In America's popular memory of the Spanish-American War, the all-volunteer Rough Riders won the war in spite of ossified civilian and regular army leadership. In this authoritative account, however, military historian Graham A. Cosmas reconstructs the planning and execution of Spanish-American War strategy from the perspective of those with the ultimate responsibility: the president, the secretary of war, the commanding general of the army, and the chief and commanders of the army's various bureaus and corps. Cosmas argues that the traditional view of the war is from the "bottom up" because, while headlines were being made about inadequate supplies, disease, and outdated weapons at ground level, the civilian and military figures at the highest ranks remained virtually silent about how and why they made their decisions. This volume, based on intensive research in documentary materials, including the personal papers of President William McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, as well as the voluminous files of Adjutant General Henry Clark Corbin and the quartermaster general's offices, shows the day-to-day progress of the war as the highest-ranking officials saw it, digested it, and based subsequent decisions on it. Faced with budgetary pressure from Congress, political pressure from the states' National Guard units, and the president's shifting stand on objectives for the war, the army was indeed ill prepared for its sudden mobilization. Cosmas concludes that the army's leadership was forced into a difficult new position in 1898, one in which its own new ideas of management and organization coupled with the broad new scope of national political/military objectives failed to address the actual circumstances of the war. After the initial wartime blunders, however, the army solved enough of its problems to make the campaigns in Puerto Rico and the Philippines run more smoothly, though with less news value. As Cosmas shows, the Spanish-American War was a foretaste of the new century, prompting the formation of a modern staff and command system that would profoundly alter world history. This paperback edition of An Army for Empire incorporates the author's 1994 preface; additional illustrations; and expanded discussion of African American soldiers, the land engagements at San Juan Hill and El Caney, and the period between the August 1898 armistice and Secretary Alger's departure a year later.
MACV describes the evolution of the command during the period of gradual expansion of the American effort in South Vietnam. From its establishment in 1962 as a small, temporary organization to administer an assistance program, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, grew by late 1967 into a large, permanent headquarters that directed more than half a million American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in a wide range of combat and pacification operations. Graham A. Cosmas tells the story of MACV's development as an organization and of the command's role in making and implementing American national policy in Southeast Asia. The volume treats both national-level decisions and military operations from the perspective of the theater joint commander. It recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why they arrived at their decisions. The volume analyzes the interservice politics of organizing and managing a joint command; MACV's relationship with Pacific Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense; and the evolution of the command's dealings with its South Vietnamese and third-country allies. As an experiment in nation-building, the story of the Military Assistance Command contains many parallels to more recent Army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons.
In this book the record of the Marine occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924 is presented as an example of the active role played by the Marine Corps in the Caribbean region in the first three decades of the 20th Century. It was prepared principally from primary sources such as official reports, memoirs, personal correspondence, and recollection of the Marines involved. Captain Stephen M. Fuller, a Marine reserve officer, served on active duty as an aviation supply officer from 1968 to 1971. Subsequently, he spent three summers with the History and Museums Division, two of them in research and writing of this pamphlet and the third in preparation of a forthcoming pamphlet on Marines in Haiti. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of New Mexico and currently is a candidate for the J. D. Degree at the University of Tulsa College of Law. In addition, he has taught for several years at Northeastern State College in Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The co-author, Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, joined the staff of the History and Museums Division in December 1973 after teaching at the University of Texas and the University of Guam. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Wisconsin and has published several articles on U.S. military history as well as An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war, and as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during crises provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized. Written to complement The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam focuses upon the activities of the Joint Chiefs that were concerned with the conflicts in Indochina and later Vietnam. The nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the sensitivity of the sources used caused the volumes of the series to be written as classified documents. Classification designations in the footnotes are those that appeared in the classified publication. This three-part volume describes JCS activities related to the Vietnam War during the period 1960–1968. Originally, the volume was written as a collaborative effort by members of the Historical Division; each part is being updated and published separately. In the preface, Dr. Graham Cosmas discusses the general nature of the revisions that he made in updating the text. Dr. David Armstrong edited the revised version of Part Three; Ms. Susan Carroll compiled the Index; and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication. The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.
In America's popular memory of the Spanish-American War, the all-volunteer Rough Riders won the war in spite of ossified civilian and regular army leadership. In this authoritative account, however, military historian Graham A. Cosmas reconstructs the planning and execution of Spanish-American War strategy from the perspective of those with the ultimate responsibility: the president, the secretary of war, the commanding general of the army, and the chief and commanders of the army's various bureaus and corps. Cosmas argues that the traditional view of the war is from the "bottom up" because, while headlines were being made about inadequate supplies, disease, and outdated weapons at ground level, the civilian and military figures at the highest ranks remained virtually silent about how and why they made their decisions. This volume, based on intensive research in documentary materials, including the personal papers of President William McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, as well as the voluminous files of Adjutant General Henry Clark Corbin and the quartermaster general's offices, shows the day-to-day progress of the war as the highest-ranking officials saw it, digested it, and based subsequent decisions on it. Faced with budgetary pressure from Congress, political pressure from the states' National Guard units, and the president's shifting stand on objectives for the war, the army was indeed ill prepared for its sudden mobilization. Cosmas concludes that the army's leadership was forced into a difficult new position in 1898, one in which its own new ideas of management and organization coupled with the broad new scope of national political/military objectives failed to address the actual circumstances of the war. After the initial wartime blunders, however, the army solved enough of its problems to make the campaigns in Puerto Rico and the Philippines run more smoothly, though with less news value. As Cosmas shows, the Spanish-American War was a foretaste of the new century, prompting the formation of a modern staff and command system that would profoundly alter world history. This paperback edition of An Army for Empire incorporates the author's 1994 preface; additional illustrations; and expanded discussion of African American soldiers, the land engagements at San Juan Hill and El Caney, and the period between the August 1898 armistice and Secretary Alger's departure a year later.
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