, predominately rural, where commercial broadband infrastructure providers currently have no plans to invest. The Department provides grant funding to 44 bodies (local authorities or groups of authorities) to subsidise them to procure superfast broadband for their areas, and a framework contract for local bodies to use. But the procurement approach failed to deliver meaningful competition. The Department appointed only two bidders - BT and Fujitsu - to the framework contract. By June 2013 all of the 26 contracts agreed by local bodies had gone to BT and, following Fujitsu's March 2013 announcement that it would not be bidding for any more local contracts, BT is likely to win the remaining 18. The Department's assumptions in its 2011 business case about the respective capital contributions of the public and private sectors were wildly inaccurate. BT is committing £207 million less in capital funding than anticipated, while local authorities are contributing £236 million more. BT will eventually benefit from owning assets created from £1.2 billion of public funding. The lack of transparency over BT's costs is a serious risk to value for money, particularly as BT is now the single supplier. The Department has allocated a further £250 million to increase coverage of superfast broadband in 2015-19, but does not yet have a clear plan for reaching 100% coverage. Ofcom's review of the broadband market presents an ideal opportunity to reconsider whether the regulatory regime is doing enough to promote competition.
The Department for International Development is committed to tackling malaria, which affected 219 million people in 2010 and led to 660,000 deaths. However, there is concern that spending by DFID on measures to combat the disease, rising each year to £500 million a year by 2015, may not provide good value as the Department does not have good enough infrastructure everywhere to manage the expenditure effectively. About half of the total number of malaria cases worldwide occur in just two countries - Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo - but the Department has been spreading its resources across 17 countries. It now agrees it should do more work in these two countries but has yet to complete an analysis which would ensure well-informed decisions on where to focus resources. Cuts in funding carry their own risks. On the other hand, long-term commitments can create an equally long-term dependence on UK funding. DfID need to plan and support long term sustainable programmes to combat malaria for which developing countries can take responsibility themselves. DfID must ensure their actions do not have unintended consequences. The Department, for example, the mass distribution of free or subsidised bed nets can damage local businesses selling locally produced nets. It is also essential that the Department make the most of quick, cheap and easy diagnostic tests to increase the number of people who can be quickly diagnosed and effectively treated. This could lead to a halving of the current expenditure on drugs.
Nearly one fifth of consultant posts in emergency departments were either vacant or filled by locums in 2012. Neither the Department nor NHS England have a clear strategy to tackle the shortage of A&E consultants and there is too much reliance on temporary staff to fill gaps. The Committee raised the possibility of paying consultants more to work at struggling hospitals. Greater use in A&E of consultants from other departments could also be made, or mandate that all trainee consultants spend time in A&E, or make A&E positions more attractive through improved terms and conditions. The slow introduction of round-the-clock consultant cover in hospitals - which will not be in place before the end of 2016-17 - is also having a negative impact. More people die as a result of being admitted at the weekend when fewer consultants are in A&E. Changing this relies on the British Medical Association and NHS Employers negotiating a more flexible consultants' contract, and neither the Department nor NHS England has direct control over the timescale or details of these negotiations. Hospitals, GPs and community health services all have a role to play in reducing emergency admissions - but financial incentives to make this happen are not in place. While hospitals get no money if patients are readmitted within 30 days, there are no financial incentives for community and social care services to reduce emergency admissions. Both the Department of Health and NHS England struggled to explain to us who is ultimately accountable for the efficient delivery of local A&E services
The Carrier strike u-turn will cost the taxpayer at least £74 million. When this programme got the green light in 2007, we were supposed to get two aircraft carriers, available from 2016 and 2018, at a cost to the taxpayer of £3.65 billion. We are now on course to spend £5.5 billion and have no aircraft carrier capability for nearly a decade. The MOD rushed into a decision in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Just 18 months later they were forced to admit they had got it wrong and revert to the original choice of aircraft. At the time of the SDSR the Department believed the cost of converting the carriers for the new aircraft would be between £500 million and £800 million. By May 2012 it had realised that the true cost would be as a high as £2 billion. Officials also made basic errors such as forgetting to include the costs of VAT and inflation. There are still concerns now. According to current plans, the early warning radar system essential for protecting the carrier will not be available for operation until 2022, two years after the first carrier and aircraft are delivered and initially operated. And the MOD does not yet have the funding to replace the shipping needed to support the new carrier. To avoid making the same mistakes again the MOD needs to start planning now for the next SDSR in 2015, including making sure that this time it has the right information on which to base decisions
Improving Government Procurement and the Impact of Government's ICT Savings Initiatives, Sixth Report of Session 2013-14, Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence
Improving Government Procurement and the Impact of Government's ICT Savings Initiatives, Sixth Report of Session 2013-14, Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence
Central government spent a total of around £45 billion on buying goods and services in 2011-12, including an estimated £6.9 billion on ICT. Since 2010, the government has introduced a range of procurement reforms designed to save money. These include centralising the procurement of goods and services bought by all departments, such as energy and travel. All ICT spending over £5million must be approved by the Cabinet Office, and a programme to develop ICT infrastructure which can be shared across government organisations has been developed. These reforms are beginning to have an impact: the proportion of spending that goes through central contracts has increased steadily; the ICT initiatives have resulted in some savings; and there are signs that departments are starting to think more intelligently about why and how they use ICT. But the accountability arrangements for centralised procurement remain a barrier; the centre manages the contracts yet departments remain liable for their own spending decisions so they are reluctant to cede authority to the centre. Management information on spending and savings is incomplete, so departments do not always trust the figures on savings claimed. These gaps in accountability and data make it harder to make the case for procurement across central government and in the wider public sector to be centralised. The commitment to localism seems to be at odds with buying through central contracts, and government's desire to give more government business to small firms does not appear to have changed the way large procurements are managed.
Early action in public policy delivery involves the use of resources to tackle causes rather than symptoms. The Government spends nearly £400 billion each year on, for example, health, education, employment, justice and welfare, but huge numbers of people still suffer preventable health problems that are expensive to treat, too many young people leave school with too few qualifications and unable to get a job, too many young offenders commit further crimes when they leave prison, often because of drugs or alcohol addiction, and too many families get locked into benefit dependency. A concerted increase in effective early action could help to deal with the root causes of such problems, benefiting individuals and society and saving the taxpayer billions of pounds each year, but governments have consistently failed to deliver. Early action accounts for only a fraction of annual spending and this spending is not properly co-ordinated. There is no common definition of early action, no central ownership, and little capacity at the centre to drive effective delivery and share good practice. The Treasury is far too focussed on the short term. Robust evidence on the cost-effectiveness of early action and strong incentives for departments to implement early action projects are both vital. Good evidence, however, is thin on the ground and existing incentives do not seem to be working. Addressing social problems effectively also requires that departments work together but, despite some encouraging evidence of joint working amongst departments and at the local level, silo behaviour still predominates.
The first proposals to modernize the Thameslink route and increase capacity were developed by a succession of rail industry sponsors but nothing much happened until the Department for Transport became sponsor in 2005. The Department has delivered the first phase of the infrastructure project under budget and on time. The other two aspects of the programme are going less well. The procurement of new trains through a £1.6 billion PFI deal has taken over three years longer than expected. And the timetable and approach for letting the new franchise have been revised. The planned completion date has been put back to 2018. But meeting the timetable for delivering the new trains will be very demanding and risky. The Committee is also sceptical about using PFI to fund this project. It is alarming that the Department compared the PFI option against only one other private sector option and did not construct a public sector comparator to understand better the relative costs, risks and rewards of choosing a PFI funding route over a public one. Another source of worry is the small size of the Department's core Thameslink team - just five people for a programme of this size and complexity. The impression that there is a scarcity of these skills is reinforced by the apparent need to move the key civil servant leading the Thameslink team, the man whose experience, skills and continuity have been crucial to the delivery of the programme, over to the High Speed 2 team
The New Homes Bonus was introduced as a financial incentive for local authorities to encourage the building of new homes. The scheme is funded from existing local authority grants. £7.5 billion will have been redistributed between councils by 2018-19, so there is a lot of money at stake. It is clearly vital that the incentives work and the Government achieves its aim. It is therefore disappointing that after more than two years of the scheme being up and running, no evaluation is in place and no credible data is available to show whether the scheme is working or not. So far the areas which have gained most money tend to be the areas where housing need is lowest. The areas that have lost most tend to be those where needs are greatest. The Department has yet to demonstrate whether the New Homes Bonus works. Is it helping to create more new homes than would have been built anyway? Is it the best way for Government to use its limited resources to create more homes where they are needed most? Its planned evaluation of the Bonus scheme is now urgent
For many years Governments have sought to breakdown silo working in departments and ensure better integration across departments to ensure more effective services and better value for money. The Cabinet Office and the Treasury are best placed to support and promote integration across the Government, as they are responsible for coordinating policy and allocating monies. However, they are failing to provide the necessary strategic leadership and are not doing enough to tackle the barriers to integration. These include the lack of good information to identify where the Government could do better by joining services, funding arrangements which make it difficult for bodies to invest in joint working, and the risk that Accounting Officers are reluctant to pool budgets in case they lose control and authority. In contrast, the Whole-Place Community Budgets programme has involved local public bodies and central government working together to develop evidence-based plans for new integrated services. Four local areas have analysed in detail the expected costs and benefits of integration and their findings show clear potential for improving outcomes and reducing costs. The Department for Communities and Local Government, which manages the Whole-Place Community Budgets programme, has provided effective support to date. However, if other central government departments are not committed to Whole-Place Community Budgets it may, like similar initiatives in the past, fail to deliver any significant and lasting change. The programme must be evaluated properly to see whether the early promise translates to real change on the ground and improves value for money.
The Department for Transport has yet to present a convincing strategic case for High Speed 2. It has not yet demonstrated that this is the best way to spend £50 billion on rail investment in these constrained times, and that the improved connectivity will promote growth in the regions rather than sucking even more activity into London. The pattern so far has been for costs to spiral - from more than £16 billion to £21 billion plus for phase one - and the estimated benefits to dwindle. The Department has been making huge spending decisions on the basis of fragile numbers, out-of-date data and assumptions which do not reflect real life, such as assuming business travellers do not work on trains using modern technology. The Department has ambitious and unrealistic, plans for passing the Bill for High Speed 2. The timetable is much tighter than for either High Speed 1 or Crossrail, despite the fact High Speed 2 is a much larger programme. Not allowing enough time for preparation undermines projects from the start. A rushed approach contributed to the failure of the InterCity West Coast franchise award. The Department has increased its High Speed rail team, but getting the right mix of skills is challenging and the Department lacks the commercial skills necessary to protect taxpayers' interest on a programme of this size
Tobacco smuggling represents a significant risk to revenues. It undermines initiatives to reduce smoking and it is linked to the activities of organised criminal gangs. HMRC estimates that duty not paid on tobacco smoked in the UK in 2010-11 resulted in revenue losses of around £1.9 billion. Some 9% of cigarettes and 38% of hand-rolling tobacco sold in the UK are estimated to be illicit, yet there were only 265 prosecutions for tobacco smuggling in 2012-13. HMRC's 2010 Spending Review settlement included £25 million over four years to invest in new initiatives to tackle tobacco smuggling. However HMRC was also required to find efficiency savings so total spending on HMRC's tobacco strategy in 2011-12 rose by only £3 million to £68.9 million and fell to £67.4 million in 2012-13. By the end of 2012-13, three of the five Spending Review-funded projects had yielded nothing and the Committee is not convinced that the Spending Review projects will deliver the £900 million benefit, in terms of revenue loss prevented, that HMRC now predicts they will achieve by March 2015. The Department has also failed to challenge UK tobacco manufacturers who turn a blind eye to the avoidance of UK tax by supplying more of their products to European countries than the legitimate market in those countries could possibly require. The tobacco then finds its way back into the UK market without tax being paid. The supply of some brands of hand-rolling tobacco to some countries in 2011 exceeded legitimate demand by 240%.
The report Access To Clinical Trial Information And The Stockpiling Of Tamiflu (HC 295) examines two separate but connected issues; the routine withholding of clinical trial information from doctors and researchers, and the effectiveness of stockpiling of Tamiflu during an influenza pandemic. The full results of clinical trials are being routinely and legally withheld from doctors and researchers by the manufacturers of medicines. The ability of doctors, researchers and patients to make informed decisions about treatments is being undermined. Regulators and the industry have recently made proposals to open up access, but these do not cover the issue of access to the results of trials in the past which bear on the efficacy and safety of medicines in use today. Research suggests that the probability of completed trials being published is roughly 50%. Trials which give a favorable verdict are about twice as likely to be published as trials giving unfavorable
The Border Force's 7,600 staff operate immigration and customs controls at 138 air, sea and rail ports across the UK. It has a budget of £604 million for 2013-14, but is facing cuts. It has had to prioritise passenger checks at the expense of its other duties thereby weakening security at the border by neglecting other duties, such as the examination of freight for illicit goods, and checks in Calais on lorries to detect concealed illegal entrants. It was not able to meet and check up to 90,000 private planes or private boats arriving in the UK each year, leaving the UK border vulnerable and raising issues about resourcing and how priorities are set. The Border Force acknowledged that it had missed 8 of its 19 seizure and detection targets. Recommendations: set out how it will ensure that it delivers its full range of duties across all ports to provide the required level of national security; demonstrate that it can deliver its workload within the resources available; must address the gaps in the data it receives on people arriving in the UK, and the existing data needs to be cleansed to increase the quality, reliability and usefulness of the intelligence generated; set out how, and by when, it will have in place the functional IT systems it needs to underpin the security of the UK border; senior management must provide the organisation with a clear sense of purpose and tackle those barriers which inhibit the flexible and effective deployment of its staff.
Police forces pay widely varying prices for very similar items, which means money is being wasted. The price paid for such basic items as standard-issue boots can vary from £25 to £114, or £14 to £43 for handcuffs. This is even the case where items are identical. It cannot be right that prices paid for the same type of high-visibility jacket varied by as much as 33%. With central funding being cut, police forces must ensure they get best value for money from procurement so that they can focus resources on fighting crime. Forces can make big savings through bulk-buying of items, but have been unable to agree on the most simple things, like how many pockets they should have on their uniforms. The Department cannot persuade enough individual forces to cooperate with its attempts to introduce more centralised procurement, in part because forces are sceptical about the commercial competence of procurement officers working at the centre. National contracts with suppliers are not used by enough forces and do not cover many basic goods and services. Forces' use of the new, online police procurement 'hub' is also woefully below the Home Office's expectations. By 2013, a miniscule 2% of items were being bought through this central hub, against a target of 80% by the end of this Parliament. Police and Crime Commissioners have authority over local spending but, as the Department remains accountable for public money voted by Parliament, it cannot step back from value for money issues
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