This report finds that the Department for Education has made clear progress in implementing its Free Schools programme by opening 174 such schools since 2010. Many of these Free Schools - new all-ability state schools set up following proposals from different groups and, as academies, funded directly by the Department for Education - have been established quickly and at relatively low cost and the Department's assessment of proposals has improved. However, the primary factor in decision-making has been opening schools at pace, rather than maximizing value for money. The Department is now establishing a wider approach on how it could maximize its benefits in deciding on which schools to approve. At £6.6 million a school, the average unit cost of premises is now more than double the Department's original planning assumption, though the current assumption now reflects actual costs. Because the programme is demand-led, there is uncertainty about types of schools and where they will be located. Most primary Free Schools are in areas that need extra school places but there have been no applications in half of all districts with high or severe forecast need for school places. Overall, Free Schools opened with three-quarters of planned admissions in their first year, but there have been significant variations between schools. Oversight of the schools has evolved, but serious financial management and governance concerns highlighted in two recent investigations by the Education Funding Agency highlight the risks in some schools, and the need systematically to address lessons learned as the programme develops.
The Charity Commission did not properly consider whether The Cup Trust met the key legal requirement of being within the jurisdiction of the High Court of England and Wales before registering it as a charity in 2009, and was slow in handling the case. Earlier this year, the Public Accounts Committee concluded that The Cup Trust had been set up as a tax avoidance scheme. The Cup Trust submitted claims for £46 million Gift Aid on £176 million of payments from participants to the scheme, but gave just £152,292 to charitable causes between April 2009 and March 2013. The Gift Aid claims have not been paid. The Charity Commission did not give sufficient consideration to issues which might have enabled it to open a statutory inquiry into the Cup Trust in March 2011, and that it was slow to appreciate the potential impact of the case on public confidence in charities, which it has a statutory duty to increase. The Charity Commission did not take sufficient account of the scale and nature of the tax avoidance scheme in its case strategy, was narrowly focused on the legal position and paid insufficient attention to the wider issues of public detriment, which it would have been appropriate to pursue further.
Despite a renewed focus by government on the financing challenges facing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), there is scope for the range of funding initiatives currently in place to work as a more unified programme, according to the National Audit Office. Preparations for the Business Bank, which was publicly launched in October 2013 but will start operating as an independent entity in 2014, prompted the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) to re-examine the nature of the finance problems facing SMEs. These include a possible need by SMEs by 2017 for an additional £22 billion over and above the finance available to them. BIS and HM Treasury are able to draw on an increasingly strong body of data to inform decision-making, including Bank of England reports on credit conditions, the SME business barometer and aggregated information from the British Bankers' Association on loan applications and approvals. At present, although BIS and HM Treasury both have teams dealing with 'enterprise' policy, there is no formal research programme joining the Departments with other departments, such as HMRC, with an interest in SMEs. One of the Treasury's priorities is to support the development of new routes to finance for SMEs, while BIS schemes target specific parts of the market. To date, the Departments have not articulated clearly enough what the various schemes are expected to deliver as a programme. The NAO found that BIS-led schemes such as the Enterprise Finance Guarantee and Start-Up Loans provided direct support to around 5,900 firms in 2012-13, and the current schemes are generally performing positively in terms of meeting the largely activity-based success measures set for them. BIS has also taken steps to provide better explanations to SMEs on the options available to them for financing their business, but raising the profile of the help available will be a challenge for the Business Bank.
While arrangements for identifying and testing for risks to food safety are relatively mature and effective, similar arrangements for the authenticity of food are not. Government has failed to identify the possibility of adulteration of beef products with horsemeat despite indications of heightened risk. A split in responsibilities for food policy between the Food Standards Agency and two Whitehall departments in 2010 has led to confusion among stakeholders about the role of the Agency and Defra in responding to food authenticity incidents. Local authorities said they continue to be unclear on whom to contact in certain areas of food policy. Local authorities reported 1,380 cases of food fraud in 2012 - up by two-thirds since 2010. The Government recognizes that it needs to address weaknesses in its intelligence gathering and sharing and its understanding of opportunities for fraud throughout the modern food chain. Only one-third of English local authorities record laboratories' test results on the Agency's national database. The total number of food samples tested by official control laboratories in England has gone down by a quarter since 2009-10. Although a substantial amount of testing is carried out by private food businesses, public authorities do not know the amount, nature or results of these tests. Among the NAO's recommendations is that some resource should be shifted from such activities as the inspection of slaughter houses to the checking of the manufacture of processed meat products and the long supply chains involved, but this will require European agreement.
Government has no overall coherent strategy for confiscation orders and this fundamentally undermines the process for confiscating assets. In 2012-13, 673,000 offenders were convicted of a crime, many of which had a financial element, yet only 6,400 confiscation orders were set. The annual amount of fraud perpetrated by criminals in England and Wales has been estimated by the National Fraud Authority as some £52 billion. On this basis, it has been further estimated that, out of every £100 generated by the criminal economy, £99.65 was kept by the perpetrators. Without the government knowing what constitutes the overall success of its policy, the bodies involved have no way of knowing which criminals or court cases should be prioritized for confiscation activity. Action was not taken early enough in many cases and this, together with out-of-date ICT systems, data errors and poor joint working, hampers the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcing confiscation orders. Throughout the criminal justice system, there is insufficient awareness of the proceeds of crime and its potential impact. Confiscation orders have a low profile within law enforcement agencies, with low awareness of financial legislation outside specialist teams. This results in many cases not being considered for confiscation. Owing to a lack of data and agreed success criteria, it is impossible to make meaningful cost-benefit assessments of the enforcement of different orders. Where confiscation orders are made and not paid, the main sanctions do not work. The Courts and Tribunals Service found that in 2012, only two per cent of offenders paid in full once the sentence was imposed.
In this memorandum 'Managing government suppliers', the NAO welcomes the fact that the Cabinet Office is now asserting government's position with contractors in way that its scale as a customer merits. Specifically, this has enabled government to get greater value from contracting and has sent signals that government is willing to be tough on underperformance. However, the Cabinet Office still faces a number of challenges in developing a more mature approach. It is currently focused on short-term savings and has adopted a robust approach with departments and suppliers, which has enabled it to report significant savings from contract renegotiations. However, this approach will become harder over time, and risks missing out on achieving longer-term value for money through innovation and investment. There is a balance to be struck between tough negotiations and maintaining relationship with suppliers in the long term, if government is to maintain competition in public sector markets. The Cabinet Office is seeking to reform commercial practice across Government with the development of the Crown Commercial Service. There is a risk that the ambitions are not matched by the right resources, capability and information. It has gaps in commercial experience and expertise below senior levels, while its information on its 40 strategic suppliers is inconsistent and incomplete. A related report 'The role of major contractors in the delivery of public services' (HC 810, session 2013-14, ISBN 9780102987027) sets out some of the benefits that can be achieved through contracting but highlights issues that deserve greater public scrutiny.
In the memorandum 'The role of major contractors in the delivery of public services' the NAO sets out some of the benefits that can be achieved through contracting but highlights three issues that deserve greater public scrutiny. First, it raises questions about the way public service markets operate. This includes the need for scrutiny over whether public service contracts are sufficiently competitive and whether the rise of a few major contractors is in the public interest. Secondly, it highlights the issue of whether contractors' profits reflect a fair return. Understanding contractors' profits is important to ensure that their interests are aligned properly with that of the taxpayer. But transparency over rewards that contractors make is at present limited. Thirdly, the report asks how we know that contractors are delivering services to the high standards expected. In particular, government needs to ensure that large companies with sprawling structures are not paying 'lip-service' to control and that they have the right culture and control environment across their group. This requires transparency over contractors' performance and the use of contractual entitlement to information, audit and inspection. This should be backed up by the threat of financial penalties and being barred from future competitions if things are found to be wrong. A related report 'Managing government suppliers' (HC 811, session 2013-14, ISBN 9780102987034) examines the way the Cabinet Office is working to improve government's management of strategic suppliers.
The current strategy for the prison estate in England and Wales has provided good quality accommodation, suitable for decades to come for prisoners with a wide range of security categorizations. The strategy is also a significant improvement in value for money over the short-term and reactive approaches of the early and middle 2000s. However, the strategy has resulted in the closure of several prisons that were performing well, and their performance has not yet been matched by new establishments. Some prisoners still routinely share cells, some of them in overcrowded conditions. The strategy understandably focuses on cost reduction and, by 2015-16, it will have resulted in total savings of £211 million, with further savings accruing at a rate of £70 million a year thereafter. However, decision-making has sometimes traded good quality and performance for greater savings. The Ministry of Justice and NOMS use good forecasts of prisoner numbers and have good contingency plans to help them implement changes to the estate, for example responding effectively to an unexpected spike in prisoner numbers after the riots in 2011. NOMS could free up more spare capacity if prisoners serving indeterminate sentences had more access to accredited courses the completion of which might reduce their risk of causing harm sufficiently to allow the Parole Board to release them. The report also points out that the Home Office removes over 1,000 foreign national offenders from the UK every quarter but, for a number of reasons, is currently removing fewer than in 2009
The Department for Communities and Local Government worked together effectively with local authorities to ensure Council Tax support was introduced on schedule. Not all local authorities' support schemes, however, will achieve the expected objectives outlined by the Department before the policy was implemented. The Department reduced the funding for Council Tax support by 10 per cent, equating to a saving for central government of £414 million in 2013-14. Its 'localization' of Council Tax support required local authorities to design their own local support schemes. Most local authorities have reduced support for claimants to meet some of their funding reduction. Seventy-one per cent of local authorities have introduced schemes that require working age claimants to pay at least some council tax regardless of income. Most local authorities also used new powers to charge more Council Tax on some properties, such as second and short-term empty homes, to help offset the funding reduction for Council Tax support. The National Audit Office found that all of a sample of 207 local authorities had taken advantage of these additional powers, raising an estimated additional income of £178 million. The Department expects local authorities to implement schemes which protect vulnerable people and improve work incentives. The task for local authorities to meet these different objectives whilst managing their funding reduction is complex, and may require trade-offs. The Department takes the view that scheme designs are local decisions and it does not plan to intervene in local authorities' scheme choices
Many emergency admissions to hospital are avoidable and many patients stay in hospital longer than is necessary. Improving the flow of patients through the system will be critical to the NHS's ability to cope with future winter pressures on urgent and emergency care services. At a time when NHS budgets are under significant pressure, the number of emergency admissions to hospitals is continuing to rise, albeit at a slower rate than in the past. More patients attending major A&E departments are now being admitted to hospital. In 2012-13, over a quarter of all patients attending major A&E departments were admitted, up from 19 per cent in 2003-04. The rise in emergency admissions is dominated by patients who stay less than two days (short-stay) in hospital. The main factors behind the increase in emergency admissions include the slowness with which the NHS has developed effective alternatives to admission to hospital. There are many local initiatives to prevent avoidable emergency admissions but limited evidence on what works. A lack of alignment between hospitals and community and local services in the hours they are open compromises efforts to avoid out-of- hours hospital admissions and prolongs the length of stay of inpatients. Among the NAO's recommendations is the need for both short-and long-term strategies to address staffing shortages in A&E. The Department and NHS England should also address barriers to seven-day working in hospitals, such as the consultants' contract, which gives consultants the right to refuse to work outside 7am to 7pm, Monday to Friday
Financial support from the Government to the Sovereign was consolidated from 1 April 2012 into the Sovereign Grant and the existing Civil List reserve fund was transferred into a Sovereign Grant Reserve. The Sovereign Grant Act 2011 set the initial Grant for 2012-13 at £31 million. For subsequent years the level of the Grant is based on a percentage, initially 15 per cent, of the net income of the Crown Estates in the year two years prior to the funding year. Following this formula the Grant is set to rise to £36.1 million in 2013-14 and is likely to be £37.9 million in 2014-15. The Act also introduced new arrangements to strengthen the accountability and scrutiny of the Household for the spending on The Queen's official business. The Comptroller and Auditor General is the statutory auditor of the Sovereign Grant and Sovereign Grant Reserve accounts which are laid before Parliament. The first Annual Report and Accounts for the Sovereign Grant and Reserve Fund, covering 2012-13, were published on 27 June 2013 (HC 212, session 2013-14, ISBN 9780102984248), and form the basis of this memorandum. The memorandum for the Public Accounts Committee sets out: the changes to the Household's funding arrangements and the introduction of the Sovereign Grant; the calculation of the Sovereign Grant, the Reserve Fund and the impact on the Household's management of its finances; the Household's financial management of the Sovereign Grant.
This report sets out the events surrounding the Ministry of Justice's process in 2013 to retender its electronic monitoring contracts, currently with private contractors G4S and Serco, and its subsequent decision to commission a forensic audit of the contracts by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The Department is in dispute with G4S and Serco over the amount of money by which the Department may have been overcharged for electronic monitoring services under the current contracts. Both contractors are also now subject to a criminal investigation by the Serious Fraud Office. The Department believes that both providers charged for work that had not taken place, in a way that was outside what was set out in the contracts for the electronic monitoring of offenders. PwC's estimate is that the potential overcharge may amount to tens of millions of pounds. The NAO's report includes examples of disputed billing practices which show that, in some instances, both contractors were charging the Department for monitoring fees for months or years after electronic monitoring activity had ceased; over similar timescales where electronic monitoring never occurred; and multiple times for the same individual if that person was subject to more than one electronic monitoring order concurrently. G4S has said that it intends to offer the Ministry £23.3 million in credit notes in respect of issues it has identified to date. Serco has stated that it will refund any amounts that it agrees represents overcharging. The Department has not currently agreed to any refund offers made by the providers.
In establishing the Levy Control framework, the Government has recognised the importance of monitoring and controlling the considerable cost of energy schemes that consumers fund through their energy bills. The NAO concludes that the Levy Control Framework is a valuable tool for supporting control of the costs to consumers that arise from the Government's energy policies, and has prompted the Department of Energy and Climate Change to monitor actual and expected costs to consumers from the schemes it covers. However, the operation of the Framework has not been fully effective in some key areas. Spending and outcomes have not been linked in deliberations by the joint Treasury and departmental levy control board and reporting on Framework schemes has not supported effective public and parliamentary scrutiny of the overall costs and outcomes from levy-funded spending. As consumer-funded spending on energy policies increases and new schemes are introduced, the Department needs to assure Parliament and the public that it has robust arrangements to monitor, control and report on consumer-funded spending, and the outcomes it is intended to secure. The spending cap under the Levy Control Framework is set to rise from £2 billion in 2011-12 to £7.6 billion in 2020-21 (in 2011-12 prices). By establishing this cap, the Department has provided greater certainty for investors. The NAO's report highlights that the Framework does not cover the consumer-funded Energy Companies Obligation scheme and that it is not yet clear whether it will cover the new Capacity Market including electricity demand reduction measures.
The Government's first mutual joint venture MyCSP, which administers pensions for 1.5 million civil service employees, has the potential to be good value for money with a projected saving of 25 per cent on costs after seven years. However, the complexity of the deal combined with poor quality of data, initial planning, and infrastructure meant that it took the Cabinet Office longer than intended to finalise the transaction. Furthermore, the Department and MyCSP still face many large challenges in transforming the service. The biggest challenge is improving data to support the implementation of the new 2015 pension scheme. The deal is projected by the Department to reduce the cost of administration by 25 per cent, to £13 per member per year by 2019. Scheme members should receive a better quality of service as a result of significant investment in the business by the private sector partner, Equiniti Paymaster, and a payment mechanism that penalizes MyCSP if it misses the service standard levels in the contract. The deal also means that MyCSP now has a credible plan to meet the challenges of the 2015 civil service pension reforms, including data improvement. The Department did not initially make the most of the opportunities to learn from this transaction as a pathfinder, but has now reviewed the lessons learned from executing the transaction and has put in place an evaluation strategy. The Cabinet Office must now ensure it evaluates the longer-term comparative performance of MyCSP and captures and disseminates the lessons learnt from the deal.
Since the Department's 2007 Maternity Matters strategy, there has been improvement in maternity services. However, there is wide variation between trusts in performance. The Department did not fully consider the implications of delivering its ambitions and has failed to demonstrate that it satisfactorily considered the achievability and affordability of implementing the strategy. Nor has it monitored national progress against it. In 2011, one in 133 babies was stillborn or died within several days of birth. The mortality rate has fallen over time, but comparisons with the other UK nations suggest scope for further improvement. Trusts paid £482 million for maternity clinical negligence cover in 2012-13, equating to around a fifth of spending on maternity services. The level of consultant presence has substantially improved but over half of maternity units (including all of the largest units) do not meet recommended levels. The NHS is also not meeting a widely recognised benchmark of one midwife to 29.5 births. The government has commissioned more places to study midwifery, but it is unclear whether these will be enough. Meeting the benchmark would require around 2,300 additional midwives nationally. In terms of choice of place of birth, 79 per cent of women are currently within a 30-minute drive of both an obstetric and midwifery-led unit, compared with 59 per cent in 2007. However, choice is restricted where units have to close because of a lack of physical capacity or midwives. Over a quarter of units closed for half a day or more between April and September 2012
The Money Advice Service assumed responsibility for commissioning face-to-face debt advice in 2012, and has improved the standards of advice throughout the sector. The Service provided 158,000 face-to-face debt advice sessions in 2012-13, an increase of 58 per cent on the previous year. This report underlines how vital money advice is for some consumers to make effective decisions. 36 per cent of consumers in the UK sometimes or often run out of money before payday and the proportion of people with savings has decreased from 75 per cent in 2006 to 62 per cent in 2013. Although the Service adopted a 'digital first' strategy, evidence is mixed that the digital platform is meeting consumers' needs. Over 2 million consumers used its website in 2012-13, and 195,000 accessed its phone, webchat and face-to-face money advice channels. However, it is not clear that the website is directing those who need more assistance towards phone or face-to-face channels. In addition, an estimated 17 per cent of households still lack access to the internet, which might mean that some of those in most need of money advice cannot access the Service. The proportion of consumers using a tool on the website, such as a budget planner or savings calculator, has increased from 13 per cent in June 2012 to 25 per cent in July 2013. The Service has not yet completed the development of a mobile platform, despite the fact more than half the adult population now use a mobile phone to access the internet.
Since the UK Border Force was separated from the UK Border Agency, it has met some important objectives such as reducing queuing times. To provide value for money, however, it needs to perform effectively and in a sustained way across the full range of its activities. Border Force officers reported that staff shortages and the requirement to prioritize full passenger checks while managing queue times often prevented their performing other important duties, such as checking freight. In addition, during the first months of 2012-13, the Border Force's performance in some of its activities, such as seizures of cigarettes and counterfeit goods, entry refusals and detecting forgeries, was below target. The Home Office's internal auditors confirmed that the 2012 Olympics and wider resourcing issues had an effect on the Border Force's ability consistently to resource customs controls. The Border Force's workforce lacks organizational identity. The Border Force consists largely of officers who previously worked in separate customs and immigrations agencies, who typically still identify themselves as 'ex-customs' or 'ex-immigration'. To meet the demands the Border Force is recruiting more staff. Despite this, there are continuing staff shortages at the border. The Border Force has not established whether it has the resources it needs to deliver all its objectives. It needs to deploy staff flexibly to respond to its competing demands, but is prevented from doing this as efficiently as possible because almost a fifth of its workforce is employed under terms and conditions that restrict working hours to fixed periods during the week
The Department's work to address the affordability gap around the equipment budget and costs appears to have had a positive effect. However, there remain risks to affordability, most significantly around the half of the budget relating to equipment support costs which were not subjected these to the same level of detailed scrutiny as the procurement costs. The Department also does not understand the implications of its £1.2 billion underspend on the Equipment Plan in 2012-13. With the exception of the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, there have been no significant cost increases and only minimal in-year delays. In the last year, there was a net increase in costs of £708 million in respect of the 11 projects in the review. The main contribution to this was a £754 million increase in the cost of carriers. Three of the projects the report examined experienced delays during the year, together amounting to 17 months. A third of projects this year reported delays compared to over half of the projects in last year's report. However, the NAO is unable to report on timings for two of the 11 projects - Lightning II and Specialist Vehicles -because the Department has not yet given final approval. This report also includes an examination of the MOD's Complex Weapons Programme, which aims to achieve net financial benefits of £1.2 billion over ten years. Noting that these benefits have already been 'banked', if there are delays or cancellations some of these benefits may be lost
In 2010, the Government set out a new approach for local economic growth, in the White Paper Local growth: realising every place's potential. This involved the closure of the Regional Development Agencies and their replacement with new local growth organizations and funds, such as Local Enterprise Partnerships and the Regional Growth Fund. Three years on from this initial announcement, the new Local Enterprise Partnerships and Enterprise Zones are taking shape. However, Local Enterprise Partnerships are making progress at different rates. The Growing Places Fund, Enterprise Zones and the Regional Growth Fund have also been slow to create jobs and face a significant challenge to produce the number of jobs expected. The estimate of jobs to be created by Enterprise Zones by 2015 has dropped from 54,000 to between 6,000 and 18,000. There is also no plan to measure outcomes or evaluate performance comparably across the range of different local growth programmes. Departments cannot therefore show value for money across the programme of local growth initiatives or be sure about where to direct their resources. The new local programmes were not established in time to avoid a significant dip in local growth funds and jobs created. Direct central government spending on local economic growth through the initiatives fell from £1,461 million in 2010-11 to £273 million in 2012-13, but will rise to £1,714 million in 2014-15. Central government needs to plan such reorganizations more effectively, to ensure that sufficient capacity is in place both centrally and locally to oversee initiatives and that accountability is clear
This report concludes that the Department for Work and Pensions has not achieved value for money in its early implementation of Universal Credit. The Department was overly ambitious in both the timetable and scope of the programme, took risks to try to meet the short timescale and used a new project management approach which it had never before used on a programme of this size and complexity. It was unable to explain how it originally decided on its ambitious plans or evaluated their feasibility. Nor did it have any adequate measures of progress. Over 70 per cent of the £425 million spent to date has been on IT systems, and £34 million of its new IT systems has been written off. The existing systems offer limited functionality - the current IT system lacks a component to identify potentially fraudulent claims so that the Department has to rely on multiple manual checks on claims and payments. Problems with the IT system have delayed national roll-out of the programme, which will reduce the expected benefits of reform and - if the 2017 completion date remains - increase risks by requiring the rapid migration of a large volume of claimants. The source of many problems has been the absence of a detailed view of how Universal Credit is meant to work. In addition, poor control and decision-making undermined confidence in the programme and contributed to a lack of progress. The Department has particularly lacked IT expertise and experienced frequent changes in senior management.
Government and regulators do not know by how much overall expected new investment by the private sector in infrastructure will increase household utility bills and whether bills will be affordable. The National Audit Office has recommended that the Treasury ensure there are mechanisms to assess the cumulative impact of infrastructure investment on consumer bills. This report, which focuses on the energy, water and, to a lesser extent, telecoms sectors, recognizes that the UK requires significant investment in new infrastructure. The Treasury expects that over two-thirds of the £310 billion worth of the planned infrastructure it has identified will be privately financed, owned and operated but paid for by consumers through their utility bills. High levels of expected new investment in infrastructure mean that energy and water bills may rise significantly from current levels. The available projections suggest that increases in both energy and water bills will continue to outstrip inflation, on average, up to 2030. This is particularly concerning, given that energy and water bills have increased significantly in recent years, while incomes have not. The affordability of utility bills can be assessed only in the context of wider pressures on household expenditure, including an understanding of all household bills as well as potential trends in household incomes. There is a range of schemes to support vulnerable consumers but without a fuller understanding of affordability in the round, government and regulators cannot assess the adequacy of these schemes, now or in the future
Until the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has a robust strategy for maximizing the collection performance of student loans and improves its information on borrowers, it will not be well-placed to secure value for money. BIS forecasts that the total value of outstanding student loans will increase from £46 billion in 2013 to approximately £200 billion by 2042, in 2013 prices. The number of borrowers due to repay is projected to increase from 3 million in 2012-13 to 6.5 million by 2042. The loan book is therefore becoming a substantial public asset. BIS and its collection partners HM Revenue & Customs and the Student Loans Company (SLC) work together in a joined-up way. In 2012-13, they collected £1.4 billion in student loan repayments, at a cost of £27m. BIS needs to make better use of data to support its collection strategy and improve its understanding of where it could invest to maximise the collection value of the loan book. In designing how student loans would work, BIS anticipated that a proportion of the loans would not be repaid. However, BIS has not set an annual target for the amount to be collected because repayments are affected by graduate earnings and economic factors outside its direct control. Annual repayment forecasts are consistently higher than amounts collected. While many borrowers may not be in employment, BIS and the SLC have carried out little analysis to establish how many may be working overseas or the level of repayments that may be missed
On 3 July 2013, the Committee of Public Accounts took evidence on the use of confidentiality clauses and special severance payments across government. The Committee decided to hold a further hearing to allow time for the Treasury to develop proposals to improve government's approach to the use of compromise agreements within the public sector, and the National Audit Office to complete further work on the use of confidentiality clauses and severance payments in the culture, media and sport sector, defence sector and the health sector. This report presents the results of testing overall, including items that remained outstanding after the NAO's original report. Specific highlight particularly the need for: better guidance on the use of confidentiality clauses and special severance payments; and improved transparency and oversight to identify and address patterns of behaviour. The Treasury had approved some severance payments, where business cases refer to failure or inappropriate behaviour. Severance terms, however, were approved because legal advice set out that the individual would be likely to win an award in an employment tribunal and settlements would probably be cheaper and quicker. This may be valid for individual cases, but it may not be true for the wider public sector. Examples were also found where severance payments were agreed in response to failure to comply with internal policies and procedures. In three cases in the defence sector, managers had not followed the internal policy in relation to the employment of staff. As a result, severance payments were approved to avoid claims for compensation
The Charity Commission is not regulating charities effectively and there is a gap between what the public expects of the Commission and what it actually does. The NAO has concluded that the Commission does not do enough to identify and tackle abuse of charitable status. Between 2007-08 and 2013-14, the Commission's annual budget fell 40 per cent in real terms to £22.7 million but the number of main registered charities has remained fairly constant at around 160,000. In response to budget cuts, the Commission has reviewed how it works and successfully reduced demand for its services, but it has not identified what budget it would need to regulate effectively. The Commission makes little use of its enforcement powers, for example suspending only two trustees and removing none in 2012-13. And it can be slow to act when investigating regulatory concerns. The NAO found cases where periods of several months passed during which the Commission took no action. Furthermore, the Charity Commission does not take tough enough action in some of the most serious regulatory cases. It is also reactive rather than proactive, making insufficient use of the information it holds to identify risk. The Charity Commission needs to think radically about alternative ways of meeting its objectives with constrained resources. It also needs to make greater use of its statutory powers in line with its objective of maintaining confidence in the sector; and develop an approach to identify and deal with those few trustees who deliberately abuse charitable status. This report publishes alongside another NAO report, the Cup Trust.
Older ICT systems that are critical for the delivery of key public services ('legacy ICT') expose departments to risks which must be understood and managed. A particular risk is that departments dependent on legacy ICT will find it more challenging to achieve the business transformation envisaged by the Government in its digital strategy. Some £480 billion of the government's operating revenues and at least £210 billion of non-staff expenditure such as pensions and entitlements are reliant to some extent on legacy ICT. Good practice in managing legacy ICT as an integrated part of public service delivery is therefore crucial to maintaining the performance of these services. The reliance of government on legacy ICT is highlighted by the NAO in a number of case studies. The common risks seen by the NAO in its case studies include a higher vulnerability of legacy ICT to security problems; being locked in to uncompetitive support arrangements with a single supplier; a shortage of skills to maintain and support legacy ICT; the proliferation of manual processes as legacy ICT systems have to cope with changing business needs; the cost of new business processes to compensate for missing functionality in the legacy ICT system; and increased complexity caused by additional interfaces with other systems, driving up costs.
Network Rail owns most of Britain's 2507 stations and is responsible for their structural repair and renewal. It also operates and manages 17 large stations, known as managed stations. It leases the remainder, known as franchised stations, to 22 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) responsible for station maintenance, cleaning and operations. The Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) sets minimum standards, including facilities and services required at franchised stations, monitors TOCs' compliance with requirements and helps fund stations' operation and improvement. In this report, NAO examines whether passengers are satisfied with station facilities and services and whether station requirements are being met, the barriers to station improvement and what is being done to overcome them. There has been a little improvement in passengers' satisfaction over recent years. National Passenger Survey data show that satisfaction increased from 59 per cent to 63 per cent between 1999 and 2005, but the greatest levels of dissatisfaction are with the more than 2000 small and medium-sized stations which are unstaffed, or staffed for only part of the day, and which have few facilities. But there is a gap between rising passenger expectations on the one hand, and value for money and what the government and the industry can afford to spend on the other. Funding constraints constitute the biggest barrier to further improvement. Having originally envisaged spending £225 million on new facilities at 980 stations in its Modern Facilities at Stations programme, the SRA shrank the programme to £25 million and 68 stations to match the amount of money the Department for Transport made available.
This joint report by the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission examines the different ways in which public services are delivered, the nature of the links between partners in public service delivery chains, and how these can be made more efficient and effective. The report draws its conclusions in part from analysis of reports regarding three major Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets relating to affordable housing, increasing bus use, and halting the rise in child obesity. It recommends that government departments and their delivery partners use a self-assessment list of 12 strategic questions to help them understand their capacity to deliver efficient and effective public services, covering issues such as risk management, strategic funding plans and the need for a robust evidence base.
Government targets are increasingly concerned with the outcome of services instead of the inputs. These targets can involve partnerships between national, regional and local bodies as well as private companies, which is known as the delivery chain. The Audit Commission, and National Audit Office have combined to look at the local and national aspects of three targets: Bus services; affordable housing; childhood obesity. This report looks at bus usage, which is likely to meet its target of a 10% increase by 2010. However this is mainly due to the increase in London, where there is a much clearer delivery chain and tighter regulation.
This NAO report examines sick leave in the National Probation Service, which was running at 12.3 days per person in the 2004-05 period at a cost of £31.6 million. A number of recommendations have been set out as follows. That the National Probation Directorate should agree with the Chief Probation Officer a consistent minimum standard for collecting and reporting sickness absence data in their areas. This in turn could be used to produce comparative analyses, and offer a basis to diagnose the causes of sickness absence. An upgrade in some areas of their information technology systems should occur, so that better management information can be compiled. All probation areas should implement the mandatory elements of the national policy on sickness absence. All Chief Officers should review their action plans for reducing sickness absence. Sickness absence should be managed effectively but sympathetically, by including return to work interviews, along with a means of distinguishing between avoidable and unavoidable sickness absences, and addressing the culture of absenteeism. Long term sickness absence should be reviewed as a matter of urgency. Policies relating to work/life balance should be implemented nationally.
Maintaining prisons at a safe and acceptable standard is an expensive and complex undertaking. This National Audit Office investigation of maintenance and upkeep of the UK prisons finds that the National Offender Management Service Executive Agency (NOMS) has obtained good value for money from its expenditure on prison maintenance. In spite of an increasing prisoner population - over 73,000 people held in custody in public sector prisons in England and Wales in 2007-08 - spending has been kept at around £320 million in recent years. Nevertheless, the Agency Service could improve its plans for maintaining assets over their economic life and how it manages risks to the effective utilisation of its assets.
The National Asylum Support Service provides accommodation for asylum seekers who are destitute, or likely to become destitute. There work is demand led and the increase in asylum applications between 2001 and 2003 caused considerable problems. Although the system coped with the pressure, a subsequent ministerial review concluded that the system needed to be improved. This report looks at the Service to see if lessons have been learnt and its approach has been modified to provide a better quality service at a more economical cost.
The Government's first sale of shares in Lloyds Banking Group in September 2013 was managed effectively and provided value for money. United Kingdom Financial Investments (UKFI) thoroughly reviewed available options for a sale. It chose a process that maintained flexibility and allowed the sale to take place quickly, once a decision to sell had been taken. Taking account of market conditions and the fact that this was the first of a series of sales, UKFI decided to minimise risk by selling the shares only to institutional investors. Ahead of the sale, UKFI commissioned an extensive analysis of the value of the shares and priced the sale at 75p a share, a 3 per cent discount to the closing market price of just over 77p ahead of the offer. Demand in the sale from institutional investors exceeded the number of shares on offer by some 2.8 times. However, over three-quarters of this demand came from institutions seen as shorter-term investors. If these investors sold their shares soon after the sale, there was risk of a weak aftermarket and negative perceptions affecting future sales. Following the sale, the market price of the shares has held steady. Taking account of the cost of borrowing the money to buy the shares, there was a shortfall for the taxpayer of at least £230 million. This shortfall should be seen as part of the cost of securing the benefits of financial stability during the financial crisis, rather than any reflection on the sale process.
The 2012 Budget, announced the 'ambition' to double the value of exports by 2020 to £1 trillion a year. However current performance has been flat over the last two years and, to meet the Government's ambition, exports will have to grow by 10 per cent year on year. Many factors which affect export performance are outside the control of the FCO and UKTI, such as exchange rates and political and economic changes overseas. While the UK outperforms Germany, France and Italy in the Gulf, it has not traditionally performed as well in many other emerging markets, such as Russia, Brazil, Turkey and China. Success here is essential if the Government is to meet its target. There is a joint UKTI-FCO Board to oversee coordination of their work overseas but currently there is no further joint accountability for planning, monitoring and delivery against their goal. Their initial responses to the government's objectives have not been sufficiently coordinated. UKTI is now increasingly looking to measure actual business outcomes rather than volume of activity. Among the NAO's recommendations is that the FCO improve how it measures and monitors the impact of its activities supporting exports so that it can demonstrate that its spending of some £420 million a year yields tangible results. UKTI is piloting the use of external business partners to provide some of its services, and needs to implement lessons from the evaluation of its pilot initiative to use external partners if it decides to roll it out
Gift Aid provides an important source of income for many charities but it is important that they are properly administered. There is not enough evidence to conclude that reliefs on donations in their current form, and the way they are implemented, provide value for money. First, there is insufficient evidence that government has actively encouraged take-up of the reliefs so that those charities which are entitled to them get the intended benefits. Secondly, HMRC has not collected the data which would enable it to conclude how tax incentives since 2000 have affected donor behavior or if they have increased the value of donations. Changes introduced in April 2000 were intended to encourage more people to give more to charity. HMRC undertook evaluative work but this did not provide assurance that they had resulted in more income for charities. HMRC also faces a serious compliance challenge in respect of reliefs on donations, in particular from avoidance. While the proportion of charities set up to abuse charitable status is very small, the cumulative costs of small-scale avoidance activity are large, accounting for £110 million of tax lost in 2012-13. HMRC has also identified eight marketed avoidance schemes, which it is challenging robustly, estimating that they are putting £217 million of tax at risk. The Department has made a working estimate that £170 million was lost in 2012-13, based on its analysis of tax loss in related areas. However, it recognizes that its methodology is crude and may understate the level of loss
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's systems for recording, scrutinizing and challenging claimed savings at Sellafield, the UK's largest and most hazardous nuclear site, provide moderate assurance of reported overall savings since 2009-10. The original target for site wide savings was £796 million over the initial period of the 'parent body' agreement between Nuclear Management Partners Limited and Sellafield Limited (from 2009 to 2014) at 2012 prices. Based on latest data, the Authority forecasts there will be site-wide savings over the initial period totalling £652 million, compared to the earlier, October 2012, forecast of £825 million. These forecast savings relate to impacts in the initial period and do not include the impacts of savings initiatives on costs in later years. During 2012-13 the Authority removed legacy ponds and silos from the savings target in order to focus these projects on achieving progress on the ground, rather than cost-savings. The Authority tracks savings by comparing the cost of work carried out with the estimated cost of that work in the contract baseline, adjusted to remove savings not attributable to Sellafield Limited's actions. Site-wide measurement and reporting of savings mitigates the risks of efficiency savings being claimed by reallocating costs between cost categories. This report does warn, however, that the exclusion of legacy ponds and silos from the savings target creates new risks to the accuracy of reported savings against that standard. The Authority understands the risks and to mitigate them intends to continue to monitor site-wide savings
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