In America's popular memory of the Spanish-American War, the all-volunteer Rough Riders won the war in spite of ossified civilian and regular army leadership. In this authoritative account, however, military historian Graham A. Cosmas reconstructs the planning and execution of Spanish-American War strategy from the perspective of those with the ultimate responsibility: the president, the secretary of war, the commanding general of the army, and the chief and commanders of the army's various bureaus and corps. Cosmas argues that the traditional view of the war is from the "bottom up" because, while headlines were being made about inadequate supplies, disease, and outdated weapons at ground level, the civilian and military figures at the highest ranks remained virtually silent about how and why they made their decisions. This volume, based on intensive research in documentary materials, including the personal papers of President William McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, as well as the voluminous files of Adjutant General Henry Clark Corbin and the quartermaster general's offices, shows the day-to-day progress of the war as the highest-ranking officials saw it, digested it, and based subsequent decisions on it. Faced with budgetary pressure from Congress, political pressure from the states' National Guard units, and the president's shifting stand on objectives for the war, the army was indeed ill prepared for its sudden mobilization. Cosmas concludes that the army's leadership was forced into a difficult new position in 1898, one in which its own new ideas of management and organization coupled with the broad new scope of national political/military objectives failed to address the actual circumstances of the war. After the initial wartime blunders, however, the army solved enough of its problems to make the campaigns in Puerto Rico and the Philippines run more smoothly, though with less news value. As Cosmas shows, the Spanish-American War was a foretaste of the new century, prompting the formation of a modern staff and command system that would profoundly alter world history. This paperback edition of An Army for Empire incorporates the author's 1994 preface; additional illustrations; and expanded discussion of African American soldiers, the land engagements at San Juan Hill and El Caney, and the period between the August 1898 armistice and Secretary Alger's departure a year later.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war, and as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during crises provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized. Written to complement The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam focuses upon the activities of the Joint Chiefs that were concerned with the conflicts in Indochina and later Vietnam. The nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the sensitivity of the sources used caused the volumes of the series to be written as classified documents. Classification designations in the footnotes are those that appeared in the classified publication. This three-part volume describes JCS activities related to the Vietnam War during the period 1960–1968. Originally, the volume was written as a collaborative effort by members of the Historical Division; each part is being updated and published separately. In the preface, Dr. Graham Cosmas discusses the general nature of the revisions that he made in updating the text. Dr. David Armstrong edited the revised version of Part Three; Ms. Susan Carroll compiled the Index; and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication. The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.
MACV describes the evolution of the command during the period of gradual expansion of the American effort in South Vietnam. From its establishment in 1962 as a small, temporary organization to administer an assistance program, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, grew by late 1967 into a large, permanent headquarters that directed more than half a million American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in a wide range of combat and pacification operations. Graham A. Cosmas tells the story of MACV's development as an organization and of the command's role in making and implementing American national policy in Southeast Asia. The volume treats both national-level decisions and military operations from the perspective of the theater joint commander. It recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why they arrived at their decisions. The volume analyzes the interservice politics of organizing and managing a joint command; MACV's relationship with Pacific Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense; and the evolution of the command's dealings with its South Vietnamese and third-country allies. As an experiment in nation-building, the story of the Military Assistance Command contains many parallels to more recent Army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons.
MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967," is the first of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. It traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from its establishment in February 1962 to the climax of American escalation at the end of 1967. It deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations and supplements detailed studies in the Center of Military History's United States Army in Vietnam series covering combat operations, the advisory effort, and relations with the media. "MACV: The Joint Command" recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why they arrived at their decisions. It analyzes the interservice politics of organizing and managing a joint command; MACV's relationships with Pacific Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense; and the evolution of the command's dealings with its South Vietnamese and third country allies. Perhaps most important, it traces the commander's role in developing and executing U.S. policy in Vietnam, a role that extended beyond military operations to encompass diplomacy and pacification. As an experiment-not entirely successful-in nation building, the story of the Military Assistance Command contains many parallels to more recent Army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons.
CMH Pub 91-6-1. United States Army in Vietnam. Covers the United States buildup in Vietnam from every angle: strategy, operations, tactics, logistics, inter-service relations, personnel policy, diplomacy, civil relations, and the handling of the news media to show how the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) developed and became the linchpin holding the entire American effort in Vietnam together. First published in 2006. Illustrated.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war, and as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during crises provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized. Written to complement The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam focuses upon the activities of the Joint Chiefs that were concerned with the conflicts in Indochina and later Vietnam. The nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the sensitivity of the sources used caused the volumes of the series to be written as classified documents. Classification designations in the footnotes are those that appeared in the classified publication. This three-part volume describes JCS activities related to the Vietnam War during the period 1960–1968. Originally, the volume was written as a collaborative effort by members of the Historical Division; each part is being updated and published separately. In the preface, Dr. Graham Cosmas discusses the general nature of the revisions that he made in updating the text. Dr. David Armstrong edited the revised version of Part Three; Ms. Susan Carroll compiled the Index; and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication. The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.
MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973," is the second of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. It traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from the Communist Tet offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973. It deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations and supplements detailed studies in the Center of Military History's United States Army in Vietnam series covering combat operations, the advisory effort, and relations with the media. "MACV: The Joint Command" recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why the commander arrived at his decisions. Central themes are the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from combat operations, the American effort to prepare South Vietnam's military establishment to take over defense of the country, and the implementation of the Paris peace agreement of 1973. The volume analyzes MACV's relationships with Pacific Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense, as well as the evolution of the command's dealings with its South Vietnamese and third-country allies. Perhaps most important, it traces the commander's role in developing and executing U.S. national policy in Vietnam, a role that extended beyond military operations to encompass diplomacy and pacification. As an experiment-not entirely successful-in nation building, the story of the Military Assistance Command contains many parallels to more recent Army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons.
With FULL COLOR maps and illustrations. CMH 91-7-1. United States Army in Vietnam. 2nd of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. Traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from the Communist Tet offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973. Deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations.
CMH 91-7-1. United States Army in Vietnam. 2nd of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. Traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from the Communist Tet offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973. Deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations.
This publication represents the eighth volume in an operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War. This particular volume details the gradual withdrawal in 1970-1971 of Marine combat forces from South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, as part of an overall American strategy of turning the ground war against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Although written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps, the volume treats the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, and Marines on the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon. There are separate chapters on Marine air, artillery, and logistics. An attempt has been made to place the Marine role in relation to the overall effort.
During the first three decades of the present century, the Marine Corps served as the striking arm of the United States policy of Caribbean intervention. In 1916, Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to protect foreign lives and property and to provide the "muscle" for a United States military government which was trying to bring stability to the troubled island republic. While there, Marines performed a variety of functions not normally assigned to an occupying military force, and they gained experience which helped to provide a pool of combat-trained leaders for future conflicts. This study is based on primary sources contained in the archives and holdings of the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, and the National Archives. In these sources, the record of the Dominican occupation is set forth, often in painstaking details. From research in these records, several themes, common to similar Marine campaigns in neighboring Haiti and in Nicaragua, became apparent. The first of these is the paramount role played by the Marine Corps in establishing and training a native constabulary capable of maintaining order after the Marines withdrew. Secondly, effective tactics for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations emerged from these interventions: for example, the coordinated use of air and ground forces began during these campaigns. The third important theme was the gradual development among Marines stationed in these Latin republics of the concept of what would be called in Vietnam "civic action" -- efforts by the occupying troops to "win the hearts and minds" of the population.
This is the eighth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This particular volume details the gradual withdrawal in 1970-1971 of Marine combat forces from South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, as part of an overall American strategy of turning the ground war against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Marines in this period accomplished a number of difficult tasks. The III Marine Amphibious Force transferred most of its responsibilities in I Corps to the Army XXIV Corps, which became the senior U.S. command in that military region. III MAF continued a full range of military and pacification activities within Quang Nam Province, its remaining area of responsibility. Developing its combat and counterinsurgency techniques to their fullest extent, the force continued to protect the city of Da Nang, root out the enemy guerrillas and infrastructure from the country, and prevent enemy main forces from disrupting pacification. At the same time, its strength steadily diminished as Marine s redeployed in a series of increments until, in April 1971, the III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters itself departed and was replaced for the last month of Marine ground combat by the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. During the redeployments, Marine logisticians successfully withdrew huge quantities of equipment and dismantled installation s or turned them over to the South Vietnamese. Yet this was also a time of troubles for Marines. The strains on the Armed Services of a lengthy, inconclusive war and the social and racial conflicts tormenting American society adversely affected Marine discipline and cohesion, posing complex, intractable problems of leadership and command. Marines departed Vietnam with a sense that they had done their duty, but also that they were leaving behind many problems unsolved and tasks not completed.
From the Preface and Introduction - The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations is the second of three volumes recounting the overseas activities of the U.S. Army Medical Department in World War II. Charles M.Wiltse's volume on the Mediterranean and minor theaters was published in 1963, and a completed manuscript dealing with the war against Japan now exists in the Center of Military History. These volumes deal primarily with the operational and organizational history of Army medicine in the theaters, as distinguished from the clinical volumes published by the Office of the Surgeon General. In each case the combat narrative has been drawn from relevant volumes in the United States Army in World War II series, as well as from the large body of subsequent scholarship. Our aim has been to show how the military medical system organized itself in a combat theater; how medical planning was integrated with logistical and tactical planning; how medical troops were organized, trained and deployed; how hospitals were built and supplies assembled and moved forward; and how casualties were treated and evacuated from the field of battle. Although readily admitting the importance of combat service support forces, military students and historians alike tend to concentrate on combat and combat support units when studying operations, giving only passing attention to the vital work of the logisticians, signalmen, transport troops, and the rest. This is regrettable, for the operations of combat service support units-especially in a global conflict like World War II with its vast distances and varied terrains-have much to teach us about modern warfare, lessons that remain of surpassing importance to our profession. The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations supports the proposition that the experience of medical personnel in war directly stimulates advances in medical science. More importantly, it demonstrates that the organization of health care in the combat zones, including evacuation of the wounded, control of disease among troops and civilian populations, and care of prisoners of war, contributed directly to the Allied victory. The exploits of the doctors, corpsmen, and medical support units provide a model for the planning and organization of medical support in today's Army.
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