In Transparency Of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning And Trade Union Administration Bill (HL 62), the Select Committee on the Constitution raises significant concerns about the content and handling of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill. The Bill, which regulates lobbying and sets rules on expenditure by persons or bodies other than political parties at elections, is due for its second reading in the Lords on 22 October 2013. The report says that effective parliamentary scrutiny is of manifest importance for legislation of constitutional significance. The Committee questions whether the significant lowering of the cap on expenditure at general elections by third parties is justified, given the fundamental constitutional right to freedom of political expression. There has been a lack of consultation by the Government on the proposals, including with the Electoral Commission, as well as the lack of
The constitution is the foundation upon which law and government are built. Yet the United Kingdom has no agreed process for constitutional change. The Committee does not accept that the government should be able to pick and choose which processes to apply when proposing significant constitutional change. It therefore recommends in this report the adoption of a clear and consistent process. These recommendations are not intended to restrict the government's right to initiate constitutional change, but to hold ministers to account for their decisions. The Committee regard it as essential that, prior to the introduction of a bill which provides for significant constitutional change, the government considers the impact of the proposals upon the existing constitutional arrangements, subject the proposals to detailed scrutiny in the Cabinet and its committees, consult widely, publish green and white papers, and subject the bill to pre-legislative scrutiny.The Committee looks at these processes in this report, as well as considering the desirability of public engagement and building consensus. Also the importance of not rushing parliamentary scrutiny of legislation once introduced into Parliament and of conducting comprehensive post-legislative scrutiny of significant constitutional legislation once passed. Also recommended is the minister responsible for a significant constitutional bill in each House set out the processes to which a bill has been subjected in a written ministerial statement. This comprehensive package from which the government should depart only in exceptional circumstances and where there are clearly justifiable reasons for so doing. The Committee believes this approach is pragmatic and achievable, enabling the flexibility of the United Kingdom's current constitutional arrangements to be retained whilst enhancing and underpinning those arrangements
Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill, Fifth Report of Session 2013-14, Report, Together with Formal Minutes and Written Evidence
Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill, Fifth Report of Session 2013-14, Report, Together with Formal Minutes and Written Evidence
While it accepts that there may be a pressing need to reform non-party campaigning, the report Legislative Scrutiny: Transparency Of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning And Trade Union Administration Bill (HL 61, HC 755) calls on the Government to pause the passage of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill to allow for further scrutiny and for further consultation with the Electoral Commission, the Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement and relevant stakeholders. The report recommends that there be more careful consideration of the potential impact on campaigners' rights to free speech and freedom of association. The Committee welcomes the Government improvements made to Part 2 during its passage though the Commons, but suggest that concerns remain. The Joint Committee express concerns regarding: the lack of clarity about the practical effects of the provision in this Part of t
The Committee recognises the appetite in many quarters for fundamental constitutional change and welcomes the Government's renewed focus on constitutional reform and renewal in response to this. It is surprised by the limited provisions in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, and fears that this may be a missed opportunity to make progress in some areas of reform. Any programme introducing fundamental change should be carefully constructed and aimed at a coherent outcome taking into account the widest possible range of views and allowing sufficient time for consideration and response. The Government's approach to constitutional reform has been ad hoc and piecemeal. Reform must underpinned by a set of constitutional principles based on a proper understanding of the position and role of Parliament in relation to the other institutions of state. The report covers the Parliamentary Standards Bill, House of Lords reform, a written constitution, stronger powers to local government, electoral reform, young people's engagement with politics, freedom of information. The Committee cautions that inappropriate handling of bills and proposals for reform specifically designed to restore public trust may further undermine that trust.
Having looked at the Draft Deregulation Bill in some detail and taken evidence from a wide range of witnesses, the Committee does not think it is appropriate for Ministers to be given power to scrap legislation by order on the subjective test that it is 'no longer of practical use'. There is a risk that to give Ministers that power would undermine effective Parliamentary scrutiny. It was also felt unnecessary when the Law Commissions currently have the power to put forward outdated Bills for abolition anyway. The Law Commissions will need to make changes to their working practices in order to produce more frequent and more responsive Statute Law (Repeals) Bills. The Government should work with the Law Commissions to streamline the process for bringing forward these Bills. As for the duty on regulators to have regard to economic growth, whilst this is supported in principle, it is important that it is not used by Government to undermine the independence of regulators in the way it is implemented. It might be helpful if that provision were explicitly included in the Bill
This report considers the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill which would remove the Prime Minister's power to call an election at the time of his choosing, and sets a five year fixed term, subject to the possibility of early dissolution following a vote by the House of Commons. It examines the key issues of the Bill's principals as well as the process by which it was brought forward. The Committee takes the view that the origins and content of the Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand. In the view of the majority of the Committee, the shift from a five year maximum to five year norm would inconsistent with the Government's stated aim of making the legislature more accountable; with existing constitutional practice; and with the practice of the devolved institutions and the clear majority in international legislatures. However the Committee does accept that an elected government should have a full term in which to develop their policies and take their legislative programme through Parliament. It considers a four year term should be adopted for any fixed-term arrangement at Westminster. Potential date clashes with elections to the devolved institutions should also be avoided. Some form of safety valve which would allow for an early election in circumstances such as the government losing the confidence of the Commons or where a political or economic crisis has affected the country is also necessary. The report also makes several specific recommendations for amendments for the Bill.
Government of Wales Bill; Childcare Bill; Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill (HL); Violent Crime Reduction Bill - Government Response; Proposal for the Regulatory Reform (Registered Designs) Order 2006
Government of Wales Bill; Childcare Bill; Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill (HL); Violent Crime Reduction Bill - Government Response; Proposal for the Regulatory Reform (Registered Designs) Order 2006
17th report of Session 2005-06 : Government of Wales Bill; Childcare Bill; Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill (HL); Violent Crime Reduction Bill - Government response; Proposal for the Regulatory Reform (Registered Designs) Order 2006
The Committees report examines parliamentary scrutiny of legislation, focusing on the process for dealing with primary legislation (i.e. the scrutiny of parliamentary bills). This examination is carried out in the light of the Rippon Commission report on the topic (Making the Law produced by the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process) which was published in 1992. Topics discussed include the mechanisms for pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny, the growth of legislation, the dissemination of information and ways of gauging public opinion through consultation. Conclusions drawn by the Committee include concern over the growth in the number and complexity of bills being presented to Parliament without adequate expansion in the capacity to deliver effective scrutiny. The report contains a number of proposals designed to help engender a culture shift away from this unsustainable volume of legislation, towards a culture of justification which encourages government to adopt a more disciplined approach to the introduction of bills based on the objective of effectiveness rather than quantity.
This report examines the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (contained in Cm. 7342-I,II,III, ISBN 9780101734226) to see how far its provisions put into effect the recommendations of its predecessor Committee's 5th report on the constitutional role of the Attorney General (HC 306, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780215035462). The draft Bill makes no substantial change to the current situation. The Attorney General remains both chief legal adviser to the Government and a Government minister. There is no justification for giving the Attorney General power to halt investigations by the Serious Fraud Office. The Committee favours a statutory duty being placed on ministers to observe the rule of law. The accountability of the post remains limited. Public confidence in the post could be enhanced if it were to become the practice to publish all or most of the Attorney General's advice where it is referred to in support of a political case being put forward by the Government. The problem of being both legal adviser and a minister is difficult to resolve, but the Committee believes that transparency require s separating the political functions from the legal functions. The Draft Bill fails to achieve the purpose given to constitutional reform by the Prime Minister: it gives greater power to the Executive; and it does not add to transparency.
A constructive relationship between the three arms of government - the executive, legislature and judiciary - is essential for the effective functioning of the constitution and the rule of law. In recent years the character of these relationships has changed. The Committee has thus taken the opportunity of their annual examination of the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor as a starting point of an assessment of the impact of the changes. After an introduction there are three main sections that examine: the executive and the judiciary; parliament and the judiciary; judiciary, media and the public.
This report finds that serious questions remain unanswered about the Agreement reached between the UK and Scottish Governments on the holding of a referendum on Scottish independence. The Agreement provides for power to hold a referendum on Scottish independence to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament ... The role of the Electoral Commission is important in ensuring that the referendum question is intelligible and neutral. Although the two Governments agreed on the advisory role of the Electoral Commission, the Committee thinks its advice is authoritative and should be followed.
The draft Cabinet Manual was published by the Cabinet Office on 14 December 2010. Its development was first announced in February 2010, when, in a speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research, the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, stated that he had asked the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O'Donnell, "to lead work to consolidate the existing unwritten, piecemeal conventions that govern much of the way central government operates under our existing constitution into a single written document." The concept of a Cabinet Manual appears to have drawn extensively upon experience in New Zealand. The full draft of the Manual (incorporating a revised version of the chapter on elections and government formation) was published with the agreement of the new Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, and after its text had been approved by the Cabinet following consideration by the relevant Cabinet sub-committee and was made subject to public consultation. The Cabinet Secretary has stated that he expects to invite Cabinet to endorse a revised version of the Cabinet Manual in the spring of 2011. This report forms the Select Committee on the Constitution's response to the consultation. It is also intended to inform Members of the House about the issues which arise from the Manual's publication.
In the event of a 'yes' vote in the Scottish independence referendum, MPs for Scottish constituencies, including ministers, should retain their seats in the House of Commons until the day of independence itself. However, they should not negotiate for the rest of the UK on the terms of independence, scrutinise the UK's negotiating team nor ratify a resulting agreement, as their first duty would be to their Scottish constituents rather than the interests of the rest of the UK. The Constitution Committee also says that the wider status of MPs for Scottish constituencies, in terms of their ability to take part in other Commons proceedings not relevant to Scotland, would have to be decided before the 2015 general election if there were a 'yes' vote on 18 September. The Committee concludes that in the event of Scottish independence the remainder of the UK would be the 'continuator' state and so retain its current international status and treaty obligations, as well as UK institutions such as the BBC and the Bank of England. Scotland would become a new 'successor' state and would not have any automatic claim on those institutions. There would be no constitutional or legal requirement for the UK Government to adhere to the Scottish Government's proposed timetable for full independence by March 2016 and that they should not do so if that would undermine the interests of the rest of the UK.
There has been repeated criticism in recent years from a variety of sources about both the quantity and quality of legislation. The Committee's inquiry into Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation has considered these criticisms, analysed the core problems and causes of bad quality legislation, and looked to provide solutions for both the Government and Parliament to improve the quality of legislation. The Scottish Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and National Assembly for Wales have adapted the Westminster model in order to improve the quality of their legislation; it is now the turn of Westminster to look at their processes and adapt them for use here. The Committee has concluded that it would be beneficial for Parliament and the Government to work together to agree standards for what makes good legislation, and as a starting point for discussion publishes a draft Code of Legislative Standards with the report. The Committee also recommends the creation of a Joint Legislative Standards Committee to provide oversight of the Cabinet's Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee's approach to and use of the finalised Code of Legislative Standards, to ensure that the quality standards set out in the Code of Legislative Standards are met. The Committee considers that these recommendations would also improve the quality of constitutional legislation, in particular, by requiring the Government to adopt an agreed test to identify constitutional legislation and thereby improve Parliament's scrutiny of it
This report expresses concern that proposals in the Governments Civil Service Reform Plan, such as allowing ministers to select departmental permanent secretaries from a shortlist and directly to appoint civil servants on fixed-term contracts, could risk undermining the impartiality of the civil service, threaten the principle that appointments are based on merit and make it harder for officials to give honest advice to ministers. Ministers remain constitutionally responsible for everything their departments and their civil servants do. Ministers should not seek to distance themselves from the actions of civil servants, or of special advisers. The Committee also addresses the relationship between parliamentary select committees and the civil service. The report concludes that select committees should have greater access to advice given to ministers by civil servants and that select committees should be able to call former civil servants to give evidence on projects which they used to work on. Other recommendations in the report include that: Parliament should in future be given the chance to scrutinise revised editions of the Osmotherly rules, which provide guidance to civil servants on dealing with select committees; the Osmotherly rules, however, should not be regarded as anything more than guidance for civil servants; when select committees call for specific civil servants to give evidence the Government should normally agree to the request; it should be normal practice for a single senior civil servant to oversee major Government projects from start to finish, in order to ensure better accountability of such projects
In 2011 only 5.1% of judges were Black Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and just 22.3% were women. The Committee stresses that diversity incorporates a number of other elements including disability, sexual orientation, legal profession and social background and rejected any notion that those from under-represented groups are less worthy candidates or that a more diverse judiciary would undermine the quality of our judges. A number of recommendations are made to improve diversity in the judiciary, including: the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice should have a duty to encourage diversity; support of the application of section 159 of the Equalities Act; more opportunities for flexible working and the taking of career breaks; encouraging applications from lawyers other than barristers; and while the Committee does not currently support the introduction of targets for the number of BAME and women judges, it says this should be looked at again in five years. The importance of the independence of the judiciary is also stressed, opting for the Lord Chancellor's power to reject nominations for posts below the High Court to be transferred to the Lord Chief Justice. In order to ensure judges continue to have appropriate independence from Parliament the Committee suggests that a system of formal appraisals should be introduced for judges. The Committee also recommends that the retirement age for the most senior judges should be raised to 75 to prevent a loss of talent in the highest courts and allow more time for women and others who have not followed a traditional career path to reach the highest levels of the judiciary
This report examines the operational and constitutional relationship between government ministers and civil servants, including the issues of ministerial and civil service accountability, the role of ministers in making appointments and the position of special advisers, and whether it is time to give the civil service a proper constitutional footing. It considers what is meant by politicisation, whether politicisation is an entirely negative phenomenon, and, if it is not, what kinds of politicisation would be appropriate in the UK. The Committee notes that the UK civil service in held in high regard, both at home and abroad, and that it is essential that the governing relationship is kept in good repair for effective government and proper accountability. Recent difficulties have highlighted long-standing concerns about the way in which responsibility and accountability are divided in the UK political system, and the report proposes a number of steps aimed at contributing to its good working in combining an independent civil service with political accountability for its operation. Amongst the 27 conclusions and recommendations made, the report calls for a new "public service bargain" underpinned by a governance code which seeks to clarify the respective responsibilities and expectations of ministers and civil servants, including the need for a Civil Service Act to clarify the constitutional position of the civil service.
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